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ABSTRACT 
Government accountability is one of the key issues often raised in 
debates about governance in young democracies such as South Africa. 
Comparing two provincial governments in South Africa as case 
studies, this thesis explores accountability between provincial 
government and its various stakeholders. There is a wide literature 
on government accountability however this literature is limited on 
South African public sector accountability, either from the 
perspective of what it means or how it is attained. In recent years 
provincial government stakeholders, including citizens, the 
legislatures, accountability institutions and others have 
complained about weaknesses and lack of government accountability 
and efficient performance. The effectiveness of recent mechanisms 
such as Batho Pele, as a way to consult citizens and therefore to 
enhance provincial government accountability and performance, has 
also been questioned by stakeholders including government 
departments expected to implement.  
 
In the thesis, the PATIGAHAR accountability analysis framework is 
developed from the basic building blocks of the principal-agent 
model and the accountability literature, in particular Ashworth and 
Skelcher (2005) four dimensional approach. The PATIGAHAR analytical 
approach is used to analyse accountability in the two provincial 
governments, from both the principal and agent perspectives. The 
following four themes are used to analyse accountability: taking 
into account, giving an account, holding to account and redress. 
Interviews were held with various stakeholders, from government 
executives to accountability institutions and members of the 
legislature, and published reports on provincial government 
accountability were also analysed against the criteria of the 
PATIGAHAR model, to allow comparisons of performance accountability 
to be made between the two provinces. The interpretations of 
different stakeholders in relation to the current accountability 
framework and its effectiveness were shown to be dependent on 
whether the respondent played the role of principal or agent.  
 
Accountability is weakened by lack of specific measures of 
provincial citizens’ accountability. Poor implementation of Batho 
Pele further hampers government efforts to involve citizens as part 
of its accountability approach. The role of the legislature in 
government accountability needs to be improved and made specific 
for the benefits of all stakeholders.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1. Introduction 
Accountability is a frequently recurring concept mentioned and 
discussed in many societies. Government accountability has also been 
in the headlines in many countries throughout the world. The 
understanding and meaning of exactly what government accountability 
is has been debated by academics for many centuries. As a result, 
according to many public sector stakeholders and academics, it is 
not always easy to determine whether government accountability is 
achieved. This thesis explores government performance 
accountability in two of nine provincial governments in South 
Africa. In this study I explore what accountability means, whether 
it has been achieved by the relevant government institutions, and 
how we can learn from other practitioners in the domain of 
accountability. The North West and Gauteng provinces are used as 
case studies in this thesis, to explore these issues, by formulating 
them as a set of research objective and questions, as detailed later 
in this chapter.  
 
1.2. Motivation for the study 
In my working experience as a government accountability practitioner 
in South Africa, I came across various concerns and complaints from 
different stakeholders about the lack of government accountability. 
Many citizens in the country have taken to the streets through riots 
and other protest forms, reflecting the lack of government 
accountability and public services in the country (Jain, 2010). 
There have also been concerns from political parties that are not 
in the current administration criticising the government on the lack 
of accountability and poor performance in the various provinces. 
Some of the existing accountability institutions like the Office of 
the Auditor General and Public Service Commission have also raised 
concerns about the need to improve accountability by relevant 
government institutions(Clark, 2013).  
 
Despite concerns from various stakeholders, the government maintains 
that they have been accountable as expected by the legislation. This 
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thesis is motivated by concerns about governments’ accountability 
raised by various stakeholders and some government executives that 
accountability principles are being appropriately implemented. My 
professional experience within various government institutions in 
South Africa as an accountability practitioner has also influenced 
the initiation of this research.  
 
1.3. Relevance of the study 
South Africa as a country has in recent years joined other countries 
in trying to be exemplary in displaying good governance. 
Organisations such as the Open Government Partnership saw the South 
African government committing itself to enhancing accountability 
amongst other objectives by joining this organisation 
(OpenGovernmentPartnership, 2013). The South African government 
treasury and other national government institutions have also 
introduced various mechanisms to enhance accountability and 
government performances. This thesis seeks to also explore their 
(the provincial governments) adherence to various accountability 
frameworks. Legislation like the Constitutions of 1996, the Public 
Finance Management Act and Batho Pele are some of the mechanisms 
introduced by government to enhance government accountability and 
will be analysed throughout this thesis. 
 
1.4. Reflecting on the thesis objective  
In exploring provincial government accountability in this thesis I 
provided a proposed approach by building upon Ashworth and Skelcher 
(2005) four dimensional accountability approach of, taking into 
account, giving an account, holding to account and redress, further 
create the PATIGAHAR accountability analytical model. In the 
PATIGAHAR model the account giver and receiver are classified into 
agent and principal respectively. The classifications make use of 
the principal-agent model. The classification of principal and agent 
is represented by ‘PA’ where an analysis of accountability is based 
on both the agent and principal’s perspectives. Accountability is 
further analysed using themes of ‘taking into account’ (TI), ‘giving 
an account’ (GA), ‘holding into account’ (HA) and ‘redress’ (R).  
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The South African government initiative to improve the citizens’ 
participation and accountability model called Batho Pele is also 
used to analyse accountability. In the context of this thesis, both 
the agent (government departments’ representatives) and the 
principal (legislatures and accountability institutions) agree to 
the notion of having the accountability relationship between them. 
There is currently an accountability framework described through 
legislations between South African provincial governments and 
various stakeholders according to views of both the agent and 
principals. But this thesis explores whether and how the current 
provincial government accountability framework could be improved by 
clarifying the roles through policies and legislation of both 
account giver (departments executives) and receiver (legislatures 
and accountability institutions) with regards to taking views into 
account and holding the account giver to account.  
 
The thesis concludes on the provincial citizens’ participation in 
their government and receiving account is the main accountability 
weakness in both the North West (NW) and Gauteng province (GP). The 
evident lack of comprehensive implementation of the Batho Pele model 
which was initialised and implemented to support accountability in 
most government departments perpetuates weaknesses in 
accountability to citizens.          
 
1.5. Chapter outline  
In Chapter Two the conceptual and theoretical framework of 
performance accountability is explained in the context of the 
objective and questions set out in the thesis. The historical 
background of accountability in relation to governance is also 
presented in this chapter. Various approaches to government 
accountability are analysed in relation to the thesis objective. 
The literature on the principal-agent model and alternative models 
are analysed on how they relate to this thesis. PATIGAHAR 
accountability analytical approach based on Ashworth and Skelcher’s 
(2005) and the principal-agent model is introduced and modified in 
the thesis to support achieving the research objective and 
questions.  
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The Research methods and design approach of the thesis are presented 
in Chapter Three of the overall thesis. This chapter details the 
research approaches and strategies implemented to conduct the 
research. The rationale of conducting a comparative study is also 
given in this chapter. The motivation for using qualitative data to 
answer the research questions is also explained in this chapter.  
 
In Chapter Four I present an analysis of performance accountability 
in both provinces based on views collected from provincial 
government departments’ officials and executives. An evaluation of 
the current provincial government accountability is given in chapter 
four for both the North West and Gauteng Provinces. The comparison 
also helps the thesis to have more insight about the country as 
views are raised from different provinces. In this thesis design, 
the perceptions of government executives and other interviewees can 
be more clearly understood when compared to another. Comparative 
views on government accountability by both provincial governments 
are highlighted.  
 
In Chapter Five, provincial government performance accountability 
experiences and views are analysed from the perspectives of the 
accountability institutions in both the NW and the GP provinces. 
The provincial government accountability views and experience raised 
by the national institutions playing the role of accountability 
institutions are also analysed in the chapter. Accountability 
institutions include the Office of the Auditor General, the Public 
Service Commission, the Office of the treasury, the National 
Department of Public Service and Administration, the National 
Ministry of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation and the Office of 
the Premier. Representatives of all these institutions were 
interviewed for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
Chapter Six presents the analysis of the views of provincial 
legislature interviewees on provincial government accountability. 
The analysis is based on responses from interviewees of provincial 
legislatures in both the GP and NW provinces. According to the South 
African constitution, the provincial legislature for every province 
in the country should play an important role with regards to 
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assessing and imposing an accountability measure for provincial 
governments.  
 
Chapter Seven seeks to explore the effect of the Batho Pele 
initiative as an accountability model for both provincial 
governments. Batho Pele was introduced in 1997 by government as a 
model to improve service delivery and accountability in South 
Africa’s public sector. The concept is broken down into eight 
elements. These elements are: consultation with customers, setting 
service standards, access to services, courtesy, information about 
services, openness and transparency, value for money and redress. 
Interviewees’ opinions about their departments’ implementation of 
Batho Pele as an accountability enhancement tool are raised here.  
 
The concept of Batho Pele is not to be seen as a stand-alone but 
integrated into departmental programs by heads of different 
departments as part of government programs. The executives and other 
senior officials from various departments were asked for their views 
to indicate their Batho Pele implementation approach. All of the 
participating interviewees from various accountability institutions 
were asked to share views on Batho Pele, which were also analysed 
in Chapter Seven. There are also published research reports about 
Batho Pele and its impact on departments’ performance that were used 
to substantiate the findings in this chapter.  
 
Chapter Eight presents the summary of key performance accountability 
views and problems in the North West and Gauteng provincial 
governments. The conclusion in responding to the research objective 
and questions is given in this chapter. Recommendations on measures 
to be taken into account by provincial government accountability 
are also given in the chapter. The participants’ comments on the 
thesis recommendations are highlighted here reflecting on their 
thoughts on accountability. The contributions to the theory and 
government policy implication are further presented and finalised 
in this chapter. The analysis of accountability from both the 
principal and agent research participants is given in this chapter. 
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1.6. Research objective and questions 
The objective of the thesis is to analyse the state of the 
performance accountability in the Republic of South African 
government through two case-study provinces: North West and Gauteng 
provinces. Detailed explanations on how the thesis objective and 
questions were developed are provided in detail in section 3.1 in 
Chapter Three. In order to explore the research objective, the 
author seeks to answer the following research questions: 
 
 What are performance accountability arrangements in the North West 
and Gauteng Provinces (in South Africa) and have they improved 
over time? (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8 explores this question)   
 How do the changes in performance accountability measures, such 
as Batho Pele, have an effect on service delivery management? 
(Chapters 7 and 8 explore this question) 
 What are the implications for strengthening policy and practice 
of performance accountability in a South African context of public 
sectors accountability? (Chapters 2 and 8 explore this question)  
14 
 
CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 
GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter set out the conceptual and theoretical framework of 
performance accountability used in this thesis. The literature from 
academic writing and public sector practitioners is used to identify 
and explore analytical perspectives on the concept of public sector 
performance accountability. I develop the PATIGAHAR analytical model 
and the rationale for its use to explore accountability in this 
thesis is explained. The PATIGAHAR model combines the principal -
agent model with the Skelcher and Ashworth (2005) framework for 
analysing accountability.  
The chapter addresses three main objectives:  
 
 To explain the key concepts and theories of performance 
accountability in public administration and show how they are 
adapted and employed in this thesis. 
 To construct a synthesis of key conceptual frameworks for 
understanding accountability in order to provide a structure 
to the empirical research. 
 To show how the PATIGAHAR analytical approach pursued in this 
thesis has been developed from the literature 
 
These objectives provide a structure for reviewing the literature 
in order to deduce an appropriate approach for the thesis and to 
address any ambiguities that might exist in the accountability 
concept. This chapter is divided into four sections: first an 
explanation of the concept of accountability and a brief history of 
accountability is provided. This section leads to an explanation of 
how this thesis conceptualises accountability and, in particular 
government performance accountability. Secondly, the thesis seeks 
to explore approaches to accountability that are based on a 
bilateral model of accountability which sees it as an interrelation 
between two parties where one side is accountable to the other. The 
approach is used to explore government accountability arrangements 
and public service delivery with regard to citizens, legislatures, 
the national government, accountability institutions’ and treasury.  
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In explaining the concept of accountability the principal-agent 
model is examined in detail and it provides an overall framework to 
the analytical perspective used in the thesis. Alternative models 
of the service delivery relationship between the government and the 
citizen are also discussed in this chapter. The principal-agent 
model involves an accountability provider (agent) and an 
accountability receiver (principal). An account is given to the 
principal regarding the initially agreed performance. The principal-
agent model is one of a range of approaches that might be used to 
analyse accountability in an organisation. Other researchers 
consider the concept of accountability from the perspective of a 
contract between the service users and service providers, while 
others would consider accountability in the context of public 
services acquired from the market.  
 
The third section of this chapter looks to explore the use of the 
principal-agent model and other approaches towards understanding 
government performance accountability. In this third section I 
further explore performance accountability within provincial 
governments and in relation to various stakeholders. This section 
also provides the context to understand government performance and 
how it relates to the approach pursued in the thesis. The final 
section of this chapter summarises the approaches used to analyse 
accountability and performance. After reflecting on various 
approaches and perspectives on government accountability a synthesis 
of approaches is then developed to be used to analyse the two South 
African provincial governments that are the case-studies examined; 
namely the North West and Gauteng province. 
 
2.2. Background to accountability research in the government 
sector  
Several authors have suggested approaches to the concept of 
accountability with reference to either the private or the public 
sector. Conceptualising accountability has been an important element 
of public service delivery since the days when monarchs assumed and 
seized the role of governing their countries (Bovens, 2007) 
(Hartslief, 2008). In those times, in a reversal of more recent 
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roles public accountability was demanded by the monarchy (as a 
governing body) from the people; as opposed to citizens demanding 
accountability from the governing body  the monarchy (Dubnick, 
2002). Dubnick (2002) traces the concept of accountability between 
the governing body and the public back to the rule of King William 
I in England after the Norman Conquest in 1066. In his struggle for 
authority, King William I demanded that the property records of all 
his subjects be provided to the monarchy in the ‘Domesday Book’.  
 
The King required his subjects to keep an account of all land, 
buildings and other resources they used. Subjects were also required 
to give regular account to the King or his agents of the use of the 
property. The understanding was that the King owned the land upon 
which his subjects resided. As a result the buildings and other 
assets on the land also belong to the King so his subjects would be 
expected to give an account to him for using his properties. This 
process was known as ‘accounting’ or book-keeping of the realm in 
terms of properties that belong to the King (Bovens, 2007). The 
monarchy was thus holding subjects to account on all listed and 
valued properties. This early history has resonance because practice 
of accountability where citizens were expected to give account to 
their rulers, also existed in South Africa in pre-colonial periods.  
 
There are some rural parts of the country is South Africa that are 
still experiencing the rule of the tribal authority. Hartsleif 
(2008), in his exploration of the concept of ‘Izimbizos’, cited the 
suggestions of South African anthropologists Schapera (1937), Monnig 
(1967) and De-Beer (1986) that pre-colonial rulership  was assumed 
by the Chiefs of different tribes in many parts of the country. The 
land at that time belonged to tribal Chieftains. Only the Chief and 
his delegates could allocate the land and its use to citizens (or 
subjects). Izimbizos, meaning ‘gathering by the Chief’ of the 
citizens, were used by the Chief as forums where accountability was 
required by the Chief from his subjects. During Izimbizos two main 
activities were performed. Subjects gave account for land and other 
resources allocated to them by the Chief, and concerns would also 
be raised by citizens relating to their wellbeing and other “service 
delivery” matters.  
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The Izimbizos process was the framework used by the governing body 
to secure accountability from the citizens. These historical 
governance and accountability experiences in South Africa bear a 
strong resemblance to  zeitgeist that applied  in English 
monarchical rule (Dubnick, 2002, Hartslief, 2008), where citizens 
were expected to give account to Izimbizos Chief. It is clear from 
the discussion in this thesis concerning the accountability approach 
of the monarchy that the principles of accountability evolved from 
early and more limited record keeping; that is, to gain an account 
of performance derived from resources controlled by government. But 
in this thesis the government is seeking an account for resources 
it provides, but it, in turn is required to give an account to the 
electorate which assigns power on resources to the government.  
 
This thesis focuses on accountability relationships managed by 
contemporary South African government organisations, rather than 
looking at previous structures where accountability is given by 
citizens. In the monarchy and tribal rule, accountability 
relationships could be analysed with less difficulty since there 
were few players. In contemporary governments, accountability 
relationships are analysed with more stakeholders playing various 
roles. But more importantly, in the contemporary government, 
accountability is based on performance rather than keeping record 
of resources and it is this part that underpins analysis in this 
thesis.  
 
2.2.1. Contemporary governing and accountability 
There are many countries where the monarchy’s role has been replaced 
by governments elected democratically by citizens. This focusses on 
such democratic society. The accountability relationship has also 
evolved with the shift of responsibilities for public services. The 
land and its resources are seen to belong to citizens and as a 
result accountability is expected from government to citizens. The 
use of the term accounting in relation to accountability has also 
been transformed over time (Harlow, 2002). This shift from ‘record 
keeping’ to a broader public accountability has been sharpened by 
reforms relating to new public management (Hood, 1995).  
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The focus of accountability now has less to do with whether 
properties and other resources are well kept, and instead emphasizes 
accounts that assess what has been achieved with the use of the 
resources delegated by the electorates(Hood, 1995). In this thesis, 
government accountability is explored and analysed in relation to 
expected performance. The provincial governments studied - the North 
West (NW) and Gauteng (GP) provinces – Like all other provinces in 
the country have a constitutional responsibility to provide citizens 
of the province with public services (Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa Act 1996, Chapter 6). Public services are financed 
by taxes levied by government on economic activities ultimately by 
democratic permission of the electorate. All government institutions 
are expected to give an account on the use of public funds, on the 
government process of service delivery and on the results of their 
use of resources.  
 
In Bovens’(2007) classification of accountability relationships, 
the accounts expected from the governments include financial, 
procedural and performance accountabilities. In the classification 
by Bovens(2007) of accountability relationships, these three types 
of accountability require the account giver to account for their 
conduct. Bovens’ (2007)classification of accountability 
relationships is discussed in detail later in this chapter under 
the section on ‘types of accountability relationship’. In Table 2.1 
various accountability relationships based on Boven’s 
analysis(Bovens, 2007). The concept of accountability for results 
or performance accountability from the use of available resources 
is discussed later in the chapter.  
 
2.2.2. New public management and accountability 
Hood (1995) describes the adoption of a private sector-oriented 
management philosophy generally termed “New Public Management” 
(NPM),which became influential during the 1980s particularly in the 
countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) (Gruening, 2001b). During these years many 
OECD countries aimed at shifting government accountability from 
process and the use of finance to results-based accountability. Many 
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of these governments were accustomed to a government accountability 
procedure where the process of government activities and use of 
public finances were of greater importance than results attained 
from resources. Before these general moves towards adopting  NPM, 
the government  accountability approaches were generally based on 
the principles of what has been labelled as ‘progressive public 
administration’ (PPA) by Hood (1995) which other researchers call 
the ‘bureaucratic paradigm’(Lynn Jr, 2006) or ‘traditional public 
administration’ (Lynn Jr, 2001).  
 
Progressive public administration was seen as being ineffective for 
two main reasons of 1) distinguishing public management from private 
management and 2) focusing accountability on government processes, 
led to ‘progressive public administration’ being seen as ineffective 
for public services. The introduction of NPM in public 
administration reversed the progressive management principles which 
commonly informed the thought of OECD governments prior to the 
arrival of discourses on NPM (Hood, 2001). Many governments did not 
want to align management activities with those of the private 
sector, and preferred accountability based on process rather than 
on performance. NPM practices were introduced in the United Kingdom 
during Margaret Thatcher’s administration and in local government 
in the United States in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Gruening, 
2001a). This change supplemented to PPA or traditional public 
administration management practices and brought with it a greater 
use of private sector management practices.  
 
The result was to shift government accountability away from process 
towards a greater focus on results attained. The NPM was argued by 
its supporters to improve productivity and governance in the 
government sector (Demirag et al., 2004). The paradigm shift in 
public administration experienced by many of the OECD countries in 
the 1980’s was not experienced in South Africa’s public 
administration until the end of the twentieth century. The delay 
was attributable to political instability affecting the country 
(Cameron, 2009). South Africa was relatively isolated from global 
trends due to isolation and other prohibitions preventing 
participation in public administration discourse. These sanctions 
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resulted from the refusal of a plea from the political opposition 
parties to the then apartheid government to change the governing 
laws in favour of all citizens. Such change would have overturned a 
system of apartheid which favoured only a small minority. 
International organisations like United Nations and many governments 
put pressure on the apartheid government administration to reform 
its laws (Wines, 1994). Post 1994 government administration has seen 
the introduction of several of NPM strategies.  
 
2.2.3. South African and public administration accountability 
The literature that analyses South African government accountability 
arrangements prior to apartheid is less extensive than those 
analysing accountability arrangements in the current 
administration. Harris (2000) argued that some of the apartheid 
government documents and processes were destroyed prior the end of 
apartheid in the early 90’s. Harris (2000)refers to the elimination 
of policies explaining government processes. There is however 
literature and unpublished data that argues that the apartheid 
government had a parliamentary democracy (South African Exchequer 
and Audit Act, No. 66 of 1975). This view meant that the government 
did not need to be accountable to citizens or any other groups 
except the minority had the right to rule. It is not easy to 
determine whether accountability was achieved and how the exact 
processes were implemented due to the limited literature.  
 
Such arguments may be scarce because they are difficult to set out 
with any academic rigour. The late 1990s saw the introduction of 
government policies (e.g. Public Finance Management Act 29 of 1999) 
by the South African government which were meant to steer public 
administration practices towards being more aligned with their 
global counterparts. In particular, the 1997 White Paper 
‘Transforming public service delivery’ was intended to steer South 
African public administration towards new public management reform 
(Tshandu, 2010). This White Paper is called a ‘White Paper of 
transforming public service’ (Skweyiya, 1997a). The white paper led 
to the introduction of the concept of Batho Pele (people first) 
legislation. This catch-up approach by South African public 
administration has been in place for a number of years now and has 
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produced a mixture of results with the country attempting to achieve 
similar standards to developed countries.  
 
The new public management practices brought hope to many in the 
South African system (Tshandu, 2010). A more detailed analysis of 
literature on accountability and of the different definitions that 
are covered in the thesis is provided at APPENDIX E.  
 
2.3. Modern government accountability 
In this section the concept of performance and accountability in 
public administration is explored and integrated into the approach 
of this thesis. The discussions in this section use terms such as 
government accountability, performance and the principal agent 
model. A clear association between the meanings of these terms as 
they will be used in this thesis is set out in this section.  
 
Understanding of Accountability  
Many researchers argue about the difficulties and ambiguity in 
understanding public sector accountability due to various reasons. 
Some argue that the context in which accountability is assessed 
affect its description and understanding (Day and Klein, 1987), 
(Behn, 2001), (Dubnick, 2002)and (Hale, 2008), so that it cannot be 
understood properly divorced from its environment, others argue that 
accountability has different meanings to various role players such 
as account giver and account receiver. Details of the researchers’ 
views are given in this section. Some of the concerns raised by 
these researchers are also raised in the thesis by interviewees as 
reasons for weaker accountability in government, as analysed in 
chapter four, five and six. But for the thesis I use the principal 
and agent model to navigate within these concerns to understand 
government accountability. 
 
As argued in previous sections, accountability is a popular concept 
in both public and private sector management literature (Bovens et 
al., 2008). Bovens notes; 
 
“As a concept, however, ‘accountability’ is rather elusive. 
It has become a hurrah-word, like ‘learning’, 
‘responsibility’, or ‘solidarity’, to which no one can 
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object. It is one of those evocative political words that 
can be used to patch up a rambling argument, to evoke an 
image of trustworthiness, fidelity, and justice, or to hold 
critics at bay.” 
 
Bovens’ argument is similar to Hale’s (2008) point that 
accountability is described by the context and environment in which 
it is implemented and defined. In addition Hale (2008) suggests  
that: 
 
 ‘Accountability, like art, it is more recognised than 
defined’ 
 
Other authors argue that the concept of accountability is a 
relationship in which there are expectations of ‘giving’ and 
‘receiving’ an account between different bodies or individuals 
(Stapenhurst and O’Brien, 2008). Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2008) view 
accountability as a process of the account giver providing an 
explanation for their action, or lack of action, to the account 
receiver. The action (or lack of it) relates to activities (or 
performance) that would have been agreed between the provider of 
explanations and the person expecting the explanations.  
 
Stapenhurst and O’Brien’s (2008) description of accountability is 
taken into consideration when devising an analytical approach for 
this thesis. In this thesis I explore whether provincial government 
departments give explanations for their actions. It is of interest 
to determine whether the process of government accountability to 
citizens, the legislature, national government, accountability 
institutions involves giving an explanation for actions or lack of 
action. Stapenhurst and O’Brien’s (2008) approach to accountability 
places emphasis on government institutions through their executives 
giving an account on action. In this thesis the process of analysing 
accountability take into account actions taken by those receiving 
account.   
 
Accountability as a process 
The approach taken in this thesis to accountability is that of a 
process where there is an initial understanding between those 
expected to give explanation and those expecting to receive such 
explanations, and further commitments made by both parties to 
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redress accountability. The process involves examining government 
accountability beyond giving explanations on actions and elaborating 
on further actions taken after that accounting. The thesis explores 
government performance accountability to citizens, legislature, 
national government, accountability institutions involved and 
whether there are account giving expectations that initiate a 
process of accountability. There are other approaches to 
accountability on the part of government that were explored before 
the Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2008) approach and can also be found 
in the literature.  
 
According to Behn it is not easy describing accountability as it 
means various things to different people, including cost control 
and, for professionals adhering to ethical standards. But Behn 
argues that accountability in one way or the other is achieved in a 
process. Behn (2001) reflects accountability both from the 
perspective of account ‘holdee’ or from account ‘holder’. Both the 
holder and the holdee may interpret the phenomenon differently. From 
either perspective government accountability is about giving 
explanation for expected actions. In his approach to accountability, 
Behn (2001) argues that interest groups understand the concept 
according to their individual experiences. Such interest groups 
include both those being held to account and those that hold others 
to account.  
 
These experiences are related to the activities of interest groups 
within government institutions: either the experience of being held 
to account through political or administrative accountability or as 
legislature members and citizens demanding accountability. 
According to Behn (2001) the account holdee view of account is as a 
form of punishment by the account holder. The account holdee will 
have a particularly strong experience of this in cases where the 
expected performance is not attained. But from the point of view of 
the accountability holder, accountability will entail expecting 
explanations from the holdee on agreed actions (both directly and 
implication) without necessarily focusing on the punishment for not 
achieving agreed actions. 
 
24 
 
Various roles in government accountability 
Hale (2008) who cites Schedler (1999) in looking at accountability 
from an ‘answerability’ and ‘enforceability’ point of view, argues 
that it is not always clear who is accountable to whom amongst 
different roles within the general framework of government 
accountability. Those being held to account are often not clear on 
what accountability is and what is expected from them. They expect 
those holding them to account, to indicate explicitly what is 
expected of them in terms of accountability. Behn (2001) further 
argues that some of these ambiguities in government accountability 
are due to the continuous reform of roles for public managers and 
politicians in public administration. These reforms are brought into 
public management by different spheres from continuously changing 
political environments, academia and the expectations of public 
institutions from other interest groups.  
 
Hence this thesis attempts to identify and clarify ambiguities in 
government accountability in the context of provincial government. 
Often government institutions argue that they give account as 
expected but from the point of view of the account holder the account 
given appears unsatisfactory. In the thesis, Behn (2001), Hale 
(2008) and Schedler (1999) present arguments on government 
accountability that raise questions about roles played by account 
holdee and holder is explored. Lack of clarity about roles between 
the account holdee and holder in government accountability raises 
concerns as to whether accountability is attained as expected. 
Account holders have various expectations during the government 
accountability process, but in the initial stages of accountability 
such roles between the account holder and holdee are not always 
clarified.  
 
The lack of clarity on roles leads to the conclusion that there is 
no comprehensive accountability by government institutions. There 
has been growing frustration in recent years amongst many citizens 
in South African provinces who complain about the lack of government 
accountability and poor service delivery (Jain, 2010). These 
frustrations are demonstrated through rapid increase in recent years 
of public riots and in some cases reduction in the number of votes 
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for the ruling political party in recent local government elections. 
In responding to citizens’ concerns, government departments’ 
representatives argue that they regularly produce accountability 
reports and make presentations to various accountability receivers. 
Departments further use other accountability methods such Izimbizos 
in order to give account to citizens about performance and the use 
of public finances.  
 
Representatives of government institutions argue that citizens do 
not often make use of the account given to them to engage government 
institutions on specific concerns. As a consequence citizens may 
protest (or riot) about the lack of accountability and poor service 
delivery, even if government institutions have provided accounts of 
progress in improving service delivery through reports and 
presentations. This raises a question about how provincial 
government departments can account for their performance to the 
public. This thesis subsequently explores the mechanisms used by 
provincial government to give account to citizens. Stewart (1992) 
describes government accountability as ‘giving an explanation’ and 
as ‘being held liable’ for a given conduct. Stapenhurst and 
O’Brien’s (2008) description of government accountability in some 
way reflects on earlier views by Stewart (1992).  
 
In earlier paragraphs, we noted that Stapenhurst and O’Brien’s 
(2008) view of accountability is about giving an explanation for 
actions to those expecting the account. But Stapenhurst and 
O’Brien’s (2008) approach and a critical part of Stewart’s (1992) 
approach to accountability, concerns the holding of account of those 
giving account for their actions. It is this question that this 
thesis also explores in relation to provincial government 
accountability. Moreover, Stewart’s (1992) view on government 
accountability portrays accountability as a process of two actors 
engaging with each other on accountability - actor ‘A’ (account 
holdee) giving account to actor ‘B’( account holder). Actor ‘B’ then 
holds the actor ‘A’ liable for not attaining agreed actions 
(performance).  
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In this description both actors ‘A’ and ‘B’ are expected to agree 
on actions (performance) to be undertaken by actor ‘A’. But this 
process of accountability is preceded by an agreement between the 
actor ‘A’ and ‘B’ on actions or activities (performance) about which 
the account would be given. Figure 2.2 illustrates the process of 
describing government accountability as explained by Stewart (1992). 
Both actors agree on how ‘A’ would be held liable by ‘B’ subsequent 
to an account being given. 
 
Figure 2 1 Accountability process by Stewart (1992)  
ACCOUNT HOLDER ACCOUNT HOLDEE
HOLDEE GIVES ACCOUNT ON ACTION
HOLDING HOLDEE TO ACCOUNT ON ACTION
HOLDER AND 
HOLDEE AGREE 
ON ACTION
ACTOR B ACTOR A
Source: Adapted from (Stewart, 1992) 
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2.3.1. Ashworth and Skelcher approach to accountability  
 
Ashworth and Skelcher’s (2005) view on government accountability is 
to split the process into four interdependent and chronological 
dimensions. They argue that each dimension of accountability is 
dependent on the prior element to fulfil the process of 
accountability. The accountability dimensions are ‘taking into 
account’, ‘giving an account’, ‘holding to account’ and ‘redress’ 
(Ashworth and Skelcher, 2005). The four dimensions and their 
relationships are reflected in Figure 2.3. Four dimensions of 
accountability are numbered chronologically based on their order in 
the accountability process. ‘Taking into account’ is the first 
accountability step and it is shown by step‘1’ in the diagram, with 
the others three dimensions shown as ‘2’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ respectively. 
There should at least be two groups engaging with each other for 
this approach to hold: the account holder and the account holdee.  
 
The accountability process describes an initial consensus and an 
understanding between the holder and the holdee on the expectations 
of accountability. Ashworth and Skelcher (2005) use this approach 
in their assessment of local government policies in different 
communities around England. This approach was developed from 
previous work by Ranson and Stewart (1994) in their study of public 
administration. The approach is an extension of the Stewart (1992) 
approach to government accountability. The focus of Ashworth and 
Skelcher’s (2005) government accountability approach is on citizen 
involvement in government activities, and how citizens influence 
the decisions that affect society. Ashworth and Skelcher’s (2005) 
four dimensions of accountability are described below, and relate 
to the investigations which comprise this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 2 Framework for assessing local government accountability 
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Framework for assessing local government accountability
Account Holdee:
Local authority decisions 
and activities
Account Holder:
  Citizens and stakeholders
3
Holding
To
account
2
Giving an 
Account
1
Taking 
Into 
account
4
Redress
Time
    
Source: Adapted from Ashworth and Skelcher  (2005) 
2.3.2. Four accountability themes   
 
‘Taking into account’ relates to the extent to which government 
officials and institutions involve other government stakeholders’ 
in determining government policies and priorities (Ashworth and 
Skelcher, 2005). It is in the initial step of accountability where 
government decisions are influenced by citizens, policy makers, 
legislatures, academia and other interest groups. In assessing 
accountability in government institutions, Ashworth and Skelcher 
(2005) explore the extent to which the inputs of different 
stakeholder groups  are taken into account in government decisions. 
This is particularly relevant to decisions concerning what would 
constitute the performance that is to be pursued. In this dimension 
of accountability, government officials and agencies are expected 
to understand the interests and priorities of different interest 
groups (citizens and others), and how these interests and priorities 
could be represented in government activities.  
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In this thesis, research participants from government and non-
government institutions are asked to indicate whether the planned 
activities, which would constitute performance, are influenced by 
groups other than the management level of institutions. The aim is 
to determine whether the government departments of the South African 
provinces in question, take into account non-governmental interest 
groups views when taking their decisions. It may also be possible 
to determine whether the performance of government departments and 
their other activities are influenced by parties expecting 
accountability, and how these influences are determined. The notion 
of ‘taking into account’ as an initial stage in assessing 
accountability is used in the understanding of accountability in 
the North West and Gauteng provincial governments.  
 
‘Giving an account’ is the second stage of the Ashworth and Skelcher 
(2005) model where government officials, both politically and non-
politically appointed, give explanations for their actions. These 
could be explanations for expected or agreed actions between the 
principal and the agent, and also for actions taken by government 
institutions and agencies that were not agreed upon e.g. additional 
work done by government agencies intended to help enhance government 
performance. Account is given to interest groups in various ways. 
‘Giving an account’ follows the ‘taking into account’ dimension 
because for an account to be given there should have been an 
agreement between account giver and receiver on the activities under 
account. These initial engagements created both tacit and literal 
obligations for the account to be given. ‘Giving an account’ may 
constitute the move towards government transparency about processes 
and activities undertaken during spending periods.  
 
The third dimension of accountability in Ashworth and Skelcher’s 
(2005) model is the ‘holding to account’ of those who have given 
account. This is a process undertaken by those expecting an account 
from government officials. This dimension of accountability is more 
important in cases where the actions expected to be performed by 
government department officials have not been realised, or have been 
delayed. The account concerned in the context of this thesis is 
given to citizens, legislatures, central government, the premier of 
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the province, and other constitutional bodies that may serve to 
enhance good governance in government institutions. It is these 
interest groups which may take action in the light of an account 
being given to them by provincial government departments and other 
government agencies.  
 
Actions to hold government departments to account through 
interaction with the officials who work for them may differ based 
on who is taking the action; for example, citizens may decide not 
to vote for individuals who could not deliver the promised services. 
The fourth dimension, which completes the process of accountability, 
is ‘redressing’ poor performance which may have been experienced by 
government service users and citizens in general. ‘Redress’ concerns 
remedial actions agreed between government institutions in cases 
where the performance of government services provided has not met 
the expected standards (Ashworth and Skelcher, 2005). The notion of 
redress is also connected to how the complaints of citizens and 
other government service users are addressed. Such complaints are 
to be addressed by the government agencies concerned, to the 
satisfaction of the complainant.  
 
All interviewed participants in the thesis are given an opportunity 
to give their thoughts and understanding of accountability and what 
it meant to their own positions and institutions. The South African 
constitution requires that all government departments regularly 
produce financial reports and performance reports, and make them 
publicly available for scrutiny and to inform interested 
stakeholders. This is one form of transparency and accountability 
in regard to government activities, and is associated with the 
second dimension of accountability in Ashworth and Skelcher’ s 
(2005) approach, ‘giving an account’. An account is given by 
government departments (officials) in order to fulfil the concept 
of accountability.  
 
2.3.3. Accountability in public sector: South Africa 
As a measure to transform public administration management according 
to the philosophy of new public management, South African President 
Thabo Mbeki introduced legislation to phase in the NPM practices. 
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Being the actual framework on public sector transformation Batho 
Pele has become one of the mechanisms in government policy framework 
that is leading the transformation agenda for the South African 
public sector. At the heart of Batho Pele is the notion that service 
users are to be given priority. Citizens are to be given all due 
attention when seeking to access government services from delivery 
points, while government officials have to make sure that they 
provide a high standard of service at all times. These are some of 
examples of how Batho Pele is intended to transform government 
institutions by focusing on performance instead of process.   
 
This would in turn improve the standards of services provided by 
the government and its agencies. In this thesis, the ‘redress’ 
dimension of accountability presented by Ashworth and Skelcher 
(2005) is associated with the Batho Pele principle. ‘Redress’ is 
intended to improve the quality of services rendered by government 
and its agencies. The Batho Pele model is discussed in detail in 
chapter seven of this work. In another approach to describing 
accountability, Parker and Gould (1999) quote Roberts and Scapens 
(1985b) in describing government accountability as a process of 
providing explanations for government performance in response to 
citizens demands. This process is followed by actions taken by those 
demanding explanations for non-action by government institutions. 
In this thesis, employees of provincial government departments 
explain the process of accountability in its involvement with the 
legislature, citizens, and other stakeholders. 
 
The process of government accountability is further investigated to 
determine whether, subsequent to the explanation given, there are 
appropriate actions to be followed and by whom the actions are 
commissioned. In cases where actions are not taken, the remedial 
mechanisms that fulfil government accountability are investigated. 
There are other arguments that suggest government accountability 
can be achieved through providing an explanation of action without 
actually commissioning remedial action in the light of non-
performance. However it is difficult to see what function 
accountability for government performance would serve if remedial 
actions against non-performance are not considered. Sinclair (1995) 
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emphasises that the environment in which accountability is described 
could also bring confusion to the meaning of the concept.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the meaning of accountability has 
been determined by how it is being used and understood by individual 
stakeholders. Understanding accountability in relation to how it is 
used is an approach that has the potential to widen the process of 
data collection and analysis in this thesis. This approach is 
important when taking into the consideration that participants’ 
understanding of government accountability is informed by the 
different environments. The existence of differing views in varying 
contexts may also facilitate the identification and analysis of 
accountability descriptions and so extend the literature on 
accountability. In the initial stage of data collection for this 
thesis, subjects are given an opportunity to explore their 
understanding of government accountability. 
 
In order to analyse and explore government accountability in the 
thesis, the performance commitments of provincial government 
departments to various stakeholders (i.e. national government, 
provincial legislatures, provincial citizens, and provincial 
executive council and accountability institutions) is compared 
against their own accounts of policy and action decisions. This is 
performed by asking questions to interviewees about how government 
departments describe and then verify whether they have met their 
commitments to stakeholders. The responses allow an analysis of the 
common ground existing between public managers in their 
understanding of government accountability. Establishing common 
themes from which the perspectives of research subjects are analysed 
helped to limit disparities in the analysis of government 
accountability.  
 
The approach used in drawing out the understanding of the research 
subjects employed appropriate and consistent data collection 
instruments. The instruments further guide the analysis to limit 
any ambiguities in various understandings. This thesis seeks to 
minimize the ambiguities and concerns surrounding government 
accountability raised by researchers like Parker and Gould(1999) 
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and Sinclair (1995) by comparing the views of similar research 
interviewees from two provinces. The data analysis approach is 
underpinned by a comparison of the views of the stakeholders of the 
North West and Gauteng province in regard to accountability in 
public management. 
 
2.4. Principal-agent model and accountability 
2.4.1. Principal-agent model context 
Wood and Waterman(1994) described the principal-agent model, 
introduced in the early 1980’s, as a management framework that makes 
assumption that politically elected officials (principals) have 
incentives to control bureaucracy (agents). According to Clarke 
(Clarke, 2007) the principal-agent model is a framework  used in 
governance and management literature to understand the relationship 
between ‘principal’ and ‘agent’. Principal is the owner of resources 
to be used by the agent to enhance the principal interests. In 
Clarke’s (2007) description of principal-agent model argued that it 
should always be clear who the principal and the agent in the 
relationship. The principal has activities to be done but cannot do 
them himself due to either a lack of skills, knowledge, time or 
other capabilities. On the other hand, the agent has skill, 
knowledge and time to do what the principal cannot do for himself 
(Wood and Waterman, 1994). The principal delegates his 
responsibility to the agent so that the agent can perform them on 
the principal’s behalf(Bovens, 2007).  
 
In the principal-agent model, organisation duties and 
responsibilities are reduced to two roles: the owner who is the 
principal and the manager who is the agent (Daily et al., 2003). 
The owner provides resources and management systems to the manager, 
the latter makes use of resource and management systems to provide 
services and reports to the owner. But the owner further 
incentivises the manager not to deviate from his duties. This 
relationship is often regarded by other researchers as a contract 
between the principal and the agent. Even though the contracts 
between principal and agent are regarded as mechanisms that can be 
used to reduce principal-agent problems, most contracts contain 
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various problems. Problems associated with the principal and agent 
relationship are known to many scholars as ‘the agency problem’ 
(Besley, 2006) – this is discussed in detail late in this chapter 
in section principal-agent model problems. 
 
In this thesis, I do not make use of the full principal-agent model. 
The principal-agent model in the thesis is integrated within the 
PATIGAHAR approach and used as part of the analytical framework to 
understand and conceptualise various accountability relationships. 
The exploration of provincial government performance accountability 
in the thesis is based on the principles of this model, where there 
exists an account holdee who is agent and an account holder who is 
a principal in the accountability relationship. Hughes (2003) 
defines the principal-agent model as an economic theory that seeks 
to explain the ‘divergence’ between the managers and the owners of 
resources. According to Hughes (2003), the ability of the principal-
agent model to explain differences between the agent and principal 
can also lead to the development of appropriate incentives that seek 
to minimise perceived conflicts.  
 
It is these incentives that are meant to influence the agent to 
adopt interests similar to that of the principal when conducting 
activities on their behalf. But in many principal-agent 
relationships the incentives to the agent have not been properly 
thought out and therefore have not reduced agency problems. Summer 
(1991) believes the principal-agent model to be an economical model 
that can be used to analyse the lack of information sharing between 
the principal and agent. The model looks to improve communications 
between the agent and principal though to the advantage of the 
principal. The agent has access to private information otherwise 
unavailable to the principal without the co-operation of the agent. 
The principal-agent model provides a model capable of studying the 
relationship between service users and service provider. The 
services provided to the users are generated with the users’ 
resources.  
 
The service users are defined as principals while the providers 
function as agents. Both the principal and agent have an interest 
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in the services to be provided, although while the principal has 
expectations in regard to the services to be provided, the agent 
may prioritise the serving of his own interests according to Summer 
(1991). The principal and the agent maintain an uneasy relationship; 
agency problems that are similar in both the business sector and 
government sector. Nonetheless, the government sector is exposed to 
more problems than the business sector due to the existence of 
multiple principals, multiple objectives and multiple desired in 
the government sector with potential interests to be served by one 
agent. 
 
Principal-agent model and accountability  
This thesis uses the literature on the principal-agent model to 
explore various ways in which provincial government accountability 
is analysed. For the purposes of this thesis the principal’s views 
on provincial government accountability are analysed in terms of 
the problems of accountability with the agent. Basically the aim is 
to determine whether the agents are expected to receive the mandate 
from the principal and whether account is achieved subsequently. In 
the thesis there are multiple stakeholders considered to be 
principals including citizens, national government, provincial 
legislature and accountability institutions. Provincial government 
is considered to be the agent to give account to these multiple 
principals. Bovens (2007), Stapenhurst and O’Brien (2008), Behn 
(2001) and Stewart (1992) all suggest that accountability should be 
explored from the perspective of an agent and principal.  
 
In this light, for government performance accountability to be 
analysed and studied there should at least be one party (principal) 
demanding or expecting accountability while the other party (agent) 
gives accountability. According to Bovens (2007), in addition to 
giving descriptions of the process of accountability, it is equally 
important to clarify the relationships that create the expectations 
of  accountability using principal-agent model. For accountability 
to be analysed and understood, the relationship needs to be explored 
between institutions (individuals) giving and receiving 
accountability (Roberts and Scapens, 1985a). The clarification of 
relationships amongst ‘individuals’ would seek to answer questions 
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including: to whom is accountability given? Who should give or be 
held to account? Is there a timeframe when these accounts are 
expected? And what does the accountability concern? The principal-
agent model has been used to describe and study relationships 
between equity owners and managers (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
The model describes a relationship between the ‘principal’ and 
‘agent’ with the principal expecting accountability from the agent 
upon his use of allocated resources (Laughlin, 1996). The principal-
agent model was initially introduced by private sector management 
researchers trying to understand the relationship between the 
managers and owners of economic resources. Later in the years the 
principal-agent model was widely adopted within  public sector 
literature (Mayston, 2003), (Hughes, 2003) for similar reasons. The 
model is used to explore accountability problems in government 
between those who are seeking and those who are entitled to that 
accountability (Mayston, 2003). In his study of ‘governance 
problems’ in the public sector Bertelli (2012) uses the principal-
agent model as a framework for understanding accountability 
arrangements. The accountability arrangements thus take place 
between government institutions (seen as ‘agents’) and government 
service users (citizens and others) regarded as ‘principals’.  
 
Principal-agent model problems and public sector 
The principal-agent model may be used to explore the relationship 
between government service users and service providers with both 
recognising that the relationship may at times create unintended 
problems for both the principal and the agent. Some of the common 
problems associated with service delivery described through the 
principal-agent relationship include the incidence of self-serving 
action by the agent when a conflict of interest arises, and 
situations where agents have access to information that the 
principal does not have (also known as asymmetry of information) as 
well as hidden actions or moral hazards (Bertelli, 2012). However 
these problems associated with principal-agent relationships are 
not part of the accountability analysis for this thesis. This is 
due to the fact that the thesis does not look at principal-agent 
theory but uses the model to explore accountability.  
37 
 
 
The aim of the thesis is mainly to analyse and assess the extent of 
accountability between principal and the agent. The popular problem 
that exists in a principal-agent model is, that agent is assumed to 
deviate from the principal’s interest(Bertelli, 2012). The theory 
of the agent deviating from the principal’s intentions has been 
criticised by other scholars; for instance Davis et al (1997) argue 
that that governance in many institutions both private and public 
are influenced by agency theory assumptions. However, Davis et 
al.(1997) argue that it is not always the case that agents pursue 
their own interest. The stewardship theory suggests that managers 
(agents) should be seen as protecting the interests of the 
principals. Davis et al., (1997) suggest that the stewardship theory 
could be explored as an alternative explanation for the relationship 
between managers and equity holders.  
 
The argument is again that managers are not always driven by their 
own interest, as the agency theory suggests, rather relate their 
personal interests to that of the principal (Clarke, 2005). Mayston 
(1993) argues that the principal-agent model is better suited for 
profit-driven organisations while still suggesting the adoption of 
the model by government institutions. Mayston (1993) adds that, 
instead of a profit drive like in the private sector, higher 
performance can be the key driver for the public sector. The 
substitution of performance for profit stems from the view that 
government should be concerned about providing public services 
efficiently. According to Mayston (1993) the use of public finance 
creates an environment for the public and government service 
providers to be the principal and agent respectively.  
 
Having a principal and an agent in a relationship should create an 
expectation of giving and receiving an account. This relationship 
often encourages the principal to incur more expenditure in making 
sure that there is an environment of accountability. 
 
Principal and agent roles in accountability 
In contrast to the use of principal-agent model in government 
institutions, Kassim and Price (2005) bring together research that 
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advocates the use of the principal-agent model together with a clear 
role played by various stakeholders in exploring governance and 
government accountability. In their analysis of the consequences of 
institutional theory for the successful implementation of 
multidimensional performance measurement and management in the 
public sector, Brignall and Modell (2000) argue that it is important 
for different stakeholders to understand their role in the 
principal-agent model. There should be both internal and external 
stakeholders exerting pressure in the organisation to ensure that 
the principal-agent model is effective in governance and 
accountability. 
 
For both the external and internal stakeholders there should be some 
sort of accountability from the organisations. In the thesis, I 
combine the principal-agent model with an adaptation of the 
Skelcher-Ashworth framework for accountability to develop the 
PATIGAHAR analytical model, which includes the classification of 
different respondents into either principal or agent. Respondents 
can either be principal or agent depending on how they are viewed, 
and this selection has been determined in accordance with their 
responses and relations with provincial government departments. The 
views of accountability between the principal and the agent are 
contrasted against each other in the discussion in chapter eight.  
 
2.4.2. Governance issues and principal-agent model   
There are governance and accountability problems that are inherently 
associated with the principal-agent relationship. The asymmetry of 
the information issued and passed between the principal and agent 
arises from the circumstances surrounding the availability of 
information between the principal and the agent. The agent often 
has access to information about activities they should undertake on 
behalf of the principal. Having this privileged information creates 
unease for both principal and agent over whether the agent will use 
information for personal gain. The fact that the agent is being 
mandated by the principal to undertake certain functions and 
activities that the latter cannot do for himself creates the 
opportunity for exploitation according to Bertelli (2012).  
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The principal-agent relationship can also be used to understand the 
relationship and service delivery engagements between agent and 
principal where the principal provides resources and an 
accountability structure to the agent, from whom performance is to 
be delivered according to certain expectations. This meant that 
government managers were expected to manage public institutions 
using private sector philosophies. The key private sector management 
concept adopted is that the expectation of accountability from 
public managers should be based on performance rather than the 
process and inputs. Public managers are then allowed to perform 
activities with minimal interference from the citizens and other 
principals deemed by the NPM system. Just as many problems were 
experienced principals around the management of private equity by 
an agent, similar agency problems mushroomed in the public 
sector(Smith and Otto, 2011).  
 
The problems associated with the principal-agent model had been in 
existence prior to the introduction of the NPM but were quantified 
and contextualised by the new approach. It is important to reflect 
that there are many compelling reasons why the principal would 
rather have the agent providing service on their behalf instead of 
performing the activity themselves. Some motives include, but are 
not limited to: lack of time and resources by the principal; lack 
of skill and knowledge; and problems of co-ordination. Moreover, we 
can also note on the part of the agent that: the agent often has 
expertise in the field of service delivery and is in a better 
organisational position to provide services, and some agents will 
have a proven record in performing the activities in question and 
will have knowledge that is lacking on the part of the principal. 
For these reasons agency problems exist everywhere (Bertelli, 2012). 
 
Information asymmetry and accountability 
Ferris and Graddy (1998) argue that information asymmetry is the 
source of public management problems related to the efficiency of 
public service delivery and accountability. Their argument is that 
public service users, mainly citizens, rely on elected public 
officials to provide efficient services and ensure good governance. 
In this thesis’ context, where provincial government institutions 
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are agents, the public managers who act as their representatives 
are commonly seen as having more knowledge about government 
performance and related activities than the citizens. Various 
stakeholders regarded as principals do not have access to government 
activities and information as much as government institutions have 
access through their representatives. The principals mainly rely on 
reports and information given to them by the agents as 
accountability.  
 
The lack of access to details of provincial government activities 
by citizens and other principals means provincial government is seen 
and treated as an autonomous body from other spheres of government 
and related institutions. But because provincial governments have 
more information about government activities than citizens and other 
principals, there is a risk of the agent (that is government 
institutions) manipulating information about government activities, 
because of information asymmetry. On a different argument, Waterman 
and Meier (1998) argue that the principal-agent model use in public 
sector is often exaggerated with the problem of information 
asymmetry. They argue that the principal agent model could not be 
easily generalised in government sectors due to varying 
relationships between politicians and administrators.  
 
Knott and Miller (2006) argue that the advantage or disadvantage of 
information asymmetry is among the three main problems facing any 
principal in any principal-agent relationship. For the principal-
agent relationship to benefit both the agent and the principal it 
is for the principal to create systems and structure within which 
the agent performs his or her functions. Having government 
departments being accountable at frequent intervals may minimise 
potential asymmetry of information between principal and agent. The 
reduction of costs associated with information asymmetry in the 
principal-agent model is at the heart of this thesis. The thesis 
explores the sharing of information between the provincial 
government, citizens’ provincial legislatures, the treasury, 
accountability institutions and national government as form of 
accountability. Whether these principals regard provincial 
government as an agent in the delivery of public services and 
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accountability is a different argument altogether, but for the 
purpose of this thesis provincial government is considered as agent.  
 
Section 2.5 government performance and accountability in this 
chapter seeks to clarify the classification of agent and principal. 
The principal-agent literature in analysing this information problem 
associated with principal and agent looks into information 
management systems put in place that minimises the lack of 
information from the agent. As part of this thesis, I analyse 
accountability frameworks that are in place to enhance both the 
information from departments and the process of accountability. 
There are other problems associated with the principal-agent model 
like, hidden action and self-serving interests by agents. These 
problems would not form part of the thesis discussions. This is 
attributable to earlier argument that the thesis does not explore 
principal-agent theory relationships but accountability between the 
principal and agent.  
  
2.4.3. Multiple principal and agent relationships  
In other literature it is suggested that the agent’s behaviour in 
the principal-agent model may be affected by lack of clarity 
concerning the principals’ expectation in accountability. Often 
there is more than one principal who is expecting accountability 
from a single agent (Knott and Miller, 2006). Hughes (2003) 
advocates the application of the principal-agent model to the public 
sector, but also argues that it is often difficult to determine who 
is the principal in comparison with the private sector. In the 
public sector there are various interests groups regarded as 
principals but each of them has their own expectations from the 
agent. The existence of multiple principals means that there is a 
proliferation of performance expectations in service delivery and 
accountability. These multiple expectations from various principals 
create uncertainty on the part of the agent (Hughes, 2003). 
 
Public managers as agents are often subject to multiple expectations 
as they mostly serve more than one interest group which can be 
classified as being a principal (Waterman and Meier, 1998). Knott 
and Miller (2006) argue that multiple principals serve incompatible 
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purposes and perpetuate the problem of self-serving agents. Hughes 
(2003) pronounced on multiple principals in the principal-agent 
model three years earlier than Knott and Miller (2006), arguing that 
having multiple principals increases agency problems since 
expectations vary. In summary, agency problems lead to questions 
about whether the agent is adhering to the accountability principles 
as agreed with principal. In other cases, the agent may play the 
principal’s role in the principal-agent model. Here the agent has a 
relationship with both the principal to whom they should be 
accountable and also an agent from which they should receive 
account.  
 
In such circumstances the agent plays a double role and this is 
maintained by the varying nature of the relationship between 
principal and agent. For example, the government may be seen as the 
agent of the legislature, but may also serve as the principal to 
service delivery agencies which are nominally accountability 
government departments. Having multiple principal-agent 
relationships often creates different expectations on the part of 
various agents and principals and can often lead to poor 
accountability from either the agents or the principals. In this 
thesis, through their representatives, provincial government 
departments have a relationship with citizens, provincial 
legislatures, national government, the Premier and accountability 
institutions that expect public services to be subject to good 
governance and accountability.  
 
All these interest groups are classified as principals in the 
context of this thesis. They have interests in provincial government 
accountability and provision of public services to local citizens, 
a fact that is further substantiated by the type of the relationship 
they have with the provincial government. They all expect a certain 
level of accountability from the provincial government. Some of the 
principals would complain about the provincial government following 
performance mandates that are not agreed with their principals. This 
is attributable to lack of clarity on expected performance in 
various areas of service delivery, and may reflect a tendency for 
the employees to pursue choices as agents who best reflect their 
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own interest amongst the competing demands of multiple principals. 
In the South African provincial government context, whether the 
provision of services is outsourced or provided in partnership with 
external agencies, accountability is expected from the provincial 
government departments.  
 
The chances of multiple principal-agent relationships are minimised 
by having one accounting officer in every provincial government 
department (Public finance management Act no. 01 of 1999, Chapter 
5). But some of the principals in this thesis also play the role of 
the agent; the Office of the Auditor-General (AG) is appointed by 
Parliament to demand an account from the provincial government. In 
his relationship with provincial government, the AG is seen as the 
principal but he may also be an agent to Parliament. Since this 
thesis focuses on performance accountability where provincial 
government is agent with various stakeholders as principals, the 
existence of multiple principal- agent relationships is also 
explored with both the agent (provincial government) and the 
principals (AG, PSC, Provincial legislature, accountability 
institutions and others). 
 
2.4.4. Alternative approaches to principal-agent model 
There are other governance theories that are often used to 
understand accountability and the extent of governance in private 
and public management. These other governance theories are: 
managerial hegemony, stakeholder theory and resource dependency 
theory (Clarke, 2008). However these governance theories are not 
considered in detail in the accountability approach of this thesis 
as they are not comprehensively representing the research 
objectives. Stewardship theory is the main alternative approach used 
to understand and explore public service delivery and government 
accountability. Davis et al. (1997) suggest that the stewardship 
model could be used to study the accountability relationship between 
citizens as service users and government institutions as service 
providers.  
 
Unlike the principal-agent model which assumes conflict of interests 
between agents and principals, in the stewardship model public 
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managers are seen to be concerned with the wellbeing of the service 
users to whom they are accountable (Daily et al., 2003). The 
stewardship model is often criticised by advocates of the principal-
agent model who argue that, as agents, service providers are often 
distracted by personal interests while providing services to the 
users, and that this adversely affects accountability, regardless 
of whether it involves stewards or the agent(Daily et al., 2003). 
But Kao (2007) argues that the steward is often seen as the extension 
to the principal, in that the steward position enables the steward 
to make decisions on behalf of the principal without consulting the 
principal. The decisions taken by the steward on behalf of the 
principal are binding for both of them, with accountability expected 
from the steward.  
 
The stewardship model focuses on the importance, on the agent’s 
part, of fulfilling the expectations of public services for citizens 
and other service users by government departments as stewards. Daily 
et al. (2003) argues that the stewardship model does not make agents 
as selfish as the principal-agent-model seems to suggest of agents. 
They argue that, in stewardship model, the agent makes decisions 
that take into account both the principal’s interests and their own 
interests if pursuing a personal agenda. The attainment of service 
delivery mandated by the citizens satisfies the stewards’ 
responsibility. Davis et al. (1997) further argue that agents have 
interests that are congruent with those of their principals. 
Stewards are encouraged to behave in a manner that will ensure that 
the interests of the principal are addressed by acting in the 
citizens’ interest (Davis et al., 1997).  
 
The steward in this regard has motives other than personal goals, 
allowing them to fulfil the principal’s expectations (Kao, 2007). 
The principal also expects the steward to act with courtesy on his 
behalf at all times. As a result, the principal minimises his 
accountability expectations (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Being 
relaxed about accountability would not necessarily mean that the 
steward is not accountable to the principal for actions taken to 
achieve a mandate (Kao, 2007). Day and Klein (1987) explain that: 
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“Government is seen as the management of an estate, where 
the task of running the affairs is delegated to stewards 
who are required to answer for the way in which they have 
exercised their responsibilities”.   
Ranson and Stewart (1994) have emphasised the importance of 
accountability in public management, acting “in the culture of 
stewardship”. Ranson and Stewart (1994) support the notion that some 
of the actions or decisions taken by public management cannot always 
acquire the permission of the public (principal) due to the 
difficulty of applying a process for  attaining consent. The lack 
of permission on the part of the principal further increases the 
need for stewards to apply the imperative of public interest to make 
choices and decisions on behalf of the public. In this context 
public managers are seen as stewards rather than agents of the 
principals. 
 
Principal-agency instead of stewardship theory 
One of the fundamental similarities between the principal-agent 
model and stewardship model is that they both focus on making use 
of the principal’s allocated resources to pursue the interests of 
the principal (Podrug and Tipuric, 2008). The literature around the 
stewardship model raises arguments about whether the principal-agent 
model can be used as a fair analysis approach for management and 
governance philosophy. Stewardship literature disputes that the 
steward is opportunistic, as argued in principal-agent model, 
depicting the steward as instead being concerned with the principals 
interests (Kao, 2007). Clarke (2005) has summarised the differences 
between principal-agent model and stewardship model with regard to 
motivation (intrinsic and extrinsic), identification (low value 
commitment and high value commitment), use of power (institution 
and personal), behaviour (self-serving and collective-serving), and 
management style (control-oriented and involvement-oriented).  
 
The conclusion of Clarke’s study is that stewards are more committed 
than agents to serving the interest of principals, yet the stewards 
are less controlled by the principal than is the case for agents. 
Ghosh and Harjoto (2011) also suggest that it is not always the case 
that managers are opportunistic but are more likely to become 
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motivated by attaining the objectives of their principals. In 
addressing public services, stewards make use of their own judgement 
with limited engagement with citizens as service users. These 
characteristics commonly distinguish both the principal-agent and 
stewardship models. Dicke (2002) distinguishes the stewardship model 
from the principal agent model in two ways: firstly, that stewards 
are more concerned with providing public services to the citizens 
than self- interested agents; secondly, that stewards are motivated 
by non-monetary values, such as a sense of fulfilment from 
conducting their duties, unlike agents who expect economic benefits 
for carrying out their mandates.  
 
The notion, that seeks to distinguish stewards from agents, led me 
to the decision not to use the stewardship theory as my approach 
for analysing governance and accountability in this thesis. The 
accountability analysis of this thesis would otherwise be limited 
by the notion associated to stewardship theory that the principal 
may not find it necessary to give views to be taken into account by 
the stewards. Stewardship theorists suggest that the opportunism 
that underpins the principal-agent model should not be a factor in 
any analysis of governance. The South African constitution was 
developed within the premise of principal-agent model where 
government institutions are expected to have accountability 
relationship with various stakeholders. The accountability 
relationship includes various stakeholders’ views being taken into 
consideration by government and obligation of giving account by the 
latter.  
 
2. 5. Government performance and accountability  
The accountability literature reveals several differing views about 
government performance and accountability. This section describes 
and analyses them and outlines the concept of government performance 
used in this thesis. Government performance is analysed using the 
NPM approach and making a comparison with other public management 
beliefs. The meaning of government performance is hence explored 
together with how it relates to accountability. It is almost 
impossible to talk about government performance without locating 
the concept within the philosophy of NPM (Hood, 2001). Academics 
47 
 
and professional managers studying literature about government 
administration seem to regard performance as having various degrees 
of focus in NPM philosophies (Moynihan, 2009). The phenomenon of 
NPM was initially discussed and introduced in the 1980s by different 
academics, public management professionals and governments of 
developed countries (Moynihan and Pandey, 2006). 
 
These discussions initially centred on enhancing government 
accountability, and increasing efficiency and efficacy in government 
public service provision. Previous approaches in public management 
were seen as not focusing government practices on outcomes achieved 
or expected (Hood, 1995). It was thought that NPM would revitalise 
public managers’ practice and result in the provision of government 
services superior than those resulting from the former approach that 
focused on government process. NPM was seen as a process of reforming 
public administration by focusing government accountability on 
outcomes or results. Accordingly as covered in section 2.2 
Background to accountability, the philosophy of NPM is aligned with 
the administration approach used in the private sector. According 
to many academics, NPM relates to a system of reform wherein 
government performance and accountability are operationalised 
(Hood, 2005).  
 
The current debate about NPM occurred as a result of the 
deterioration of the applied government service delivery model and 
the contract between government management and private sector 
management. According to the progressive public administration (PPA)  
approach, separating the government approach to doing business from 
that of private corporations and focusing on process accountability 
as opposed to a focus on results is more relevant for successful 
public management. The principles of PPA are seen by those who 
advocate NPM as weakening accountability (Moynihan, 2009). In NPM, 
government performance management mirrors the private sector rather 
than being differentiated from it. The government management 
approach is to adopt the private sector’s efficiency-related 
approach. The other characteristic emphasised by NPM, one that seeks 
to distinguish it from ‘PPA’, is that government managers are 
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expected to be allowed to manage and are accountable for their 
expected results, not the process by which the results are achieved.  
 
This is distinguished from the PPA approach of measuring government 
performance, which focuses on the process that is in place as opposed 
to the expected results (Moe, 1984). It is the expected results of 
government performance that this thesis seeks to explore in its 
discussion of accountability. The first step is thus to define 
‘performance’. Despite NPM being seen as model that enhances 
government performance and accountability there have been critics 
of the model. Ferris and Graddy (1998) caution against taking 
private sector models like NPM and using them to resolve public 
sector problems. They argue that private sector problems are not 
similar to those of the public sector and hence caution against 
implementing NPM and expecting results similar to those achieved in 
the private sector. 
 
In simple terms, what is performance? 
In the field of human resource management, Kane (1996) reviewed 
indices that seek to articulate ‘the effectiveness of performance’ 
in human resource management and captured some important dimensions 
of performance. Kane (1996) perceives performance as a record of 
results attained by pursuing various targets over a period of time. 
He suggests defining performance according to three characteristics: 
the existence of a record, the definition of targets that are to be 
pursued, and a period specified to measure performance. These three 
premises determine whether performance has been effective. In 
relation to government activities, officials are expected to have 
plans of targets that are to be attained over given periods of time. 
Giving feedback on whether these targets have been attained would 
give meaning to government performance based on Kane’s approach. In 
earlier years, before Kane’s research on performance, Brumback 
(1988) conducted a study defining human performance in relation to 
results achieved.  
 
In this study Brumback (1988) argues that performance has less to 
do with results and more to do with an individual’s behaviour. 
According to Brumback (1988) results are beyond the control of the 
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performer so the focus should instead be placed on their behaviour. 
Brumback (1988) further argues that it is the performer’s behaviour 
at a given point that determines whether she has performed well. 
Brumback (1988) gave an example of a car salesperson and a customer 
at a dealership. Here the customer often appreciates the 
salesperson’s courteous and informed behaviour, even though the 
salesperson cannot indicate at the point of sale what the results 
of the customer’s choice would be i.e. whether the car would last 
its promised lifespan. This is not a popular understanding of the 
phrase ‘performance’ in the modern world perhaps because it is 
related to PPA as opposed to NPM.  
 
Government performance is certainly regarded as that which has been 
achieved by public institutions on behalf of its citizens, which 
includes looking at the quality of public services provided by 
government institutions. The terms ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are the 
key determinant of performance here, being that it is impossible to 
make accountability meaningful unless an additional positive or 
negative reflection on the success or failure of results are taken 
into account  in service delivery performance.  
 
Figure 2 3Analysis of how to determine performance  
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Source: Adapted from Brumback (1988) 
 
There are other perspectives on performance that view performance 
in terms of using a process of determining the target outcomes and 
process of achieving them. What is important here is the extent to 
which government performance is evaluated in terms of how the 
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planned activities were realised with additional indications given 
about what has not been achieved. The meaning of performance is 
associated with public services that citizens and other users have 
been promised by government institutions and so taken to be the 
agreed targets. At regular intervals (quarterly, yearly or half-
yearly) government institutions may consult their citizens and allow 
them to indicate whether the results intended were attained and at 
what standard of performance.  
 
The approach to performance by Kane (1996) has formed the basis for 
my conceptualization of government performance in this thesis. I 
operationalize the concept of government performance as the 
perception by public managers and other stakeholders of the record 
of targets achieved in relation to targets that were originally 
envisaged. Perceived government performance is therefore a 
comparison between results and performance commitments made by 
public institutions and other state officials. Performance 
commitments are made on different government platforms including 
plans that are given to various stakeholders. Most importantly, many 
of the performance commitments of state institutions are declared 
to funders and citizens through a process created by these same 
government institutions.  
 
The process could take place via elections manifestos, performance 
plans, spending forecasts, public service level agreements or other 
government communications. In this research, all research 
interviewees are asked to give their understanding of government 
performance and to give their experiences related to it. Research 
interviewees are allowed to give their views in order to make sure 
that a comparison became possible between research interviewees, so 
determining whether they share the same meaning of government 
performance. Common views and definitions of government performance 
emerged based on the interviewees’ range of perspectives. 
 
2.6. Integrated theoretical framework- Roadmap for the 
thesis 
In this section, I will present and discuss the theoretical 
framework that I also take to be a road map for the entire thesis; 
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that which this thesis uses to explore performance accountability 
in the South African provincial government. I have demonstrated that 
there is a variety of literature on government accountability and 
performance. I have further been able to realise the potential of 
integrating the economic model of understanding governance and the 
relationship between the agent and  the principal (principal-agent 
model) with Ashworth and Skelcher’s (2005) four-dimensional model 
of  government accountability. This has led to formulation of the 
PATIGAHAR analytical model used to explore accountability in the 
thesis. 
 
The PATIGAHAR analytical model– provides me with a strategy to 
address my research objective and questions. In this thesis the 
performance accountability relationship between provincial 
government departments and various stakeholders – such as citizens, 
provincial legislature, national government - accountability 
institutions is explored using the PATIGAHAR model as an analytical 
framework. This PATIGAHAR analytical model makes more specific the 
very generic principal-agent model by grafting on four dimensions 
of accountability developed by Ashworth and Skelcher (2005), as 
further developed and adapted in this thesis. This reduces the 
ambiguity of the generic principal-agent model and gives a clear 
analytical framework for the thesis.  
 
Figure 2.4 demonstrates how this thesis conceptualizes government 
performance accountability for both the North West and Gauteng 
provinces. The diagram illustrates the types of government 
accountability relationships that the thesis is exploring: 
performance accountability; financial accountability; political 
accountability; and partly-administrative and social 
accountability. This range of accountability types were selected 
from the list of accountability relationships described by Bovens 
(2007) and listed in Table E.1 of APPENDIX E. The aim of the 
integrated framework is to keep the thesis objectives as clear as 
possible. This study seeks to explore performance accountability 
within provincial government. The main questions of this thesis are 
detailed in Chapter One.  
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The integrated framework aimed at giving a rationale to the 
literature reviewed in addressing the afore-mentioned objectives. 
In Figure 2.4 the accountability assessment framework pursued in 
this thesis is illustrated with specific instruments that are used 
to analyse provincial government accountability. The principal-
agent model, with its lists of principals and agents, is integrated 
into the Ashworth and Skelcher accountability framework it is these 
accountability measures that helped me to analyse provincial 
government accountability.   
Figure 2 4Integrated theoretical framework diagram: roadmap  
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PRINCIPAL:
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legislature
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government
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Sources: Created by the author 
2.7. Conclusion 
As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, both conceptual 
frameworks of accountability and approaches to government 
performance and accountability are reviewed in this chapter with 
the choice of the government accountability model explained. This 
section summarises the association between the research questions 
and selected research analytical approaches. An analysis of the 
historical origins of accountability examined the similarities in 
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the manner in which it was considered and applied in the periods of 
history where the monarchy played the role that is now delegated to 
modern government institutions. I explained the difference between 
the origin of accountability and its modern form, and gave an account 
of what is now expected from governments as opposed to what used to 
be expected from citizens.  
 
This thesis provides an important underpinning of the concept, as 
performance accountability in modern governments is generally viewed 
in terms of governments going to the citizens to engage them without 
any question of the contrary occurring. In summary, the key 
similarities are that accountability has always been associated with 
giving account of one’s action to other parties of interest. In the 
case of government accountability, NPM philosophies advocate that 
accountability should be clear at an initial stage, either tacitly 
or in writing in relation to the performance expected to be accounted 
(Hood, 1995). In many countries, modern public administration 
governments are expected to be accountable for their performance to 
citizens, the legislature and other interests group. 
 
This chapter has illustrated the differences in the way government 
accountability is viewed by various researchers and accountability 
practitioners. Nevertheless, it has shown common ground in regarding 
accountability as a process whereby explanations are given for 
actions or lack of actions between the state and public service 
users. The explanations given are based on agreed and expected 
actions by citizens and other stakeholders. Government 
accountability is also expected by government programme funders, 
legislatures, and accountability institutions. The analysis of 
different views of accountability has led to the identification of 
the approach used in this thesis to explore provincial government 
performance accountability. I seek first to understand what 
provincial government performance accountability arrangements have 
been put in place.  
 
The desire to explore provincial government accountability is 
inspired by many complaints from citizens across the Republic of 
South Africa about the lack of accountability and a failure to 
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improve public service. South African citizens around the country 
have, in recent years, turned to protest and riot against provincial 
governments attributing the demonstrations to poor public services 
and a lack of accountability (Wyk, 2009). Citizens’ grievances are 
centred on the lack of adequate public services provided by 
provincial government departments, reinforced by the problem that 
public institutions do not have measures to communicate with 
citizens about government services (Jain, 2010). In trying to 
understand these research questions an approach has been developed 
that encompasses how performance of government services was 
assessed, how these public services were provided and how citizens 
and their representatives are informed about government 
performances.  
 
An integrated approach was necessary to include process 
accountability. The principal-agent model is amongst tools used by 
various management academics and practitioners to understand the 
relationship between equity owners and the managers of equity 
(Bertelli, 2012). The principal-agent model promotes continuous 
engagement between principal and agent, forming the mainstay for 
accountability. There are various accountability approaches that 
explore the principal agent relations in the literature. In the 
thesis, the principal-agent model is integrated with Ashworth and 
Skelcher’s (2005) four dimensional accountability approach to create 
a lens from which to explore performance accountability in  the 
South African provincial government.  
 
The integration of principal agent model and Ashworth and Skelcher’s 
approach led to the creation of the PATIGAHAR accountability 
analysis model used in this thesis. In order to construct an 
effective approach to analysing provincial government 
accountability, I first looked at how provincial government 
departments’ decisions are influenced by various interest groups, 
prior to an account being demanded. This approach enables me to look 
at government accountability according to the expectations created 
between provincial government and citizens, legislatures, treasury, 
national government and accountability institutions. It also enables 
me to determine whether the accountability expectations are met. My 
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analysis has further explored arrangements for giving an account, 
and arrangements to mitigate either the lack of, or the weakness in 
government accountability.  
 
The four stage process of accountability by Ashworth and Skelcher 
(2005) is widely used by different academics and public management 
practitioners in its separate components but this thesis emphasises 
the use of all four stages of accountability to analyse the 
relationship between the principal and agent within the provincial 
governments in question. Basically I integrated principal-agent 
model into Ashworth and Skelcher (2005)approach to analyse and 
explore provincial government accountability. In this thesis, 
finance accountability is explored as part of performance 
accountability and further considered in relation to the research 
questions posed during analysis and within the conclusions of the 
thesis. The South African public sector entered the public discourse 
surrounding NPM in the late 1990s and hoped to rapidly catch up with 
their peers.  
 
The late introduction of NPM is attributable to the transformation 
of the public sector the early 1990s from pre-apartheid government 
administration to a democratically-elected administration. The 
post-apartheid government administration brought in measures to 
ensure legislation, policies and directives reflecting a drive to 
improve its accountability to interest groups. Batho Pele is one 
such measure that was seen as pioneering in enhancing public service 
and promoting accountability by government to citizens. The 
implementation of this measure is further explored in Chapter Seven. 
The introduction of these measures was clearly inspired by 
reflection on the pre-apartheid government administration practices 
which were criticised for lacking greater accountability (Harris, 
2000). This further created wider public debates on government 
accountability in the nine provinces of the Republic of South 
African.  
 
Following chapter 
Chapter three presents the research methods and designs that were 
used in this thesis. It maps out the research strategies that I have 
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used both to collect and analyse the data used in this study. The 
rationale for conducting a comparative study is also given in this 
chapter. The motivation for using text data to answer the research 
questions are also be explained in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH APPROACH AND DESIGN 
3.1. Introduction  
In this chapter, I explain the research design and methods adopted 
in this thesis. I discuss my approach to data collection and analysis 
and how they were informed by the literature. This chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first section explores the rationale behind 
the objective of the thesis and the research questions posed. The 
second section explores the data collection strategy employed and 
its rationale, while the third section concerns the approach which 
is used to analyse both the data collected and the conclusions of 
literature on data analysis. Every research study should have a 
purpose. Strauss and Corbin (1998) explain that the research purpose 
should be supported by the research proposed and clarify a definite 
problem which the research attempts to study. The purpose of doing 
a research study may be presented first through the title.  
 
In more detail the researcher can make use of questions that seek 
to extend the title with more details on what he intends discovering. 
The research questions and objectives are used to help direct the 
background, data collection and analysis in the research study. Here 
the thesis objective and the specific questions around it are 
constructed as a result of consideration of both the literature on 
accountability and the evidence around the practical implementation 
of accountability in the South African provincial government sector. 
 
Research objective  
This thesis analyses the effect of changes and reforms to the 
performance accountability in the North West (NW) and Gauteng (GP) 
provinces of the Republic of South Africa. The aim is to determine 
whether there is performance accountability and whether it has 
improved between provincial government departments and various 
stakeholders including citizens, provincial legislatures, treasury, 
public service commission, auditor general, office of the Premier 
and national government over a period of time. This thesis follows 
an approach of analysing two case studies and comparing the views 
of interviewees on each case. The two provinces, NW and GP, are 
treated as case studies and the research participants’ views from 
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both provinces are compared in their focus on government 
accountability and its performance. Accountability in the 
governmental sector is an ever-topical issue in both practice and 
academia.  
 
Many researchers have written widely on accountability, raising 
questions about accountability in the public sector – the 
accountability literature is discussed in detail in chapter two. 
Some of the literature about accountability analyses how the 
accountability concept has been understood and applied in the 
government sector, which accountability approaches are effective to 
operationalize, whose perspective on accountability is to be 
considered, as well as further questions. Some questions about 
accountability in the government sector in the literature are 
relevant for South African public sector. In the South African 
context, the accountability of government institutions has received 
attention in recent years from both researchers and a range of 
stakeholder groups, like citizens, legislatures and accountability 
institutions.  
 
Questions about the accountability of South African public 
institutions arise for many reasons, including the fact that the 
country has, in recent years, experienced administration change. A 
democratically elected government took into office for the first 
time in 1994 in South Africa. Since the introduction of the 
democratic government, many public institutions have been built and 
expectations for public services and accountability have grown 
rapidly. There have also been complaints from various communities 
across the country about the insufficiency of public services and 
the perceived lack of accountability from many government 
institutions and political and executive office bearers (Jain, 
2010). My thesis and its objective are inspired both by the 
literature on accountability and the specific South African 
experience.  
 
There are growing perceptions from various players, including 
provincial citizens, public media, accountability institutions, 
provincial legislators and others that public services and 
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accountability in provincial governments are weak. It is through 
questions about accountability in literature and various 
stakeholders’ experiences that the thesis objective and question 
were developed. 
 
Specific research questions 
In order to explore the research objective, I have used the following 
questions to seek to understand provincial government accountability 
in the South African public sector: 
   
 What are the performance accountability arrangements in the 
North West and Gauteng Provinces (in South Africa) and have they 
improved over time? 
    
 How have the changes in performance accountability measures 
such as Batho Pele had an effect on service delivery management? 
 
What are the implications for strengthening policy and practice in 
the South African context of public sector accountability?  
 
Focus area of the research  
According to audited reports from the Office of the Auditor General 
(AG) in South Africa, financial accountability by government 
institutions has improved over time in general. Financial 
accountability is related to government departments giving an 
account on how allocated public funds are used and compliance to 
public financial management prescriptions. Amongst other factors, 
the AG attributes this improvement to the introduction of the Public 
Finance Management Act in 1999, but this is a claim that is explained 
and examined in the empirical analysis set out in Chapter Five. In 
spite the AG’s claim, there seems to be on-going debate with regard 
to whether financial accountability by government institutions has 
improved over time. But there has been little in the way of similar 
debate with regard to the accountability of provincial government 
performance. 
 
The experiences of provincial government performance accountability 
in South Africa have motivated the focus of this thesis. Performance 
accountability has not only been of importance in the public sector 
but has also drawn interest from the private sector. With the changes 
experienced recently in South Africa, the role and implementation 
61 
 
of performance accountability has become a more relevant issue to 
be addressed in the government sector. Some of the recent 
transformations have included government administration change, a 
change in government culture and the introduction of the New Public 
Management philosophy. Some government initiatives intended to 
transform government administration, such as the introduction of 
Batho Pele, have also influenced the motivation for looking at 
performance accountability.  
 
According to Behn (2001), the approach to assessing and 
understanding accountability varies in organisations and countries, 
as the concept is ambiguous without a context. Behn’s (2001) study 
gave further rise to my interest in exploring the accountability 
approaches that have been adopted by various public institutions in 
South Africa. The country has also, in recent years, experienced 
the rapid growth of citizens’ riots against government. These 
citizen uprisings have been experienced both in the country’s rural 
and urban areas. The majority of these riots are attributable to 
the lack of accountability by government institutions to the people 
(Jain, 2010). The rapid growth of citizens’ riots has raised concern 
as to whether provincial government accountability in different 
provinces has changed over time.  
 
This concern has also motivated me to explore existing provincial 
government accountability models and determine the degree to which 
they are being implemented by different government departments. The 
community protests which have been experienced in various local 
governments and municipalities have been monitored by provincial 
government, which raises a concern as to how performance 
accountability is viewed in these regions. Citizens’ riots further 
motivated me to explore provincial government accountability to 
citizens. There has also been an increase in concerns about whether 
the current government mechanisms that engage with citizens on a 
discursive level maybe ineffective. The question of the nature of 
government accountability, or how should accountability be seen by 
citizens with regard to their governments, is more relevant in this 
research.  
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3.2. Case study as a design 
South Africa is a country made up of nine provinces, with all of 
them having to adhere to similar administration frameworks and 
policy developments, legislation and regulations on accountability. 
The South African government structure is shown in Figure 3.1. All 
major regulation, legislation and policies are determined by the 
national government with the approval of the national assembly. But 
provincial government is expected to implement these nationally 
developed policies. Provinces are further empowered by the 
legislature to propose their own legislation. As a result of the 
provincial governments having a similar framework of policy 
development, my research focuses on two of the country’s provinces, 
the North West and Gauteng provinces. The legislation introduced by 
the national government with regard to accountability, such as the 
Public Finance Management Act, provides directives for every 
provincial government to implement. There is currently not enough 
literature on performance accountability within South African 
provincial government. 
 
3.2.1. Approach to research design  
The interest in public sector performance accountability in South 
Africa has increased in recent years amongst citizens, academics 
and practitioners. Considering the limit of existing literature in 
the area of provincial government action, a case study approach is 
more relevant to providing a detailed analysis. Yin (1994) sets out 
the conditions that researchers consider before deciding to use a 
‘case study’ as the appropriate approach in comparison to other 
approaches. According to Yin (1994) some of conditions for using a 
case study are that the research objectives of a case study should 
be exploratory in nature. The researcher should have minimal or no 
control over the case(s) being researched. Finally the researcher’s 
study focus should be based on current events and behaviour as 
opposed to historical cases.    
 
Figure 3 1 South African three spheres government structures and accountability  
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SOUTH AFRICAN THREE SPHERE OF GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
1 National Government Comprise:
Executive Authority (EA) : President and Ministers leading National Departments
       EA has legislated  accountability relationship with NA    
Legislative Authority (LA): National assembly (NA) of Member voted by citizens
9 Provincial Governments Comprise:
For every province:
Executive Authority(EA): Premier and MECs leading Provincial Departments
      EA has legislated accountability relationship with PL
Legislative Authority (LA): Provincial legislature (PL) members voted by 
citizens
284 Local governments Comprise: 
For every local government:
Executive Authority (EA): Mayor and Member of the Mayoral Committee
  EA has legislated accountability relationship with CM
Legislative Authority (LA): Council Members(CM) voted by citizens
Intergovernmental relations
Intergovernmental relations
I
n
t
e
r
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s I
n
t
e
r
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
Intergovernmental relations
Intergovernmental relations
Glossary of key terms:
Intergovernmental relations: in South African context concern the interaction of the different spheres of government (National, provincial 
and local government)
 
Source: compiled from legislative framework (constitution, treasury 
regulations, pfma) 
 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue that the ‘case study’ approach to 
research design is used by researchers focusing on analysing 
qualitative data rather than quantitative data. They attribute this 
view to the notion that qualitative researchers often focus their 
studies on understanding the particular scenery and background of 
the social beings in the setting given, in order to make sense of 
it. This thesis also examines qualitative data (interviewees’ views) 
from government and non-governmental officials through the use of 
interviews. Like many research designs, the case study approach has 
strengths and weaknesses that I considered prior to adopting this 
approach. The main benefit of using a case study design is the 
facility it offers to give a detailed and substantiated account 
relating to a particular discourse in the wider literature (Yin, 
1989, Verner et al., 2009).  
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Some of the weaknesses which researchers face when adopting a case 
study design are generalising case study findings to a wider 
population and lack of thoroughness(Holloway, 1997) (Larbi, 1998). 
In this thesis, views and findings in regard to two cases are 
analytically compared with each other in order to strengthen 
generalisability of findings. For every province as a case, various 
departments’ executives, legislature executives and accountability 
interviewees are interviewed. So the views they raised are fairly 
representative of wider participants. Basically findings raised by 
both case studies have more meaning compared to issues raised by 
one province. Ragin and Zaret (1983) also argued that a comparative 
case study design strengthens findings and conclusions in 
qualitative research. Comparing research views also improves 
validity of the conclusion about such findings.  
 
The thesis therefore considers views of two provincial governments’ 
executives and other stakeholders on their understanding and 
experience of performance accountability. The provinces NW and GP 
are chosen for several reasons, including my work experience before 
beginning this thesis, in which I spent more than ten years working 
and studying in these provinces. I also know the provincial 
government departments’ offices of these provinces well and can 
access then easily. The provinces are also geographically located 
close to each other. The provinces’ principal cities, where their 
government departments’ offices are situated, are separated by less 
than three hundred and fifty kilometres of road, which is the 
shortest distance in relation to that which divides other provinces.  
 
I also know some of the government officers and it was easy to gain 
access to them in order to conduct interviews with their executives 
and other non-government officers. The government department 
structures in these provinces are similar and therefore can be more 
easily be compared while the languages spoken in these provinces 
are similar. However GP is economically more developed than the NW 
which is one of the poorest provinces in the country in terms of 
its contribution and recipients of the country’s gross domestic 
products. The provinces’ populations are also significantly 
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different with GP having a larger population than the NW. 
Disparities in economic performance such as the gross domestic 
products contribution by each province, the differences in 
population per province and culture variances are some of factors 
distinguishing Gauteng from North West provinces.  
 
The afore-mentioned differences between NW and GP influenced me to 
select these provinces as case studies for this thesis. I am able 
to analyse the views and experience from a developed and less 
developed province, so testing the perception of whether one 
province’s views about accountability is different from another. 
Before I continue the process of justifying the research approach, 
it is important to explain the context of the research case study.  
 
3.2.2. Case study defined 
The creation of a comprehensive and rigorous understanding about a 
particular part or related parts of an environment (country etc.) 
can be seen as an example of a case study (Robson, 2011). Yin (2009) 
defines a case study as follows:  
 
“A case study is a strategy for doing research which 
involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using 
multiple sources of evidence.” 
 
In Yin’s description of a case study, he uses three characteristics 
in an empirical study which are ‘contemporary’ occurrences ‘in real 
life’, where ‘research boundaries and context are not easily 
represented within the occurrences’ and alternative measures are 
used to study them to distinguish case studies from other forms of 
research approaches. Stake (1995) defines a case study as research 
that focuses on a specific area, outlining its difficulties without 
leaving other issues out. Stake’s (1995) description further 
indicates that the aim of the study is to appreciate the activities 
of the case within the given context of the researchers’ objectives. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) also regard a case study as research that 
is conducted within the context of the boundaries of the focus 
created. All the case study literature descriptions share common 
understanding that a case study involves researching and having 
details about a specific area.  
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In the thesis I use both provinces as cases to analyse and explore 
government performance accountability between government and 
various stakeholder groups. Common and varying views raised in these 
cases provide a greater understanding of provincial government 
accountability in the South African context. Considering the 
characteristics of a case study and my thesis aim of exploring 
provincial government accountability, a case study allows me to 
provide a detailed analysis of government accountability. The 
analysis chapters show comparing views between two provinces. This 
comparison is based on how Gauteng interviewees differ from North 
West interviewees.    
 
3.2.3. Alternative designs 
There are other research designs other than case studies that I 
considered but did not use for various reasons. These alternatives 
include experimental design, cross sectional design and longitudinal 
design. Experiment design relates to a study where the researcher 
commission interventions on the researched aspect and is often used 
for life physical and other none public management researches(Sharp 
and Howard, 1996). A longitudinal approach involves repeated 
studying of similar subjects and area over a long period of time. I 
did not prefer an experiment and longitudinal approaches for various 
reasons including, my thesis is conducted within three years and 
government process may not change significantly within three years 
which limits the time of study, the thesis is further intended to 
draw an understand of the accountability arrangements within 
provincial government as a result experiments would not work as an 
approach.     
   
3.3. Research Instruments: topic guide 
The research instruments used for the data collection were developed 
with the PATIGAHAR analytical model and are meant to underpin the 
research objectives. The instruments are structured to source 
principal and agent views on accountability and further based on 
four themes, taking into account, giving an account, holding into 
account and redress. The instruments were developed as semi-
structured interviewee topic guides. Having semi-structured topic 
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guides allowed me to probe interviewees further where need arose. 
Interviewees were all asked to give their understanding what 
accountability meant based on their experiences and thoughts. The 
interviewees’ responses were followed by questions with the 
framework of views to be taken into account, whether it is expected 
that government departments to give account, which holds those 
giving account to accountable and what are the redress mechanism.  
 
The use of Batho Pele as an accountability measure is also probed 
by asking the interviewees to give their experience and 
understanding of the model’s implementation and its implication for 
government citizens’ accountability. The detail of the data 
collection instruments (both pilot and main instruments) are 
attached in Appendix A at the end of the thesis. The data collection 
instruments are an improvement of the instruments used for piloting 
the study. All interviewees were asked similar questions including 
both the principal and the agent.  
 
3.4. Pilot study 
3.4.1. Pilot study relevancy 
A pilot study is pre-testing of data collection instruments before 
the beginning of the main field work. Piloting a research project 
is regarded by various researchers to be helpful in ensuring the 
main research process is able to address research questions and 
objective (Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). A pilot is also important 
in trying to reduce problems that the researcher could experience 
if such pilots are not performed. Some of the objectives of piloting 
a research study could arguably be to ensure answerability of 
research questions, determine the usefulness of the research 
instruments, minimise ambiguity and further determine the relevancy 
of the research instruments. The other reason for piloting a 
research is that the pilot also helps the sampling process of the 
research project and many other related motives.  
 
Before the beginning of the main field work in South Africa I 
conducted a pilot using initial research instruments. The pilot 
study was performed in particular to determine whether the data 
collection instruments were suitable to fetch information that would 
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enable me to answer research questions. The process of this pilot 
study was initiated based on the availability of potential 
participants around United Kingdom (particularly West Midlands). 
The pilot was a simulation of my main study since government and 
non-government officials were interviewed. The interview guides 
expected to be used during the main study to collect data were 
utilised for the pilot study. Using these guides helped me to update 
some of the topic guide based on the response of the pilot 
interviewees in the main study. 
 
3.4.2. Pilot process 
The approach adopted in the pilot study was not to create any 
assumptions about potential responses prior to the interviews being 
conducted. Basically I did not pre-empt my pilot interviewees 
perspectives and response to both the practicality and relevancy of 
my interview guides. It is perhaps important to also indicate that 
only one-on-one semi structured interviews were conducted. Basically 
no numeric data were collected for both the pilot and main study. 
The pilot study did not involve sending questionnaires since the 
main study was not based on questionnaires and I also had fewer 
respondents to interview. Even though the scope of availability of 
potential interviewees was later increased when I travelled to the 
area where the main study took take place, South Africa, I still 
thought it was not necessary to collect data through questionnaires.  
 
The similar interview topic guides were used to interview all the 
interviewees during the one-on-one interview with changes made as a 
result of the pilot. All of the interviewees were told that the 
study was a pilot of envisaging the main study about accountability 
in South African provincial governments. It was important for them 
to know about the pilot as they made valuable contributions on how 
to improve to main study instruments. In total six interviews were 
conducted with six different participants for the pilot study. Three 
of these interviews were conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
the other three were conducted in South Africa (RSA). The 
participants in the UK were mainly sourced from the University of 
Birmingham (Government and society) through references. I needed to 
at least identify participants extensively familiar with the South 
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African government administration processes. It was important that 
their responses would take into account their working background. 
The other three participants were interviewed during my visit to 
South Africa just before the beginning of the main study.  
 
The pilot study participants were also identified based on their 
availability and my short stay in South Africa. The process of 
conducting the pilot took two calendar months which included 
updating the initial research instruments subsequent to data 
analysis. The pilot and related data analysis was conducted between 
May 2011 and June 2011. 
 
3.4.3. Summary of pilot issues 
In summary the pilot study’s findings were related to both the 
structure of data instruments and the experiences on accountability 
by the interviewees. The following were some of lesson noted from 
the study:  
 
 The relevancy of the research 
All participants hinted to me that government accountability as a 
research area is worth exploring as there was not much research work 
being done in the area of performance accountability in South 
African provincial context. Some participants mentioned that 
government institutions charged with enhancing performance 
accountability like the Office of the Auditor General have not been 
rigour in doing their work. As a result this study was seen as to 
be effective in resurrecting the role played by the accountability 
institutions. 
 
 Academic participants’ response 
Some of the participants were responding from the researcher’s point 
of view as opposed to their working experience in government. For 
example one participant responded to the structure of the research 
as opposed to the content of the questions (e.g. she asked me, why 
I am using the PATIGAHAR model to assess accountability). Such 
questions were also helpful in giving substantiation for using 
principal-agent model with four themes, taking to account, giving 
an account, holding to account and redressing in the thesis and how 
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it relates to literature.  
 
 Ambiguous and general questions  
Some participants hinted that there were questions they could not 
answer due to such questions being unclear or being too general. 
For questions such these I had to explain to them what they meant 
or had to repeat the questions. One participant further suggested 
that I make some questions specific to the point in order to get 
expected responses. This comment allowed me to go back to specific 
questions that were seen as either general or unclear and made them 
specific. 
 
 Citizens not clear about their role in accountability 
There is a common theme from all of the participants that citizens 
do not have knowledge as to why they should be engaged in government 
activities. Lack of citizens’ awareness on the government 
accountability process was substantiated by the recent rapid 
increase with regards to citizens’ complaints about lack of 
accountability and service delivery. According to interviewees many 
government institutions are perceived to be imposing government 
plans and activities on the citizens.  
 
 
 
 
 Service users’ versus citizens 
Further views were noted that some government departments at times 
focus on service users as opposed to citizens when giving account 
on its activities. This is due to arguments that some of the service 
users are organised institutions with necessary capacity to demand 
such accountability. In addition to that it was relatively easy to 
engage organised groups of societies from a government point of 
view. The recent citizens’ riots in various parts of the country 
concerning poor government services delivery were cited to 
indicating that there were an inadequate number of citizens’ 
consultations.  
 
 Availability of accountability frameworks 
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National government developed accountability frameworks through the 
country’s constitution. All provinces are also given autonomy to 
enhance such mechanisms to suits respective provinces’ needs. Some 
participants argued that there are also constitutional institutions 
charged with enhancing accountability by the government 
institutions. They further argued that given the short length that 
the post-apartheid government had governed South Africa, much has 
not been done in ensuring that proper frameworks are in place. 
 
 Communication gap 
One of the participants who had an experience of working for the 
institutions regarded as an accountability institution, raised 
concerns that certain government departments do not see it important 
to engage with its citizens for the purpose of accountability. She 
further argued that her institutions made numerous recommendations 
to government departments and other institutions to improve the 
process in place to consult citizens for accountability and other 
purposes.  
 
As a result of the summary of these pilot findings the main data 
collection instruments were improved. 
 
3.5. Data collection  
3.5.1. Methodology and data collection 
In the above discussions on the approach followed in this thesis I 
noted that various researchers support the use of a case study 
design in qualitative research. This thesis is for the most part 
informed by qualitative data transcribed from interviews with 
participants from both North West and Gauteng provinces which each 
lasted more than one hour. The qualitative data from these research 
processes forms the foundation of this thesis research findings and 
conclusions. Furthermore, secondary quantitative data, such as 
published reports, are used to emphasise and compare views during 
the analysis stage of the research. 
 
3.5.2. Period of the study 
The data collection instruments included an interview topic guide 
used during one-on-one interviews, follow up emails with further 
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questions confirming findings and final summarised thesis findings 
and recommendation lists sent to all the interviewees for comments 
that I took into account in finalising the thesis. The actual field 
work for this thesis was conducted in many intervals. The initial 
stage took more than four months and this was followed by follow-up 
data collection process subsequent to transcription and further 
analysis. The process of performing the main fieldwork for data 
collection through interviewing participants in both NW and GP 
provinces was initiated in July 2011 and March 2012 in a period of 
eight months. Further discussions took place with interviewees 
through emails and telephone calls to follow up on the initial 
interviews.  
 
The period of the main data collection through interviews, emails 
and telephonic discussions took longer than the planned time, which 
was originally intended to be three months. The travelling distance 
between me and the geographical location of the research subjects 
contributed to the increase in duration of the data collection 
process. The research focuses on South Africa which is more than 
seven thousand miles distant from the United Kingdom. Moreover, the 
two provincial governments are merely three hundred fifty kilometres 
apart from each other. Additionally, some interview participants 
cancelled interview dates due to unforeseen circumstance, and some 
of these experiences were not adequately anticipated. 
 
3.5.3. Sampling  
The thesis is mainly informed through the primary data that was 
collected by interviewing three categories of role-players in 
provincial government accountability: namely, provincial government 
executives, provincial legislatures and accountability institutions 
in NW and GP. A total of fifty-eight officials from all three 
categories in both provinces participated in this thesis. The study 
selected two provinces, as the aim is to have a comparative analysis 
between the two provincial governments’ views of accountability. 
The aim of the comparative study is mainly to emphasise views raised 
from different provinces’ interviewees. The interviewees in the 
selected provinces could be easily and efficiently accessed in 
comparison to other (not selected for study) provinces that are far 
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apart from each other. In the initial analysis of which potential 
interviewees to invite, common government departments and 
accountability institutions were selected (APPENDIX B shows a list 
of participating institutions).  
 
Letter of invitations to take part in the research were sent to 
every government department, accountability institution and 
legislature offices in both provinces. A sample copy of the main 
letter sent as invitation is attached as part of APPENDIX C. 
Identifying common departments for data collection allowed a 
comparative analysis to be performed from similar perspectives, much 
like comparing an apple to an apple. The invitation to interviewees 
in the research was also extended to those departments which were 
not commonly represented in other provinces. Inviting each 
department to participate further emphasised the views represented 
by each province in cases of similarity and also whether variances 
are significant. Similar government departments in both provinces 
that were invited to take part in the research were: the Department 
of Education, the Department of Health and Social Services, the 
Department of Community Safety, the Department of Local Government.  
 
A detailed list of all the provincial government departments in both 
provinces participating through their representatives and are given 
in APPENDIX B. Accountability institutions that were invited and 
participated in the thesis through their representatives in both 
provinces include the Office of the Auditor General (AG), the Office 
of the Public Service Commission, the Treasury Office, the National 
Department of Public Service and Administration, the National 
Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, and the Office 
of the Premier. Representatives of the provincial legislature in 
both provinces were also invited to participate in interviews.   
 
3.5.4. Rate of participation   
APPENDIX D shows a detailed list of all the potential interviewees 
that were invited to take part in the research. This thesis received 
interest from more government departments than otherwise expected. 
I had not expected many to take part due to a perception about the 
concept of accountability prevalent amongst government executives. 
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In the NW province, out of eleven provincial departments invited to 
take part only one department did not respond to the invitation. 
Moreover, all the accountability institutions and both legislatures 
agreed to participate in the thesis processes. In the GP province, 
every department invited to take part in the study agreed to 
participate by sending their representatives. The rate of 
participation in the thesis is more than ninety per cent of invited 
interviewees. 
 
3.5.5. Interviews guides 
The quantitative data analysed was collected from government and 
non-government reports that are made available to the public through 
websites and other institutions in printed format. The pilot was 
conducted by interviewing different government and non-government 
officials from South Africa. Similar interview strategies as used 
during the pilot interviews were adopted during the main data 
collection process. APPENDIX A shows a comparison between the pilot 
and main study data collection instruments. Both the pilot and the 
main interviews were conducted using research instruments that I 
constructed after analysing the literature and legislation on 
accountability in South Africa, and particularly Ashworth and 
Skelcher’s (2005) four dimensional accountability approach that led 
to the creation of the PATIGAHAR analytical model. An extract 
comparison of both the pilot and actual data collection instrument 
is given in Table 3.1.  
Table 3 1.Comparison of pilot and main topic guides 
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Source: Developed by the author 
Research instruments were adjusted according to the responses made 
by interviewees during the pilot. The actual data collection process 
was conducted with sharper research instruments and was conducted 
in different intervals. The provinces that form the analytical 
approach of this thesis are not a great distance apart from each 
other.  
 
3.6. Data Analysis  
3.6.1. Analytical framework  
According to Stake (1995), research data analysis does not have a 
particular starting point or an end. The analysis process takes 
place at the beginning, during and at the end of the research 
project. Stake (1995) argues that analysing data is a process of 
dismantling something - in my case, the interview transcripts - in 
order to understand it.  Stake writes:  
“Data analysis is a matter of giving meaning to the first 
impression as well as to final compilation. Analysis 
essentially means taking something apart” 
 
Figure 3.2 below illustrate and reflects on the process of 
government accountability and connects to the processes in the 
analytical approach of this thesis. In this way, I am able to give 
Pilot topic guide Updated topic guide
Do you think the provincial 
government/departments ought to involve 
citizens and other stakeholders regarding 
the determination of government goals and 
objectives?
Should the department have a 
framework that enables 
consultation with the 
provincial legislature in 
determining specific 
performance to be pursued?
Is provincial government (departments) 
expected to give explanations for its 
action or non- actions to the public or any 
other stakeholders?
Is the department expected to 
give an account for its 
performance? And why do you 
say that?
  What mechanisms are developed by either 
provincial or national government that 
allow the community and other stakeholders 
to hold the government and its officials to 
account on their actions (non- actions)?
Should the department be held 
to account for its 
performance? Why do you say 
that?
How provincial government does make aware 
by the community and services users in case 
the latters are not satisfied by the 
services being provided?
Are there processes in place 
to help the department to 
identify poor performance in 
the departmental performance?
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an overview indicating how all the processes affecting each other 
from the initial stage of literature to the conclusions were drawn 
from the collected and analysed data.  
 
Figure 3 2 Analytical framework connecting entire thesis processes  
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3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES FOMULATED
4.SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF  ACCOUNTABILITY THEORY:  PRINCIPAL AGENT 
THROUGHT FOUR DIMENSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: TIA, GAA, HTA & 
REDRESS((PATIGAHAR)
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: DESK RESEARCH, PILOT, INTERVIEWS, EMAIL 
FOLLOW UP, PARTICIPANTS VIEWS ON ANALYSIS, 
                      
6. ANALYSIS OF DATA COLLECTED: CLASSIFIYING VIEWS IN THREE CLUSTERS 
(GOVERNMENT, LEGISLATURES & ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTIONS) THEMES 
ANALYSIS, COMPARING VIEWS PER PROVINCES USING FOUR DIMENSIONS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY, IDENTIFY DIFFERING & COMMON VIEWS
7. DISCUSSIONS ON FINDINGS OF PERFORMANCES IN BOTH PROVINCES 
ON ACCOUNTABILITY, ROLE OF THE LITERATURE HERE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMEDATIONS
 
Source: Developed by the author 
 
3.6.2. PATIGAHAR analytical model  
The research instruments used for this thesis were informed by a 
four dimensional accountability model developed by Ashworth and 
Skelcher (2005) that I used further to develop an analytical  
PATIGAHAR model. PATIGAHAR model is the merging of the principal-
agent model with Ashworth and Skelcher (2005) four accountability 
themes. ‘PA’ represent for principal- agent in the model, whereby 
for accountability to be analysed there should be a clear 
relationship on whether one party is defined as an agent and the 
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other party is described as the principal. ‘TI’ represent taking 
into account, in the analysis the thesis seeks to understand whose 
inputs are to be taken into account in the principal-agent 
relationship of accountability. ‘GA’ represents giving an account 
dimension of accountability, where analysis is conducted to 
understand whether the agent and or principal are expected to give 
or receive account in accountability relationship. ‘HA’ represents 
the holding to account dimension of accountability, it looks to 
analyse whether the account giver should be held to account.  
 
Finally the ‘R’ represents the redress dimension where the analysis 
seeks to determine the remedial actions and process in the 
accountability relationship between the principal and the agent. 
Interview topic guides used for data collection for the thesis were 
all structured using PATIGAHAR analytical model as it is 
demonstrated in Figure 3.3. The same interview topic guides were 
used to interview both the principal and agent classified research 
interviewees. The process of using the same topic guide improved 
the analytical process as views were compared using the PATIGAHAR 
model. Details of the interview topic guides used for all the 
interviews and data collection are reflected in APPENDIX A. 
 
Figure 3 3 PATIGAHAR analytical model  
PATIGAHAR ANALYTICAL MODEL 
PRINCIPAL:
 
 Citizens
 Provincial 
legislature
 National 
governme
nt
 Accountab
ility 
institution
 Office of 
the 
Premier
 
AGENT:
 Provincial 
government 
department
 Political 
Head 
(MEC)
 Heads of 
department
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT
GIVING AN ACCOUNT
REDRESS
HOLDING TO ACCOUNT
 
Source: Developed by the author 
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In the analysis of the data collected the thesis elements of the 
PATIGAHAR (principal, agent, taking into account, giving an account, 
holding to account and redress) are presented as the main analytical 
themes for the thesis. The transcription reports from various 
interviewees are analysed based on their responses on these themes, 
for example interviewees are asked whose views are taken into 
account with regards to accountability. Various interviewees’ views 
are compared against these themes from both provincial governments 
taking part in this thesis. 
 
3.6.3. Comparative analysis: data management by Nvivo  
The process of conducting the interviews in this thesis has led to 
large amounts of data to be transcribed from the interview 
recordings. I used NVIVO qualitative data analysis software to both 
help me to manage and analyse the interviewees’ transcripts. NVIVO 
can further be used by many qualitative researchers for collating 
and coding data for analysis purposes (Bazeley and Richards, 2000). 
Comparative analyses were drawn from more than fifty eight 
interviews and follow-ups that I conducted in the NW, GP and national 
government participating institutions. Many interviewees which were 
considered for this thesis had various levels of authority in their 
work classifications. Consideration of different work levels was 
used for fair representation of views of accountability. The levels 
are ranked from the lowest seniority is a junior clerk and highest 
level being political representative in legislature.  
 
Some of the interviewed officials were heads of departments, 
commissioners, performance management chief directors and 
directors. But due to the confidentiality agreement with 
interviewees I did not disclose their names and employment titles 
in this thesis.  
 
3.7. Research quality consideration 
3.7.1. Internal validity of the findings 
 
This section on validity discusses the extent to which the design 
proposed and adopted in this thesis can maintain the causal 
conclusion that the researcher claims (Vaus, 2009). Validity relates 
79 
 
to the extent to which the research design is able to demonstrate 
the elimination of possible alternative explanations for the 
findings that my research makes. The other element of the question 
of validity is that similar conclusions should be achievable when 
similar research is performed repeatedly by different researchers. 
It may not be possible to achieve validity completely in certain 
areas of research design but, as Vaus suggested that it is worth 
trying to reduce as much as possible the alternative explanations 
for the findings made in a research. The fact that I compare the 
views in two provinces within different government departments and 
other agencies as part of an analytical approach strengthens the 
conclusion of the thesis.  
 
In improving internal validity of this thesis, as part of my 
interviewees sampling process I identified three categories of those 
to be interviewed. The categories are provincial government 
executives, legislature executives and accountability institutions 
executives. Each province in the thesis has these categories being 
represented in the study. The actual interviewees are from different 
employment levels ranging from most of the junior staff members to 
the highest in the political office. Having all the above measures 
in place reduced internal validity of the thesis key findings. 
 
3.7.2. External validity of the findings 
External validity brings a further challenge to the conclusions 
reached in a research project. External validity concerns whether 
the claims made in the conclusion can be generalised to other 
provinces. In this thesis each province has its own governing 
structure but the performance accountability frameworks are provided 
by the national treasury in the national government. All the 
provincial governments are expected to adhere to the accountability 
legislation developed by the treasury, though interpretations may 
at times vary. The fact that government structures in each province 
are drawn from central government policies should further improve 
the generalisability of my research findings in the country. 
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3.7.3. Ethical considerations for the study 
It is considered important to reflect on the effect of ethics at 
the design stage of the research project. I consider ethics within 
the context of the behaviour and the activities undertaken by the 
researcher in order to complete the thesis. The ethics issues are 
also relevant in the case study design employed for this thesis. 
Vaus (2009), Denier and Crandall (1978) suggest that ethics in 
social science research should be considered within the context of 
certain principles including voluntary participation, informed 
consent, no harm to participants, confidentiality or anonymity and 
deception. It is important to mention that this thesis does not 
explore the profile of the actual interviewees but merely their 
views about the performance accountability of provincial government 
departments. 
 
a. Deception in the thesis 
Deception relates to circumstances where the researcher represents 
himself and his projects as being different from what they actually 
are (Hooks and Schultz, 1996). Deception may at times be perpetuated 
by thoughts that if the researcher had to fairly present the research 
project to research participants, this could lead to either 
contamination of the information obtainable or the refusal of 
participants to take part. My research project is purely related to 
the exploration of accountability arrangements in the provincial 
government in the South African provincial context. It would not 
benefit me or this thesis to misrepresent either myself or the 
project. The thesis is also interesting for the participants, who 
wished to share their views as experts in their government 
departments and other institutions.  
 
There is an opportunity to misrepresent their views and behaviour 
to the thesis by the author to benefit their provincial government 
departments. But to avoid such temptations from taking effect I used 
a formal process to request the interviewees to take part, I also 
phrased the questions asked to the participants so as to make 
misrepresentation harder and I have further triangulated the 
research process by asking the same questions to different 
stakeholders from various perspectives. The research process 
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involved writing formal letters to all of the interviewees’ 
organisations indicating my clear objectives and the fact that this 
is an academic study for a PHD thesis. I also provided my 
interviewees with the university and department contact details in 
case they wanted to verify my activities and also to enable them to 
request my thesis findings. 
 
b. Confidentiality and anonymity 
The research interviewees were guaranteed that their names would 
not to be disclosed on any account during the research writing, as 
many of them were not comfortable with that. This principle was 
intended to protect the interviewees from any harm in sharing their 
views and experiences with me. The information collected through 
interviews and published reports was related to the South African 
provincial government administration, though this information is 
given by public servants. Some interviewees gave their personal 
views regarding certain government policies and framework. This 
required me to promise to keep their names anonymous.  
 
c. Harm to participants 
Harm to participants relates to direct or indirect impairment of 
the research participants as a result of partaking in this thesis. 
This principle of ethical consideration often relates to 
experimental research where certain interventions are made to the 
participants (Vaus, 2009). This thesis did not require me to conduct 
any experiments with the interviewees and indeed no experiments were 
conducted. The decision not to conduct experiments was also 
substantiated by the fact that this thesis is intended to study 
government administration as opposed to specific human participants. 
Any indirect harm that the participants could be exposed to would 
be addressed through the previous principle, the right to anonymity 
or confidentiality of the participants. Many research participants 
further requested that their names should not be mentioned for their 
contribution, and their requests were honoured. 
 
d. Informed consent 
Social science researchers are obliged to ensure that all their 
research participants are well informed about the research they 
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participate in. Homan (1991) argued that adhering to the principle 
of informing the potential participants completely has at times 
proved complex to achieve. Issues such as uncertainty in the 
parameters of the data collection instruments such as interview 
time, or being afraid to influence the participants’ responses to 
questions, at times limited the information divulged to the 
potential participants. As Homan (1991) observes, not fully 
informing the potential participants about uncertainties in the 
research does not necessarily disregard the importance of 
familiarising participants with what they are really agreeing upon 
when engaging. In this thesis I furnished the interviewees with all 
information that they needed to know about the thesis and it was 
stressed that the research was purely for academic purposes. I 
further indicated to them that the accuracy of some information 
provided might be subject to change; for example the interview 
length would be ideal, not absolute. 
 
3.7.4. Voluntary participation 
Not disregarding other principles, this is one of the most important 
ethical issues of social research. The participants were regularly 
reminded that they are not compelled by any law to participate in 
this thesis. If they wished to be excused from participation, such 
a decision would be respected by me unreservedly. As mentioned 
earlier, my research is based on studying provincial government 
accountability and this did not entail that any government employee 
is obliged to provide personal information. This fact was mentioned 
to all the interviewees. The Access to Information Act is applicable 
to the information that is either documented, or recorded using 
other forms of keeping information in the South African context 
(UNISA, 2009). But the legislation was not used because all the 
interviewees participated were happy to take part in this thesis.  
 
Many initially sceptical interviewees were later more enthusiasm 
subsequent to realising that the research was indeed academic 
related. As a result all interviewees were at ease that they were 
not obliged to take part in this thesis. 
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3.7.5. Research limitations 
There were research challenges that I encountered during the process 
of conducting this thesis. The challenges are related to accessing 
research interviewees, negative perceptions and expectations of 
certain interviewees regarding the true purpose of the research, 
and lack of disclosure of government information to foreign 
institutions, logistics and others. During the setting of 
appointments to meet with the different executives and political 
heads, I noted with concern the lack of enthusiasm for participation 
from some few potential interviewees. Lack of enthusiasm was even 
more evident with political officials, as some of them had 
perceptions that I was searching for confidential information and 
that I would disclose it to foreign countries and other interested 
agencies. It was also thought that my research information would 
then be negatively used against South Africa’s provincial 
governments. One of the interviewees in Gauteng appeared to have 
supported this notion in saying: 
 
‘We first need to contact our legal team to make sure that 
our department does not expose its confidential information 
to foreign countries. We can then confirm the appointment 
subsequent to the legal team approval and further 
enquiries’  
 
The other interviewee in the North West provincial government, who 
initially allowed me to record our interview continuously, 
repeatedly asked me to switch off the recording machine in response 
to certain questions that he deemed confidential to answer. Some 
interviewees cancelled the agreed appointments more than once with 
the thought that I would completely abandon my intentions if they 
did so, while some did not even respond to my official request for 
an interview. Certain participants wanted me to send them interview 
questions in advance so that they could prepare themselves. In some 
of the interviews I was perceived as a national government agent 
who had come to investigate whether accountability policies and 
frameworks are being implemented comprehensively at a provincial 
level. The perception was that I would then inform the national 
government with recommendations on how to improve the accountability 
systems and frameworks.  
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These perceptions put me in a predicament in that I was forced to 
repeatedly emphasize my role as an academic researcher and stress 
that useful data could not be easily sourced. There were other 
challenges I endured that were not directly related to the data 
collection and use. These were related to the multiple travelling 
arrangements I had to honour between three places: Birmingham in 
the United Kingdom, Johannesburg and Mahikeng as the primary areas 
where I had to spend most of my time. At times I had to be in 
Johannesburg and Mahikeng within the same day due to either 
cancellations or the postponement of appointments. In the end  most 
of the planed interviews were conducted with minimal concerns. 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
The interviews with various stakeholders within provincial and 
national government provided the fundamental data used to answer 
the research questions. The data is analysed by comparison of the 
views raised by various stakeholders based on the PATIGAHAR model 
which was  developed by the author, based in Ashworth and Skelcher 
(2005) four dimensional accountability approach. The principal-
agent model is used to contextualise accountability relationships 
between the North West and Gauteng provincial governments and 
various stakeholders, including provincial legislatures, 
accountability institutions, national government and citizens. The 
use of PATIGAHAR model allowed me to triangulate the research 
findings in this thesis as it includes analysing accountability 
based on the principal-agent model using the four themes of taking 
into account, giving an account, holding to account and redress. 
Through their executives, provincial government departments are 
classified as agents while government stakeholders are classified 
as principals for analytical purposes. Both the agents and 
principals’ views on performance accountability were analysed using 
four themes that were used as part of data collection.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY IN NORTH WEST 
AND GAUTENG PROVINCES 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the views of various government department 
representatives on accountability, and whether departments are 
accountable for their performance to respective principals are 
analysed. These views are analysed by comparing those of North West 
provincial departments to those of Gauteng provincial government 
departments. This chapter of the thesis explores the questions 
surrounding whether provincial departments in both the North West 
and Gauteng provinces are implementing their envisaged performance 
plans, and the extent of accountability for these performances. The 
analysis is conducted in two stages: first, the general views of 
interviewees on what accountability is for provincial government 
departments are considered; then I consider their views based on 
PATIGAHAR analytical model.  
 
Secondly, the accountability views of different government 
departments’ executives are analysed in the context of the 
principal-agent model as it relates to PATIGAHAR model. In this 
thesis, provincial government departments are regarded as agents of 
national government, legislatures, citizens, accountability 
institutions and other stakeholders. The views of government 
representatives and their accountability experiences are compared 
based on the two provinces, thereafter the views of each province 
are presented separately. In the first part of the chapter I present 
an analysis of accountability in the North West provincial 
government departments, which are subsequently compared to views on 
accountability in the Gauteng province. Government departments - 
national, provincial and local - are expected by citizens to make 
significant contributions towards the provision of public services 
(Rogier et al., 2011).  
 
National ministers and their director generals develop strategies 
for national government. However provincial departments’ members of 
executive council (MEC) and their heads of departments (HOD) are 
expected to echo and implement policies and strategies developed on 
86 
 
a national level. They are further expected to ‘take into account’ 
the views of various stakeholders like citizens and legislatures 
when providing public services according to interviewees from the 
office of the Presidency belonging to the department of monitoring 
and evaluation. Nationally developed government policies and 
strategies form a significant part of the performance plans of 
provincial governments according to the majority of interviewed 
government representatives. According to the experience of the 
Treasury interviewees, National government devises means of ensuring 
that all provincial governments have systems to implement both 
national and provincial performance plans. 
 
The main concern from various interviewees is whether the provincial 
government departments in question are indeed accountable for their 
performance to all stakeholder groups. Many of the research 
interviewees believe more accountability improving initiatives are 
needed in many respects to improve provincial government 
accountability to various stakeholders. This chapter begins by 
presenting the main accountability framework developed to clarify 
the process pursued to attain accountability in the provincial 
government. The framework was developed not only by researching the 
inputs of interviewees but also by analysing government policies 
and frameworks like the Public Finance Management Act and the 
framework for annual performance and strategy (Gordon, 2010).  
 
Figure 4.1 presents the actors and their responsibilities with 
regards to the accountability processes in provincial governments 
generally. In the middle of the diagram, provincial government 
departments denoted by (1) are represented by MECs and HODs to 
provide accountability for various stakeholders. Apart from 
provincial governments as the agents, the diagram shows seven 
principals expecting accountability from government: the office of 
the Premier (Premier) denoted by (2), the Presidency (President) 
denoted by (3), the national government represented by ministers 
and Director Generals (DGs) denoted by (4), the Treasury office 
denoted by (5) and accountability institutions which includes Office 
of the Auditor General (AG) and Public Service Commission(PSC) but 
all denoted by (6), the provincial legislature represented by 
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portfolio committees denoted by (7) and provincial citizens denoted 
by (8). 
 
Accountability processes and relationships are shown in a diagram 
using alphabetical letters and lower cases of roman numbers. The 
one way accountability relationship processes for example is where 
a stakeholder is required to ‘give an account’ without ‘taking into 
account’ account the receiver’s views are denoted by capital ‘A’, 
e.g. Provincial government (1) is required to ‘give an account’(the 
process is denoted by ‘A’)to accountability institutions like the 
AG (6). In contrast two way accountability relationships are denoted 
by the capital ‘B’ in the diagram, e.g. MECs (1) are required to 
take into account the Premier’s views and also give an account to 
the Premier and be held to account, the process is denoted by capital 
(B). Both the principal and agent have a role to play in making the 
accountability framework function in the provincial government. In 
the diagram principal’s contributions on accountability giving 
orders to departments as agents are classified using arrows that 
indicate exact responsibility within the principal-agent model. 
 
The contributions by principals are not always one-way: at times 
consensus is to be reached between principal and the agent and this 
is shown in diamond shape in the diagram. There are two other 
processes in the diagram that can be described at this stage: the 
process of conducting Izimbizos1 between citizens and political 
heads, and the process of service delivery agreement between the 
President and ministers. Both these processes are shown in diamond 
shapes in the diagram. These latter two processes are highlighted 
since they are useful in initiating the process whereby the agent 
provides accountability to various principals. In the framework in 
Figure 4.1 there are areas and processes of accountability that are 
outside the scope of this thesis, but it is important to make note 
of them to provide clarity and a thorough understanding. For example 
engagement between the President and national ministers indirectly 
affects the views that are to be taken into account by the provincial 
government. 
                       
1 Izimbizos means the gathering between a leader and those following to discussion matters 
of importance for both parties. 
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The accountability relationship between the President and national 
ministers is maintained by a signed service level agreement, this 
process is denoted by (i) in the diagram. The provincial government 
is not party to the agreement yet provinces ‘take into account’ some 
issues agreed at provincial level according to many interviewees. 
Leaving out accountability arrangements between the President and 
Ministers from the main accountability framework would leave 
incomplete explanations of the accountability process at a 
provincial level. Some accountability processes are associated with 
national government processes under the four dimensional themes 
(PATIGAHAR) of analysing accountability adopted. The MECs and the 
HODs ‘take into account’ the national government’s inputs when 
determining the performance to be pursued. The provincial Premiers 
of all provinces are expected to ‘give an account’ to the office of 
the President on national government outcomes according to 
interviewees from the office of the Premier in North West and the 
Presidency. 
 
The national outcomes are developed by the national cabinet 
(President and ministers) in the creation of a national strategy 
(Presidency, 2010). National government accountability processes 
that affect provincial processes have been included on the diagram 
for completeness and understanding. The other accountability process 
that falls outside the provincial government sphere is the national 
Treasury’s role in providing financial and performance management 
frameworks. According to many interviewees from government 
departments provincial MECs and HODs must ‘take into account’ the 
national treasury frameworks in their decision-making process. 
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Figure 4 1 Main provincial government accountability government processes 
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Figure 4 2 Provincial government accountability processes 
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Figure 4.2 describes in detail the entire thesis accountability 
relationship using the PATIGAHAR accountability principles: ‘taking 
into account’, ‘giving an account’, ‘holding to account’ and 
‘redress’. In Figure 4.2, there are six principals involved from 
which the provincial accountability relationships are pursued in 
the thesis. In the diagram these principals are identified by using 
the numbers 1 to 6. (1) Describes the main accountability 
relationship between the provincial legislature and departmental 
MECs according to the views of more than half of government 
departments’ interviewees. The provincial legislature uses 
portfolio committees to contribute to a clear definition of the 
accountability relationship. The second relationship in the diagram 
shown by (2) describes the accountability relationship between 
provincial governments and citizens according to the AG and PSC 
interviewees.  
 
This relationship is based on the discussion of citizens’ views 
through the mechanisms of Izimbizos and Batho Pele. The third 
relationship denoted by (3) portrays the accountability relationship 
between the national government and the provincial governments. The 
accountability relationship between MECs and the Premier is 
described in the fourth (4) relationships in the diagram. The MEC 
has direct access to the Premier through the provincial executive 
council according to various interviewees. The national and 
provincial accountability relationship of the Treasury office is 
described in the fifth category (5). Category six 6) illustrates 
the accountability relationship between the AG and PSC and 
provincial department HODs. In this chapter, part of the Figure 4.1 
is analysed with a comparison made between the North West and Gauteng 
provinces and led to conception of Figure 4.3.  
 
The Figure 4.3 demonstrates processes of accountability between 
provincial government and provincial legislatures, citizens and 
accountability institutions. Figure 4.3 is deduced from the 
theoretical accountability framework (Figure 4.1) of the thesis 
placing emphasis on the process that mainly affects the provinces. 
The accountability relations between government departments and 
other stakeholders (the Premier, accountability institutions, 
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provincial legislature and citizens) are shown here.  The 
accountability analysis in this chapter is set out in Figure 4.3 
which is now described.   
 
Figure 4 3 Provincial accountability excluding the national activities 
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Figure 4.3, illustrates provincial government accountability 
process as it is explained by both the interviewees and 
accountability frameworks. Provincial government denoted by (1) in 
the diagram reflects that the provincial government is represented 
by MECs and HODs in terms of giving accountability on behalf of the 
departments. Provincial departments are required by the legislature 
to give account to accountability institutions (including the public 
service commission and the auditor general) denoted (2), this 
process is denoted by (e) in the diagram. Provincial government 
departments take into account the Premier’s (denoted by (3)) 
performance plans and give account to the Premier on departmental 
performances. The process is denoted by (a) on the diagram.  
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The other accountability process described in Figure 4.3., denoted 
by (d) involves provincial government departments taking into 
account provincial legislature (denoted by (4))’s views. The process 
(d) further involves departments’ executives giving an account to 
the legislature and being held to account by the legislature 
members. There are currently no direct accountability processes 
between provincial governments with the citizens. Accountability to 
citizens denoted (5) is fulfilled by provincial legislature taking 
into account citizens inputs. This process is denoted by (g) and 
further gives account to citizens and constituents. Provincial 
government accountability initiative processes of encouraging and 
ensuring citizens participation is achieved through a process called 
Izimbizos that is denoted by (6) in the diagram. The process further 
involves the Premier and various departments’ executives consulting 
citizens.  
 
4.1.1. Performance experiences in provincial government  
In this section we analyse the meaning of performance and the 
experience in relation to performance of the two provincial 
governments in South Africa. However before we evaluate performance, 
the research interviewees were asked to explain their views and 
experiences separately for both performance and accountability in 
provincial governments. Getting the interviewees’ understanding of 
performance separately enables the analysis to be located in the 
context of what both the researched and the researcher understand 
to constitute ‘performance’. Various views were given for what 
government performance meant by the representatives of government 
departments. In Chapter Two, the context of government performance 
for the thesis was discussed in relation to the literature 
surrounding the subject. New public management principles of 
describing government performance placed emphasis on the attainted 
government performance results (Hood, 1995).  
 
Kane (1996) has described performance as a record of attainment of 
targets over a specified period of time. Performance, according to 
Kane, could only be determined after a given period of time, but 
there should have been planned targets from which performance is 
measured. The understanding of performance in Kane’s approach is 
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based on the new public management philosophies about government 
performance, which is based on the results attained as opposed to 
the processing of inputs. Brumback’s (1988) definition of 
performance is based on the behaviour of the individual or 
institution as opposed to the results attained. The point is that 
since the performer might not always be able to control the results 
it would be ideal to perhaps look at the performer’s behaviour. 
Brumback’s (1988) description of performance focuses primarily on 
the input of the performer. The determining of performance from 
input is addressed in a point raised by one of accountability 
institution representative interviewed for this thesis. He argued 
that provincial government departments ought not to focus 
performance on results but rather on managing their use of their 
available resource. 
  
Performance in the thesis  
In Chapter Two, I argued that the thesis follows Kane(1996) approach 
to performance where reports of targeted results is given over a 
period of time. Public sector performance in the literature is based 
on achievements expected and actually realised in modern 
governments. In Lebas’ (1995) argument performance attainment should 
be contextualised and conceptualised before its measurement. In the 
context of this thesis I am looking at performance from what 
departments intended to attain as either targets or performance. 
But the emphasis is on accountability on such performances. 
According to the views of many interviewees from departments in both 
provinces, government performance is mainly defined in terms of the 
attainment of target results that are predetermined at the beginning 
of each year of spending. Departments’ targets are explicitly 
indicated in their annual performance plans.  
 
According to the legislation, PFMA government institutions are 
required to prepare strategic and annual performance plans. 
Provincial government departments determine performance targets for 
the year by considering objectives. According to interviewees 
predetermined targets are used to describe departmental spending 
activities to be pursued during the budget year. But there are other 
interviewees who define government performance as the process of 
95 
 
attaining national government objectives, mandates from citizens, 
government activities and national outcomes. The types of 
descriptions given for performance are not entirely inconsistent 
with each other but many interviewees continued to refer to 
performance as the attainment of targets. Figure 4.4 demonstrates 
the representation of various interviewees’ views based on the 
frequency with which they described performance using five themes.  
 
It is clear from the percentages represented that many interviewees 
see attainment of government targets as performance (39% of 
representatives). The second largest group of respondents who 
defined performance as the attainment of government objectives 
(29%), with the definition of performance as mandate from citizens 
standing at 13%, government activities 9% and national outcomes 11%.  
Figure 4 4 Performance description themes in provinces (NW & GP) 
 
Source: Develop from summary on interviewees views 
However in addition to using these themes to define government 
performance there are differences in views about the source of 
targets to be pursued by government departments. It is clear in both 
provinces that the departmental managers play a more influential 
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interviewees in the NW departments (26%) than GP interviewees (0%) 
arguing that their performance is determined by ‘taking into 
account’ views from the provincial legislature committees. However, 
in the GP province there are more interviewees ‘taking into account’ 
the MEC’s budget speech and political manifestos with 20% and 20% 
respectively, in comparison to NW with 3% and 9% respectively. The 
state of the nation address (SONA) by the President and the state 
of the province address (SOPA) by the Premier are ‘taken into 
account’ in influencing provincial performance, with 12% and 0% of 
NW and GP interviewees using them for their performance plans.   
 
These views are shown on both Figure 4.5 and 4.6. The significant 
difference in views ‘taken into account’ to determine performance 
is associated with the views of legislature members. In the Gauteng 
province, the views of provincial legislatures in determining 
performance are not considered at all by interviewees but in the 
North West provinces 26% of interviewees overwhelmingly argued that 
their performance is determined through provincial legislature 
views. This varying of not taking into account legislature views 
substantiate the argument by Gauteng interviews that provincial 
legislature role is not to influence and participate in government 
activities. But on the other hand North West interviewees argue that 
actually without taking into account legislature views compromises 
citizens’ participations in government activities entirely.  
 
The NW interviewees argue since there aren’t any processes to take 
into account citizens’ views in government, legislature members 
serves as citizens’ representatives. Provincial departments’ 
interviewees in both provinces take into account ‘National outcomes’ 
to determine performance targets that they pursue. In the NW 9% of 
interviewees and in the GP 7% of interviewees derive their 
departments’ views from outcomes prioritised by the presidency. 
There were more interviewees in GP than in NW taking into account 
views of ‘political manifestos’ and ‘PEC’ (20%; 10%) and (9%; 3%) 
respectively. Despite the difference between the provinces, it is 
clear that the views about political manifestos and the Premier are 
‘taken into account’ in both provinces.  
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Figure 4 5 Departments performance determinants: NW and GP  
Performance meaning themes Gauteng  North West  Differences 
State of nation address & province address: 
President and Premier        -    12% 12% 
MEC budget Speech 20% 3% 17% 
Political manifestos through to SP 20% 9% 11% 
National Outcomes 7% 9% 2% 
Provincial legislature       -    26% 26% 
National Departments 10% 9% 1% 
Own management  27% 24% 3% 
Service delivery agreements 3%           -    3% 
Provincial Objectives/ Premier 's office 10% 3% 7% 
Provincial treasury 3% 3%           -    
    
    
Source: Develop from summary on interviewees views 
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Figure 4 6 Departments performance determinants: NW and GP per province analysis  
Source: Develop from summary on interviewees views 
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reports are often issued to departments after their reports are 
checked for accuracy and verified for validity. Interviewees from 
departments further argued that accountability means responding to 
questions upon achievement of performance targets and use of finance 
asked by either the provincial legislature, the Treasury, citizens, 
national government and the Premier. According to interviewees 
responding to questions involves, regular presentation to various 
portfolio committees, answering citizens’ questions during 
Izimbizos and responding to the questions of media representatives 
during briefings on particular issues.  
 
There are fewer departments’ interviewees who believe that there 
should be any action taken against poor achievement of performance 
and for perceived lack of good governance. As two senior executives 
interviewees from Gauteng provincial government argued that holding 
them to account does not enhance accountability and subsequent 
performance. One of these interviewees from Gauteng said:  
 
‘Accountability does not involve punishing departments’ 
officials, but asking them to explain what they have done 
and their future plans.’ 
 
In taking an overview of what accountability meant for government 
departments interviewees’ views, their understanding of 
accountability is more about reporting back on their activities they 
promised at the beginning of the period but reporting at end of the 
period. Many of the departments’ interviewees do not put much 
emphasis on role played by an account receiver to provide views to 
be taken into account. Considering that I classified them as 
principals in the initial step of analysing accountability in the 
thesis, obtaining inputs from various stakeholders is clearly not a 
priority for many departments. I will now look at effects of 
accountability processes according to interviewees.  
 
Accountability: adverse effects on government performance 
As part of discussions of what accountability means for the 
provincial government, various departments’ interviewees argued 
that there are adverse effects of the process of accountability. 
There are concerns from interviewees in both the NW and GP about 
whether the accountability process helps government departments to 
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improve subsequent performances. Areas that raised a concern about 
the effect of accountability processes are considered under the 
categories ‘repetitive of similar accountability’ and 
‘accountability without added value from account receiver’. 
 
a. Accountability to various stakeholders  
Three research interviewees from Gauteng and two from North West 
express their dissatisfaction with the process of accountability. 
They argued that, during each spending year, there are often many 
stakeholders expecting accountability from the government. In most 
cases, each stakeholder would have particular expectations with 
regards to accountability from government. Having various 
expectations often lead to the multiplication of accountability to 
suit individual stakeholders. National government expects 
provincial departments to ‘give an account’ on how the province 
contributes to the attainment of national outcomes. The Premier’s 
office expects account from the political heads, but the provincial 
legislature also expects departments to give account in writing on 
specific issues raised. Basically there are various stakeholders 
expecting same account from various frameworks.  
 
b. ‘Accountability without added value from account receiver’ 
 
Provincial government department representative are adamant that 
‘giving an account’ and adhering to other accountability 
requirements should add value to their performances. But it is not 
always the case when giving account to other principal stakeholders. 
Accordingly, ‘giving an account’ to AG and PSC adds more value than 
accounting to provincial legislature and national government 
departments. This view is shared by interviewees in both provinces. 
Departments expect action to be taken where envisaged performance 
is not attained and where accountability is poorly given. The 
failure to add value to the provincial government on account given 
is overshadowed by political issues that do not often relate to 
accounts given.  
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4.2 North West provincial government views 
The following sections will analyse departments’ interviewees’ views 
regarding accountability in both provinces using separate 
discussions based on the different provincial views. Having looked 
at general views of what accountability meant for GP and NW 
departments interviewees I will subsequently move to analyse 
accountability using PATIGAHAR model in the next section. 
 
4.2.1. Taking into account: North West Province 
All provincial departments have a political executive who is also 
known as MEC and a head of department also known as the HOD, 
respectively, a political head and accounting officer. The MEC and 
HOD are expected to give an assessment of departmental performance 
and full financial accountability on behalf of their departments 
according to all departments interviewees. The MEC provides 
political leadership to his department and is appointed through an 
election process by the Premier in the legislative house as 
prescribed by constitution. The HOD is an administrator of his 
department and supports the MEC to achieve his or her political 
outcomes (Gordon, 2010). According to the majority of government 
interviewees, both the MEC and HOD take decisions on performance to 
be pursued by their departments for every accounting year.  
 
The choices on performance are guided through consultative processes 
with various stakeholders. According to government interviewees 
‘taking into account’ the views of various stakeholders create 
options for MEC and HOD to decide on which performance targets to 
pursue. It is this process of engaging various stakeholders for the 
purpose of decision-making by the MEC and HOD that is defined as 
‘taking into account’ (Ashworth and Skelcher, 2005). According to 
the majority of interviewees the taking into account’ of various 
stakeholders’ inputs often happens before the beginning of the 
government spending year. The process of ‘taking into account’ 
various stakeholders’ inputs is followed by further consultative 
processes over the course of the year, such as reviews of provincial 
strategy by the Premier during the year of spending. However, during 
follow-up consultative processes it is the provincial legislature 
views that are ‘taken into account’ through the year.  
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According to a majority of NW government interviewees, the inputs 
of primary stakeholders that are taken into account to influence NW 
government decisions, relate to the views of the provincial 
legislature and of provincial citizens. The secondary stakeholders’ 
inputs which are to be taken into account relate to those of national 
departments, the Treasury, the office of the President and auditor 
general and public service commission. Although I have classified 
stakeholders as primary and secondary, in the majority of the 
interviewees’ experiences the provincial legislature and national 
government are expected to be the key influencing bodies that 
provincial government ‘take into account’ their views. The 
legislature is an institution where elected members of the community 
meet to set out provincial laws and appoint the Premier according 
to the constitution (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 1996, Chapter 6). 
 
The house of the legislature is expected to pass provincial 
legislation, appoint the Premier, guide provincial government 
performance, and hold MECs and HODs to account (Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 1996, Chapter 6). To perform their 
functions, the provincial legislature makes use of sub-committees 
called portfolio committees. Committees are divided according to 
the number of provincial government functions. One portfolio 
committee oversees one or two government departments in the 
province. Each committee has a chairperson who gives feedback to 
the house of the legislature on their respective functions.   
 
a. Taking into account: Portfolio committees 
In the North West province eight out of nine government departments 
agreed to take part in this thesis. Five HODs and nine chief 
directors from these eight departments were interviewed. Some of 
the participants were interviewed more than once to clarify points 
in their views. All the representatives of these departments agreed 
to the notion that provincial government departments should ‘take 
into account’ the inputs of the portfolio committees, the executive 
council, national departments and provincial citizens in their 
decision-making. According to interviewees, the process of obtaining 
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the inputs of various stakeholders on the part of MECs and HODs 
should happen at the beginning of the year. Many interviewees 
emphasis that taking the various stakeholders views into account is 
an important stage of accountability as it sets out explicit 
expectations between the government departments’ representatives 
and those who expect delivery of services and accountability. 
 
In spite of a consensus amongst the interviewees on the desirability 
of ‘taking into account’ various stakeholders’ views, they raised 
further reasons for consulting them. Various reasons were given by 
both NW and GP governments’ representatives. I will look at the 
responses of the GP provincial government later in the chapter; for 
the moment the focus will be on the NW government views. The views 
on why provincial departments should take into account portfolio 
committees’ inputs vary amongst the research interviewees. According 
to legislation it is compulsory for all government departments to 
consult portfolio committees before the beginning of the spending 
year in the province. Departments’ interviewees further argued that 
it is at this stage of consultation that portfolio committees’ 
should guide and influence departments’ decisions on the performance 
targets to be pursued for the spending year.  
 
According to government interviewees during the process of 
consulting with portfolio committee members, MECs and their HODs 
debate the performance and finance plans with the legislature 
committee. The interviewees further indicate that these debates are 
on whether performance and financial plans are in line with 
political manifestos, national government outcomes and 
pronouncements made by the Premier. In this process, as one 
interviewee argued the performance and financial plans presented by 
government departments through the MEC and HOD are scrutinised for 
their relevance to political mandates by the portfolio committees. 
Many interviewees emphasised the point that the importance of the 
provincial legislature’s need to scrutinize the plans stems from 
the fact that members of portfolio committees are citizens’ 
representatives.  
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As they added, during the debates on performance and financial plans 
portfolio committees raise further issues that relate to concerns 
raised by the provincial citizens and constituents. One HOD 
commented:    
‘Yes, you know portfolio committees have a big role to play 
here as they are the people’s representatives. Many of our 
departments are dependent on portfolio committee members 
for views and concerns raised by citizens and how to take 
them into government programs’  
 
The fact that portfolio committees’ members have been voted into 
office by citizens makes it necessary for members of the committees 
to ensure that issues of concern for citizens are ‘taken into 
account’ by the government according to departments’ interviewees. 
Since the current system of accountability does not make explicit 
provision for provincial government to ‘take into account’ citizens’ 
inputs in their decisions, raising concerns with portfolio 
committee. As a result, the majority of HODs and other chief 
directors interviewed believe it is important for portfolio 
committee members to represent the input of constituents. Other HODs 
also caution that the constituents do not represent all citizens. 
It is for this reason that most of the representatives of departments 
interviewed said they would also want to ‘take into account’ with 
caution the inputs of portfolio committees in government decisions.  
 
Other than constituents, citizens’ views are not always represented 
and, as one interviewee asserts, this issue also needs to be given 
consideration. Government representatives further argued that 
members of portfolio committees are not fulfilling their role of 
scrutinising performance and finance plans as expected. Three out 
of five HODs criticised the committees members because they do not 
actually scrutinise plans presented to them as expected but rather 
approve them without carrying out scrutiny. To the frustration of 
government departments there are fewer than expected inputs from 
portfolio committees to be taken into account. In some cases planned 
performance and use of finances are never scrutinised by the 
committees. Lack of scrutiny of government plans by portfolio 
committees leads some HODs to conclude that some members of 
committees are not clear on their role. As one says: 
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‘Their role is to provide views to be taken into account 
by government departments’ 
  
One HOD argued that portfolio committees should be robust in 
providing inputs to be taken up by the provincial government. 
However, he noted that in general portfolio committees only consider 
plans being presented by the government departments, with minimal 
or no comments given on their content. Despite minimal inputs some 
departments would not take them into account. He continued his views 
by saying: 
 
‘But if I can offer critical views to the current government 
and legislature system of accountability, it is all well 
but everything being done here is purely for compliance. 
Not really being done with rigor. That is my experience’. 
 
It would appear that there is a lack of clarity on the role of 
portfolio committees in regard to their engagements with government 
departments’ executives. The understanding of some HODs is that 
portfolio committee members are not explicitly aware that 
departments are expected to ‘take into account’ their inputs. On 
the other hand, the members of the provincial legislature 
representatives interviewed believe that, in essence, their role is 
more concerned with oversight. The oversight role is used as another 
terminology for holding to account, this was according to 
interviewee. 
 
HODs and chief directors interviewed argue that portfolio 
committees’ members are not comprehensively performing their duties 
of ensuring that the provincial government achieves expected 
performance. The committee members’ responsibilities begin by giving 
inputs to be ‘taken into account’, but failing to do this weakens 
accountability. Instead, portfolio committees’ members often fail 
to scrutinise the performance and financial plans of provincial 
government departments. On the other hand portfolio committee 
members argue that MECs participate as full members of the 
legislature, and are consequently expected to lead their departments 
to implement the contents of political manifestos. The reasons given 
by HODs and chief directors interviewed for ‘taking into account’ 
portfolio committees members’ views can be summarised as: ‘to 
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allocate budgets’; ‘forward citizens’ concerns’; ‘approve 
performance and financial plans’; ‘hold government to account’; as 
well as monitoring and oversight, and providing mandates to 
provincial government.  
 
Representatives of the provincial government departments argue that 
it is for this range of purposes that departments should ‘take into 
account’ the inputs of portfolio committees’ members. It is clear 
that most government departments anticipate more inputs from the 
portfolio committees’ members than they are receiving. Many 
departmental representatives argue that the provincial departments 
that have not been given inputs from portfolio committees as 
expected have received unfavourable audit reports from the office 
of the auditor general. Poor audit reports are also a result of 
improbity in the use of public finance and as a result of poor 
performance. According to interviewees many departments receives 
poor audit reports and these audit outcomes are an indication of 
the weak portfolio committees.  
 
The interviewees further agree that the reason for poor performance 
and lack of accountability has been a result of lack of guidance 
from portfolio committees. Figure 4.7 shows a summary of views 
expressed by various HODs and directors in this thesis on the reasons 
for ‘taking into account’ portfolio committees members inputs. The 
views on whether government departments should ‘take into account’ 
portfolio committees members’ views were given by department 
representatives. These views are compared to each other in terms of 
how many interviewees agreed and suggested them. All departmental 
representatives interviewed mentioned more than one view on whether 
departments should ‘take into account’ portfolio committees members’ 
views. These views are represented by seventeen per cent of the 
overall views in comparison with other views about the role of the 
portfolio committees.  
   
Figure 4 7 Departments views on role the Legislature NW 
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Sources: compiled from research interviews 
 
However, these views are in contradiction with the perspective held 
by the portfolio committees’ interviewees on whether departments 
should ‘take into account’ their inputs. The portfolio committee 
interviewees’ views on whether government departments should take 
into account their views is analysed in Chapter Six of the thesis. 
But, in summary, portfolio committees expect provincial departments 
to operate autonomously but also be accountable and comply with 
legislation requirements.   
 
b. Taking into account : Citizens’ inputs in government decisions 
 
According to the majority of interviewed departmental 
representatives consulting with and ‘taking into account’ citizens’ 
views enables the HODs and MECs to involve citizens comprehensively 
in government activities. But according to the experience of the 
majority of interviewees, despite it being imperative to ‘take into 
account’ citizens views in terms of the accountability approach 
adopted in the theoretical framework for this thesis, the current 
processes of accountability did not put an emphasis on compelling 
government departments to consult provincial citizens for their 
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inputs. Interviewees further indicated that there are currently 
various initiatives to ensure that provincial government takes into 
account citizens’ inputs. But the problem is that the initiatives 
are not institutionalised in the legislature’s engagement process.  
 
As a result, provincial citizens’ views are not comprehensively 
taken into account at the moment, if indeed they are considered at 
all by departments. One of the interviewees cautioned accordingly 
that the national government have expectations that provincial 
government executives have close relations and regular engagements 
with their citizens, but this is not the case. According to 
interviewed government representatives the form and structure of 
taking citizens’ inputs to account through various engagements is 
dependent on individual departments in the province. However, this 
is not effectively implemented. Only three out of nine departments’ 
interviewees admitted their departments’ weakness that the current 
system of citizens’ consultation mainly relies on local government 
institutions to take into account citizens’ views.  
 
According to many experiences of some interviewees, provincial 
government departments are expected to monitor the performance of 
every local government across the province; in addition, 
departmental executives rely on local government to gather citizens’ 
inputs to be taken into account. Local government makes use of local 
citizen committees that consult citizens to inform communities about 
municipal plans. Citizens’ reports are used by government 
departments as attempt to ‘take into account’ citizens’ inputs.  
 
Izimbizos for citizens’ accountability 
According to the National Treasury interviewee, other platforms used 
by the provincial government to take into account citizens’ inputs 
include the use of government integrated approaches with other 
institutions called Izimbizos. One of the HOD’s with experience 
explained that the Premier of the province often calls ‘Izimbizos’, 
where she is accompanied by various departments’ MECs and HODs to 
meet with citizens in different parts of the province. In these 
Izimbizos citizens raise their concerns with regards to public 
service and accountability by government. Izimbizos give government 
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a further opportunity to account to citizens visiting at a given 
point in time. According to the interviewee it is through these 
Izimbizos that citizens are consulted and their views are taken to 
account. The Izimbizos model is explained in detail in Chapter two, 
section 2.2. 
 
Izimbizos is a formally recognised South Africa government citizen 
engagement concept carried out by the head of state or 
province(Hartslief, 2008). The word Izimbizos is taken from Zulu, 
one of the popular South African languages, and its literal meaning 
is ‘a gathering’ (Hartslief, 2008). In South Africa, prior to the 
colonisation years, where chiefs and his helpers assumed the role 
of government in rural areas of the country, Izimbizos were a popular 
forum for accountability. The chief and his helpers would often call 
for Izimbizos where all the community members young and old would 
meet with him. All the important issues and problems affecting the 
community are discussed and solutions are further derived in 
Izimbizos. The former South African President Thabo Mbeki integrated  
the concept of the Izimbizos as a model of citizens’ participation 
and an accountability measure within a government framework of 
governance and accountability (Mbeki, 2001).  
 
The President together with his cabinet members often engages in 
community gatherings (Izimbizos) with the citizens of both rural 
and urban areas. Though the focus at times tends to be on the rural 
areas where government institutions are out of reach, the concept 
seeks to enhance government accountability by taking citizens inputs 
into account in government decisions (Hartslief, 2008). The issues 
raised by citizens are discussed, integrated and taken into account 
in government decisions and activities. The integration of Izimbizos 
into government frameworks was initiated in the year 1997 (Sangweni, 
2008). According to DPSA interviewees the process of Izimbizos was 
initially seen by provincial governments as national government 
policy but was later integrated into other spheres like the 
provincial Premier and members of executive council and local 
government Mayor and other senior management.  
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According to many departments’ interviewees, Izimbizos have been 
both the North West and Gauteng provincial governments’ model of 
citizens’ government participation, ensuring that citizens’ views 
are taken into account in government decisions and policy making. 
According to many interviewees the Izimbizos model seems to be 
effective in getting citizens’ inputs. The interviewees wish it 
could be taken seriously by all departments and the Premier. Many 
departments’ interviewees are concerned that the lack of 
institutionalisation of citizens’ consultation forums like 
Izimbizos by government departments encourages HODs and MECs not to 
pay attention to citizens’ accountability. Izimbizos are not 
systematically implemented by the Premier and the President. Based 
on all interviewees’ discussion about Izimbizos, it is the President 
of the country or the Premier of the provinces prerogative to host 
Izimbizos and it is not the case that every MEC and HOD is part of 
these gatherings.  
 
Lack of citizens’ accountability processes 
The HODs and other directors interviewed for this thesis confessed 
that some of the departments are not doing enough to strengthen 
accountability channels for the citizens. They further argued that 
the current government processes of citizens’ engagement very much 
depend on whether the Premier and other executive councils deem it 
necessary. A significant number of interviewees complained that the 
lack of processes is perceived by departmental representatives to 
undermine many other efforts by non-government institutions to 
enhance accountability to the citizens of the province. According 
to interviewees, there are no systematic measures to ensure that 
citizens’ views are obtained and ‘taken into account’ in government 
decisions in the NW province. The HODs further complained that there 
is a lack of will from certain government executives to ‘take into 
account’ citizens’ views and ensure wider integrated participation.  
 
There is a general perception by various department executives that 
the provincial legislature represents citizens’ views during their 
accountability session with departments, and as a result many 
departments have a lesser appetite to account to citizens. In spite 
of the views of the majority of departments’ interviewees, a 
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minority argued that their decisions represent citizens’ views. 
These interviewees argued that they make use of Izimbizos but this 
is regardless of evidence that the model has not been 
comprehensively used by many. To substantiate further the problems 
encountered by departments taking into account citizens inputs, one 
of the HODs is quoted as saying: 
 
‘The annual performance plans (APP) do not necessarily 
represent the aspiration of the people as it should. We 
pride ourselves as South Africa with being a democratic 
country with the bottom up approach to governance and 
performance. One of the fundamental problems is the manner 
in which the government structure is done. In the provincial 
government we plan on our own without the involvement of 
the community that we serve ’ 
 
In their own defence for not taking citizens’ views to account, many 
HODs argued that they rely on provincial legislature to consult 
citizens on behalf of government departments. But they further 
confessed that more citizens’ initiatives could be taken by 
government to enhance citizens’ accountability. Citizens’ 
accountability is a main concern for many departments in the 
provinces, particularly political heads.  
 
c. Taking into account: National government inputs 
Functional departments  
According to many interviewees, provincial government departments 
take into account views given by national government departments, 
including the national Treasury with high esteem compared to other 
principal stakeholders. The other interviewees commented that this 
is despite the fact that provincial legislature as part of other 
principals having more authority to demand accountability than 
national government. There are also service level agreements (SLA) 
between provincial MECs (and HODs) and the Premier for a five year 
term but they are also outweighed by the attention given to national 
government views. According to two HODs interviewed in SLAs, 
provincial departments are asked to demonstrate how their 
performance and financial plans support national outcomes. The 
process of preparing national outcomes and entering into service 
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level agreements is detailed on a ‘guide to outcome approach’ from 
the Presidency (ThePresidency, 2010).  
 
Many interviewees agreed with the view that the ruling political 
party’s manifesto identifies five priority areas and national 
outcomes are developed from these priority areas. According to 
research interviewees, attaining most national outcomes requires 
action by provincial governments. Outcomes are hence prioritised by 
provincial departments; for example, national education outcomes 
are achieved through provincial departments of education. From the 
majority of interviewees’ perspectives it is clear that the reasons 
that provincial HODs and MECs prioritise national government’s views 
compared to other principal stakeholders is to advance national 
outcomes and Treasury funding stipulations. The process of ‘taking 
into account’ national government priorities is further supported 
by the national treasury framework in planning the strategic plan 
and annual performance plan (Gordon, 2010), which stipulates that 
national government determines provincial government outcomes which 
the provinces are to ‘take into account’ in their decisions. 
 
Interviewees further indicated that ‘taking into account’ national 
government views is more important in cases of concurrent functions. 
Concurrent functions occur where the national department has a 
replica department at provincial levels; an example is the national 
department of health and provincial department of health. The 
relationship between these two spheres of national and provincial 
government allows their representatives to enhance accountability 
between the spheres, where the latter is accountable to the former. 
According to HODs interviewed in the province, accountability 
between the spheres is achieved through various platforms that make 
it possible for the different levels of government to maintain their 
autonomy. The HODs explained that some of the measures ‘taken into 
account’ that are used to communicate national government’s views 
to provinces include forums such as of Committee of Minister and 
MECs (MINMEC), Committee of Director general and heads of 
departments (HEDCON) and various ministers’ budget speeches. 
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MINMEC relates to the national committee formed by the nation 
department minister together with all nine provincial political 
heads’ (MECs) similar functions (Rapoo, 1999), for example, the 
Minister of Health has monthly meetings with all nine provincial 
MECs. A similar process is followed within the HEDCON, which is the 
national committee for the head of a national department and for 
all provincial MECs in the same function. It is, according to 
interviewees, in these engagements that the ministers brief all the 
MECs about national government expectations. Provincial MECs ‘take 
into account’ national ministers’ views in their decisions on the 
performances that they pursue at provincial levels. According to 
interviewees’ experiences provincial departments are expected to 
take into account views raised by the national director general in 
HEDCON.  
 
There are also national department ministers’ budget speeches where 
they indicate the entitlement of various provincial budgets to 
conditional grants. A conditional grant refers to funds being 
allocated to a provincial department to be used for a specific 
purpose, usually specified by the provider of the funds. Consulting 
national departments in different forums is an important process, 
but a minority of HODs interviewed raised concerns that national 
policies and priorities are imposed on provincial government, and 
such an imposition also has an adverse effect on constitutional 
provisions for spheres of government to remain autonomous.  
 
d. Status of taking into account views in the NW 
The National Treasury recently developed a framework that guides 
government institutions on whose views are to be taken into account 
in planning their performances (Gordon, 2010). The framework gives 
the provincial executive councils, the Premier and her cabinet 
authority to decide on which stakeholders’ views are to be taken 
into account. According to research interviewees, in this light the 
Premier and MECs take into account political manifestos in the 
programme of action of provincial governments. The government 
programmes of action are written as provincial departments’ 
strategic plans (SP) that have five year lifespans usually running 
with the political term of office. The process of implementing the 
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accountability framework is achieved with the consultation of the 
provincial legislature majority of the indicated departmental 
interviewees.  
 
The attainment of SP programmes is spread into five annual 
performance plans. Despite many interviewees commenting in favour 
of the process introduced by the Treasury, other interviewees argued 
that the provincial legislature may not participate in the 
government planning process. The argument that provincial 
legislature may not participate in the government planning process 
as prescribed by the Treasury process, seeks to challenge the notion 
that departments should ‘take into account’ the legislature’s views. 
Taking into account the views of provincial legislatures as 
prescribed by the Treasury process is perceived by some interviewees 
as interfering with the functions of the executives. Interviewees 
opposed to government taking into account provincial legislature 
further argued that portfolio committee members should mainly 
provide and hold  government departments executives to account on 
their plans without giving views that will be ‘taken into account’. 
 
Other executives regard being held to account as oversight by the 
legislature. I therefore need to discuss the oversight as an 
accountability process. Oversight is defined as overseeing, 
supervising, giving direction and considering one’s action (J 
Redpath et al., 2006). In many of the departments, interviewees 
viewed oversight as being supervised by the legislature, as opposed 
to being dictated on what to do. Some interviewees argued that 
‘taking into account’ provincial legislature’ views make it 
impossible for portfolio committees to hold departmental executives 
to account. These interviewees argue that failure to achieve 
performance plans influenced by the legislature would be blamed on 
portfolio committee members since they impose their views. As a 
result, these executives in the NW provincial departments regard 
the accountability framework as weak. There are those who still feel 
that the existing accountability framework is comprehensive.  
One HOD noted that:  
‘Yes it is comprehensive. The annual performance plan is a 
very useful document because once you have made commitments 
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on it there is no way you cannot perform against it because 
there are budget implications.‘ 
 
Other departments’ interviewees argue that the framework is not 
understood by all the departments’ executives expected to make use 
of it. According to the views raised by both NW and GP provinces 
government representatives, there is a common understanding that is 
intended to take into account various stakeholders’ views. Moreover, 
if implemented, it could improve government performance, citizens’ 
satisfaction and enhance accountability. But interviewees could not 
provide evidence to substantiate this claim. 
 
e. Taking into account: Provincial executive council  
The Premier and her cabinet form the provincial executive council 
that is responsible for provincial government performance 
(Constitution of Republic of South African act of 1996, Chapter 6). 
The Premier is the leader of the executive council and is also 
responsible for coordinating and consolidating the provincial 
strategy. All members of the provincial executive council are full 
members of the provincial legislature. Members of the executive 
council (often known as the ‘MEC’) have access to both the 
legislature and the government. According to departments 
interviewees, having access to both legislature and government 
activities makes the MECs more knowledgeable about government than 
other members of the legislature. Some of the interviewees also 
argued that having more information about government makes MECs feel 
superior to other members of the legislature and weakens the 
accountability relationship. 
 
According to most of the interviewees the executive council also 
has more control over the budget and related activities than the 
other members of the legislature. Interviewees further argued that 
as part of the function of the executive council, they decide on 
how the provincial spending is allocated amongst provincial 
departments. As many interviewees argued, it is the authority over 
budget that make members of the executive council superior to their 
fellow members of the legislature. This authority makes it again 
more impractical for other members of the legislature to hold 
departments’ executives to account since there are no incentives 
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for being accountable to the legislature. Provincial departments 
often take the executive council’s views more into account and 
neglect the legislature’s role.  
 
Interviewees concluded that MECs are expected by the accountability 
framework to take into account the portfolio committees views, but 
it is not always the case as the executive feels superior to fellow 
members of the legislature. Fewer departmental interviewees argued 
that the MECs at times mislead their legislature colleagues, due to 
the access to information they have about the government rather than 
being accountable to the legislature. As one of the HOD interviewed, 
summarised his argument: 
‘But there is a contradiction because the annual 
performance plan is an executive function with not much of 
a role being played by the portfolio committees (PL). Yes 
we prepare these plans and take them to the legislature but 
what we the executives present to the legislature hardly 
changes, not  even a full stop or comma after the review 
or debate the legislature.’ 
 
The point being made is that the portfolio committees’ members’ 
views are not always ‘taken into account’ by departments’ executives 
during the process of preparing performance and finance plans. 
According to many interviewees once departmental plans receive the 
approval of the provincial executive council it is often impossible 
for the legislature to impose its views. According to interviewees 
the performance and finance plans are presented by various MECs at 
their budget speech for the spending year. The budget speech is 
often approved by the provincial legislature members after its 
presentation by the MEC without amendments. Interviewees emphasised 
that it is impossible for the legislature members to amend a budget 
speech once it has been pronounced to the legislature by the MEC. 
 
f. Performance and financial plans  
According to views of interviewees subsequent to ‘taking into 
account’ the views of various stakeholders, provincial departments’ 
executives should produce strategic (SP) and annual performance 
plans (APP). According to interviewees, SP and APP is where views 
of various stakeholders are represented by the provincial 
government. Many interviewees supported the view that it is the 
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responsibility of the HODs of various departments to compile the 
strategic, annual performance and financial plans in each 
department. These planning documents are used to indicate details 
of performances to be pursued and how various stakeholders’ views 
are ‘taken into account’. Account to be given by departments is 
further based on these planning documents. Interviewed HODs make 
use of the operational plans in addition to reducing performance 
and financial plans into measurable targets.  
 
As some interviewees argued, reducing the plans into measurable 
targets further enables departmental executives to give an account 
for specific targets. But many emphasised that an operational plan 
is an internal management document that lists details of each 
program’s activities in achieving agreed performances. Operational 
plans are often used for management accountability within 
departments. According to views of interviewed government 
interviewees, presentation of the planning documents is performed 
by the MECs and HODs of departments prior to the beginning of the 
spending year. It is at this stage where the views of portfolio 
committees are to be taken into account, but they are not always 
being ‘taken into account’. According to interviewees, every 
departmental HOD and MEC may decide to amend performance plans, 
however they should obtain the approval of the provincial 
legislature through portfolio committee members.  
 
Amending performance plans means that provincial departments’ 
executives have the prerogative to decide on whose principal 
stakeholders’ views to ‘take into account’. But the amendments of 
approved performance targets do not take place consistently as this 
may have consequences for the allocated budget. Many argued that as 
a result of budgetary implications for any amendment to performance 
plans, departments’ executives are required to obtain legislature 
concern to affect amendments. Interviewees further clarified that 
the amendments relate to changes or improvements made on initially 
approved strategic and annual performance and financial plans. 
Amendments include changing performance targets, reallocating funds 
and introducing new targets amongst other changes. HODs and MECs 
could make the amendments without the need to ‘take into account’ 
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the views of principal stakeholders, but the legislature should be 
informed.  
 
The Treasury may need to be informed as well, but the Treasury often 
emphasizes that departments comply with financial management 
principles pertaining to amendments. According to one interviewee, 
guidelines to the amendment of performance targets are not clear 
and at times produce confusion because the MEC would approve 
amendments to performance plans without the knowledge of portfolio 
committee members. The understanding of the approval of amendments 
is not clear amongst the interviewed government senior officials. 
One of the officials argued that the approval of the legislature is 
required for any amendments, while others say that there is no need 
for departmental executives to seek the legislature’s approval. 
Despite all the different opinions, legislature executives argued 
that those MECs and the HODs are not expected to seek the approval 
of portfolio committees to effect amendments.  
 
In spite of certain departments agreeing to the amendments of 
comprehensively consulted plans, there were views that performance 
targets could not be amended at all. Departments’ interviewees 
argued that the other impact of amending performance plans is that 
the process of giving an account is adversely affected. Hence the 
HOD and MEC have to give account to plans approved by the legislature 
but not on amended plans. It is consequently important for 
departmental executives to make the legislature aware of any 
amendments to initial plans. Many interviewees contended that the 
significant amendments to legislature approved performance and 
financial plans that are commonly allowed with minimal legislature 
interference are those that are imposed by external sources. 
External sources relates to one or more of external principal 
stakeholders suggesting amendments to performance and financial 
plans as results or the changing of initial events.  
 
An example was given of the introduction of the Honourable Ms Thandi 
Modise, the new Premier in the North West province, during the 
government spending year of 2010. The new Premier reorganised the 
province’s strategy and continued the work of introducing new 
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government departments in the North West province. One of the new 
departments introduced was the Department of Human Settlement that 
was separated from its old departmental administration. Introduction 
of a new department meant that funds had to be reallocated to fund 
the new department during the year; inevitably the performance plans 
of affected departments were amended. Furthermore; performance 
targets for new and older departments were to be re-submitted to 
the portfolio committee for approval. According to many of 
interviewees in the North West province, such amendments are often 
effected without the involvement of the legislature.   
 
g.  Provincial budget and accountability  
According to departmental interviewees in ‘taking into account’ 
various stakeholders’ views, departmental HODs are expected to also 
consider the availability of public funds. The interviewees argued 
that the lack of public funds leads to fewer stakeholders’ views 
being ‘taken into account’. The Premier gives an annual budget 
speech which indicates intended areas of provincial government 
spending as an interviewee from her office explained. According to 
interviewees, in preparing their plans and budget speech, MECs are 
also to ‘take into account’ the contents of the Premier’s speech. 
The Premier’s presentation is followed by the finance MEC from the 
provincial treasury. In his speech, the MEC for finance would also 
try to make all departments aware of the available public funds and 
guide them in areas that would be allocated public funds according 
to treasury interviewee.  
 
MEC of finance pronouncements are often done to affirm the Premier’s 
spending pronouncements with consideration given to available public 
finance. The budget speech by the finance MEC is to be ‘taken into 
account’ by the MECs and HODs. Various department interviewees 
shared this view. In ‘taking into account’ the budget allocation by 
the finance MEC, the final spending forecast by all departments 
should be approved by their portfolio committees in the legislature. 
All interviewed HODs and senior provincial government departments 
representatives argued that the decision on the allocation of 
available provincial funds is made by the provincial legislature. 
But this point is disputed by the legislature representatives, 
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arguing that the executive councils (MECs and Premier) make major 
decisions on budget allocations.  
 
According to departments’ interviewees having to allocate public 
funds, the legislature plays a significant role in scrutinising 
provincial departments’ budgets and planned performances. The 
provincial legislature representatives argued that portfolio 
committees merely approve a budget that has already being allocated 
by the provincial executive council.  
 
4.2.2. Giving an account: North West Province 
Giving an account relates to the explanation given as an account 
for performance commitments, targets and the use of public finances 
made by the HOD and MEC on behalf of their departments. In this part 
of the thesis the views of several North West provincial 
departments’ interviewees are analysed. 
  
a. Is account expected? 
The MECs and HODs of provincial departments are expected by the 
constitution and the Public Finance Management Act to give an 
account for their performance and use of public funds to the Premier 
of the province, the provincial legislature, the treasury, national 
departments, citizens and various accountability institutions. 
Section 133 of South Africa’s constitution obliges the provincial 
executive authority and the Premier to give regular reports and 
accounts on government performances to at least the provincial 
legislature (Constitution of Republic of South African act of 1996, 
Chapter 6). The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) sets rules and 
requirements for HODs to keep records of both the financial and 
performance reports (Public finance management act no. 01 of 1996, 
chapter 7). These reports are to be submitted and presented to the 
provincial legislature on quarterly and annual bases according to 
interviewees.  
 
In accordance with the constitution the interviewees explanation 
reports of ‘giving an account’ are also submitted to the provincial 
and national treasury and national government departments. It is, 
according to many interviewed officials, the constitution and PFMA 
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provisions that are useful in ensuring that MECs and HODs give an 
account of their performances and of their use of public finances. 
An account is expected from the departments’ HODs and MECs of the 
performance plans that were approved by the legislature at the 
beginning of government spending. The ‘taking into account’ various 
stakeholders views process takes place at the beginning of each 
spending year in all provincial departments and is followed by 
‘giving an account’. Interviewees argued that all North West 
department executives (MECs) and administrators (HODs) are compelled 
to comply with the constitution and PFMA by ‘giving an account’ on 
performance and finances.  
 
The interviewees argued that there might not be a uniform and 
systematic process of ‘taking into account’ the various 
stakeholders’ views. Instead, ‘giving an account’ is a common 
process amongst departments. Many interviewees argued that taking 
views of various stakeholders into account creates an obligation 
for the provincial government to ‘give an account’ of their 
performance and use of public funds. According to interviewees, when 
giving an account, the focus is on whether the departmental 
executives were able to attain performance commitments and targets 
with supporting evidence for their reports. One interviewee further 
argued that the principle of democracy is strengthened by a 
government that always gives account of its activities. In spite of 
the acknowledgement of the democratic principle, many HODs believe 
that provincial departments need to do more to be accessible and 
transparent to citizens in order to strengthen the processes of 
giving an account to citizens.  
 
b. Account to Office of the auditor general (AG) 
The AG was created through the constitution provisions to support 
and ensure that democratic principles are adhered to by government 
departments. The AG and PSC are the only accountability 
institutions’ representatives interviewed in this thesis. Both the 
institutions are directly involved with departments’ accountability 
process as required by the constitution. This is due to their greater 
direct role in government accountability in comparison with 
constitutional institutions like the Electoral Commission. The AG 
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presents his consolidated audit reports on government institutions’ 
performance and use of public finances to the national assembly and 
provincial legislatures on an annual basis.  
 
At a provincial level the AG presents his audit report to various 
portfolio committees of the legislature and to the audit committees 
of different departments. In conducting his audit work in provinces, 
the AG relies on audit executives appointed in each province who 
conduct audits on his behalf. Interviewees explained that the AG 
provincial executives, together with their audit teams, are required 
by the audit act (Public Audit Act no 25 of 2004, Chapter 3) to 
obtain performance and financial reports from government departments 
for scrutiny departments. The AG executives have to determine 
whether the account given by government departments is fair, 
accurate, complete and valid, this being reflected by both the 
interviewed AG and departments executives. Subsequent to 
scrutinising account from departments, the AG interviewees argued 
that it is required by the audit act to report to the audit 
committees, legislature and the parliament on whether the account 
given by provincial departments’ executives on their performances 
and use of public finances is a true reflection on their performance 
and use of finance.  
 
According to HODs and senior executives’ interviewed, ‘Giving an 
account’ to the AG is more beneficial to government departments 
since AG provides further support on any weaknesses identified. One 
HOD confirmed why it benefits them to account to AG by saying: 
‘If I were to compare the way I have to account to AG and 
to the provincial legislature it is very different. With 
AG there are specific issues to be addressed but with the 
legislature there are no specifications. Basically AG 
accountability improves the services delivery as compared 
to the provincial legislature accountability. But with the 
provincial legislature it is not beneficially and does not 
add value to government accountability. Provincial 
legislature is at times not prepared for our account and 
they give very general feedback after an account has been 
given. Which most of the times is not helpful for me as the 
HOD of a department? Some provincial legislature feedbacks 
on our account are not relevant to issues we give account 
on. Most of time account to provincial legislature is about 
political scoring points as opposed to enhancing 
accountability and government governance’  
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When ‘giving an account' to AG, departmental executives are expected 
to provide a further explanation for the no-achievement of planned 
performance. They must also indicate the action plan to rectify poor 
performance; this is according to the interviewees. The action plans 
to redress poor performance are used by AG executives to scrutinise 
future government accountability. The systematic and specific 
process of giving account to AG has led to many government 
departments’ executives prioritising accountability to AG and 
subjecting other principal stakeholders to a reliance on the AG’s 
report. The departmental representatives interviewed, argued the 
fact that there is a systematic framework legislating and guiding 
‘giving an account’ to AG that makes it plausible for departments 
to give an account. The specific process of ‘giving an account’ to 
AG is legislated in PFMA and other legislative frameworks like 
public audit.  
 
The HODs of every department in the province is expected to present 
performance information and financial records two months after the 
end of the spending year (Public Finance Management Act no. 01 of 
1999, Chapter 7). Two months provision allows AG executives to 
verify whether the account given is fair and credible before 
publishing their audit outcomes about audit departments. AG is 
expected by those expecting provincial government accountability, 
as playing the role of legitimising the account given by 
departments’ executives. The provincial legislature, the Treasury, 
citizens and the Premier consider the account given by departments’ 
executives to be fair and sufficient once the report is verified by 
AG. According to many of the departmental representatives’ giving 
account to the AG also enables the departments giving such account 
to be comfortable that other principal stakeholders would believe 
in their account as the AG legitimises such an account.  
 
c. Account to Member of the Executive Council (MEC) 
Many interviewees argued that the process of MECs giving an account 
on government performance to various external stakeholders starts 
with management accountability within departments. They further 
explained that several program managers within departments give a 
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quarterly account to the HOD of their planned targets. According to 
the interviewees, the account given to HODs by programme managers 
is the initial step of ‘giving an account’ to various stakeholders 
by departments through both HODs and political heads. Programme 
managers prepare quarterly performance and finance reports that are 
presented in the management meeting being chaired by HODs. According 
to one interviewee, it is during the management accountability 
process that the entire departmental accountability of the 
government could be assessed as being comprehensive or otherwise, 
and judged on whether it is good or bad.  
 
Basically if programme managers are not held to account it is often 
impossible to hold the HODs and political heads to account. Other 
interviewees argued that if an account given to the HOD by programme 
managers is not complete and aligned with expected targets, the same 
poor account will, in most cases, be passed through the HOD to 
external shareholders. The nature of these processes and their 
subsequent failure shows the trust placed in the departmental 
process of both the HOD and the MEC giving an account through the 
management accountability process. As another HOD explains: 
  
‘In some cases of poor accountability an account given to 
the MEC by the management is often not complete and never 
represents the reality at the ground within the department. 
In most cases the HOD and MEC fails to pick this up’.  
 
When account is received by the MEC there is often insufficient time 
to go through the details of the account given. As a result the MEC 
further relies on the credibility of the account being given because 
it would have been prepared by the HOD. But according to the AG, 
this credibility does not always appear to exist as certain account 
givers lack the desired credibility. One senior executive 
interviewed from a provincial governmental department also argued 
that management accountability reports are rarely credible because 
the MEC does not have the capacity to verify all that is being 
reported to him. He argued that some managers take advantage of the 
fact that the MEC trusts their credibility and so decide not to give 
a complete account. According to a small number of interviewees, 
the processes of management accountability within government 
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departments do not allow a robust interrogation of an account given 
by programme managers.  
 
For example, one programme manager from one of 
participating departments neither attained his targeted 
performance nor revealed he had done so when ‘giving an 
account’ to the MEC. No action was taken against him since 
the HOD and the MEC could not tell whether the account 
given to them was incomplete.  
 
The interviewee argued that this example shows that the lack of 
giving a comprehensive account has an impact on the actual account 
given by the HOD and MEC to either portfolio committees. The MEC 
has the authority to summon all programme managers to give an account 
where it has not been given comprehensively. Yet in the experience 
of many interviewees, this does not always happen.     
 
d. Account to Treasury and national government 
According to many interviewees, an account given to the HODs and 
MECs by various program managers is consolidated by and submitted 
to both Treasury and National departments. As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, the Treasury has the responsibility prescribed by the 
constitution and PFMA to create a framework for government 
institutions to give an account. The HODs of provincial departments 
give an account to the provincial treasury as part of their 
compliance with PFMA and constitutional requirements. This account 
on performance and the use of public finance are given to the 
treasury office every month. The Treasury has developed specific 
reports of which departments’ HODs are to give an account of the 
use of public finance and their performance. According to 
interviewees, in-year monitoring reports are used by provincial 
departments to inform the Treasury on a monthly basis of the use of 
funds and the attainment of targets.   
 
The PFMA prescribes that the different departments HODs should 
submit these reports on a monthly basis to the Treasury to indicate 
attained targets and intended future spending and targets (Ramos, 
2000). According to the representatives interviewed, an account 
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given to the Treasury helps the MEC of finance to determine whether 
other government departments are in compliance with norms and 
standards. Whether the funds have been used for their intended 
purpose is not always investigated by the Treasury upon receiving 
account. Of those interviewees giving an account to Treasury, one 
interviewee criticised the Treasury in its role as an accountability 
institution. Upon receipt of an account, the Treasury may decide 
whether to refuse the use of remaining funds by the relevant 
departments in cases where the account given is not satisfactory. 
The account to the Treasury is used to request funds to spend in 
the following months.  
 
After a review of these reports, the Treasury could deny funds to 
accounting departments as a means of holding them to account. On 
the other hand, according to the majority of departments 
representatives interviewed, national government departments are 
more concerned with receiving accounts on conditional grants from 
individual departments in the province than accounting on the entire 
performance. Account on conditional grants is used to determine 
whether the ‘ear-marked’ funds allocated by national government are 
used as intended. According to the interviewees, the national 
government relies on the Premier’s quarterly account reports on 
performance as a whole and not just on reports on conditional grants. 
According to interviewees, the account given to national government 
departments is, dependent on specific requirements in a given point 
in time.  
 
Basically, provincial departments are not expected to give account 
to the national government for their performance or their use of 
finances. According to the majority of departments’ interviewees’, 
national government relies on provincial measures like legislature, 
PSC and provincial treasury to enhance accountability. 
 
e. Account to portfolio committee (PL) 
According to one interviewee the political head (MEC) and 
administrator (HOD) of each provincial department are expected, for 
accountability purposes, to give account to their portfolio 
committee members at least once every three months throughout the 
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spending year. Through the interviewees’ experiences, the accounting 
sessions between them are pre-arranged and agreed upon between the 
legislature committees and political heads. It is in these meetings 
that the HOD gives account of the use of public finance and the 
performance of his department, while the MEC gives account for 
attainment of political outcomes. According to interviewees in most 
of instances, ‘giving an account’ is done both verbally and in 
written reports.  
 
Furthermore, portfolio committee members obtain accountability 
reports and review them before summoning departmental respective 
HODs and MECs to answer questions related to these reports. 
Legislature representatives interviewed further explained that the 
members of portfolio committees meet with their constituents’ 
members before they summon HODs and MECs for an account and ask for 
further views. Constituency members are citizens represented in the 
house of the legislature by the committee members. The HOD and MECs 
have to account to the committees for any issues raised by 
constituents. According to the departmental representatives 
interviewed, departments are represented by the MEC and HOD in these 
account-giving sessions to the portfolio committee members.  
 
The account-giving sessions between the HODs and MECs and portfolio 
committees are ‘intense debates’ with portfolio committee members 
expecting accounts from the departments’ representatives. A 
significant number of interviewees highlighted that the main 
challenge, of ‘giving an account’ to the portfolio committees is 
that some committee members are often caught up with disrupting the 
account-giving debates, preventing them from focusing on issues in 
the reports and instead raising politically motivated matters. One 
interviewee claimed that this derailing is often motivated by the 
desire to protect an underperforming and poorly accountable 
political head and their department. The committee members do not 
want to be seen as being nasty to their fellow political members 
(MECs). In  his recent criticism to members of portfolio committees 
in parliament, Parker (2012) argued that question time in 
legislature houses is being used by politicians to appease each 
other as opposed to affirming accountability. 
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f. Giving an account to citizens 
According to the departments’ interviewees, an account on government 
performance and the use of finance for provincial citizens is given 
using various platforms. More than half of the interviewees argued 
that there are currently no mechanisms and frameworks that enable 
the provincial government to give direct account to the citizens on 
a regular basis. At least seventy per cent of the HODs interviewed 
criticized the current system of accountability for not making 
citizens’ accountability a priority. In spite of the lack of a 
systematic process of ‘giving an account’ to citizens, departments 
rely on secondary measures to account to citizens. Secondary 
measures include the publishing of performance and finance reports 
on departments’ official websites, printing reports and making them 
available at district and regional offices, public meetings like 
Izimbizos and use of other mass media briefing.   
 
Yet not much account is being given to provincial citizens by 
departments, as these measures are often used for reasons other than 
giving an account to citizens. All the HODs that took part in this 
research were adamant that they publish finance and performance 
reports, policies and strategies on departments’ official websites 
where citizens can easily access them. A snapshot survey on the 
availability of these reports and policies on websites by the thesis 
author is set out in Table 4.1. The analysis shows that not many 
departments in the North West province have properly functioning 
websites. Table 4.1 has legends which provide explanations of the 
diagram. Table 4.1 further shows that some department websites are 
not properly functioning and certain reports are not always 
available through their websites. The diagram also indicates that 
some reports listed could not be accessed immediately due to delays 
in opening them during a couple of attempts at one point.  
 
The fact that most of the citizens in remote areas have limited 
access to the internet or to libraries could explain why giving an 
account to citizens is even more challenging for many departments. 
There is a common recommendation from all research interviewees with 
regards to citizens’ accountability, namely that government 
129 
 
departments and other accountability institutions ought to 
strengthen frameworks and legislation that compels departments to 
give an account to citizens. The recommendation was made because 
they all regard regular engagements with citizens as important for 
enhancing transparency, accountability and ensuring the 
participation of citizens in government activities. As one official 
said:    
 
‘If we could regularly communicate to the citizens our 
actions, intentions and achievements there would not be 
these riots’  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. 1 Departments websites information snapshot North West   
 North West Province 
Description 
Social 
developm
ent Education 
Communi
ty 
safety 
& Human 
Settlem
ent 
Agricul
ture 
and 
traditi
onal 
affairs 
Local 
governm
ent 
Spor
ts 
and 
cult
ure 
Economi
c 
develop
ment 
Treas
ury 
Websites 
working                 
31-Mar-12 ! √ ! √ √ √ √ √ 
30-Apr-12 ! √ ! √ √ √ √ √ 
Planning 
documents 
published                 
31-Mar-12 ? X √ √ X ? X x 
30-Apr-12 ? X √ √ X ? X x 
Quarterly 
reports 
published                 
31-Mar-12 X X X X X X X x 
30-Apr-12 X X X X X X X x 
Annual 
reports 
published                 
31-Mar-12 X X ? √ √ ? X x 
30-Apr-12 X X ? √ √ ? X x 
Legends: √: Satisfactory, X: Not Satisfactory,!:Website not working, ?: Outdated reports 
Sources: Compiled by author using departments websites 
 
g. Comprehensive processes of giving an account  
Some interviewees argued that the key weakness of the process of 
accountability is the lack of processes by many departments to 
directly account to its citizens. According to some interviewees 
having various platforms of ‘giving an account’ increases the 
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chances of an account reaching many stakeholders. Giving an account 
to citizens needs to be improved as the current processes are 
ineffective. According to fewer interviewees the lack of enthusiasm 
by provincial citizens in demanding government accountability 
further perpetuates impotence in the current processes of 
accountability. A minority number of the government interviewees 
argue that provincial citizens’ lack of interest in acknowledging 
and demanding accountability from the government perpetuates poor 
accountability.  
 
In citizens’ defence one interviewee argued that citizens are of 
the view that many departmental executives and their departments 
give account about matters that are, in most cases, not important 
to citizens. Citizens are made to believe that provincial government 
departments are not aware of most of the public services that 
directly affect citizens. A research report by the World Bank about 
accountability in South Africa also raises concerns that citizens 
believe that government accountability is often irrelevant 
(WorldBank, 2011). As a result of the irrelevancy of government 
accountability, citizens often decide not to demand accountability, 
as other interviewees emphasised. But apart from weak government 
accountability to citizens, the process of provincial government 
accountability is integrated from the planning stage towards 
implementation and reporting on achievements.  
 
In order to emphasise this need to be comprehensive, HODs and MECs 
should give both a verbal and written account to the portfolio 
committees, AG, PSC and the Treasury office. According to the 
experience of many interviewees the provincial legislature through 
its portfolio committees, may also summon HODs and MECs to give 
account on any issues that are raised by local citizens. In ‘giving 
an account’ for their performance and use of finances, MECs and HODs 
should provide further evidence that support the account they are 
giving. If, for an example, the HOD reports that an individual 
achieved his targets as part of the process of giving an account, 
then this individual should provide proof that is measurable in 
substantiation of achievement.  
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But in cases where targeted performance is not obtained MECs and 
HODs do at times fail to provide reasons for the failure while 
portfolios committees are do not always demanded to provide such an  
account. According to interviewees, the lack of demanding reason 
for not attaining performance is a major weakness of the 
accountability processes. Executives of provincial departments 
often justify failures to attain planned targets as being 
attributable to the lack of funds and high vacancy rates, three out 
of eight interviewees argued this. The explanation of a lack of 
funds and a high vacancy rate as reasons for poor accountability 
and the failure to attain envisaged targets are disputed by 
portfolio committees. In many cases, legislature committee members 
probe whether these excuses are valid. In essence, as many 
interviewees cited, the process of giving an account is 
comprehensive to a certain extent due to the limited opportunity 
for legislature and other stakeholders to probe the validity of 
account given.  
 
According to interviewees lack of account to citizens does not have 
any adverse effect on the functioning of provincial departments in 
the province, particularly on departmental budgets. According to 
interviewees the worst that could happen is that citizens riot as a 
common means of demanding account from government. As a result of 
lack of incentives to account citizens, provincial government 
departments do not give account to its citizens. The lack of a 
comprehensive process of holding departments’ executives to account 
has proved, as departmental representatives argued, to have adverse 
consequences on how many of them actually bother to give account in 
future. If departmental executives are not held to account, the 
process of giving account is seen to be less important. These views 
are supported by earlier arguments made by one HOD that they would 
rather give an account to the AG and other accountability 
institutions rather than legislature.  
 
HODs gain support and follows-ups from AG and PSC, and this adds 
value to departmental performances. Getting support as result of 
‘giving an account’ incentivises departments’ executives to account 
to only specific stakeholders at the expense of others, such as 
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citizens. In many cases portfolio committee members are given an 
account but, many interviewees complained not much would come from 
the process in terms of being held to account or even providing 
support on government performance. Portfolio committee members are 
criticised for not using account given to them by MECs and HODs as 
a way to extract benefits from both departments and provincial 
citizens by holding the account givers to account. As one HOD 
interviewee further mentioned, portfolio committee members focus on 
matters within their own political organisations as opposed to 
matters to do with departmental performances and usage of finance. 
 
The fact that HODs are not also expected to account on the impact 
of their performance is a deficiency of the process in giving an 
account as mentioned by all interviewees. Accordingly HODs and MECs 
are only expected to account for what they have and haven’t done 
for a given period, but the impact on their performance on citizens 
or the environment is not always considered during the 
accountability process. According to these interviewees, the lack 
of giving an account has an impact in society as lack of government 
performance makes it difficult to determine the extent of attainment 
of government outcomes.      
 
4.2.3. Holding to account: North West Province   
According to more than half of the representatives interviewed, it 
is naturally expected that actions be taken by those receiving it 
in response to a given account. Interviewees emphasized that holding 
departments’ executives to account is just as important as giving 
an account. In holding government department executives to account, 
portfolio committee members or any interests’ groups receiving an 
account may recall a political head from their positions for 
consistent underperformance. According to the departmental 
representatives interviewed, recalling underperforming and 
unaccountable executives is an effective way of holding them to 
account. Furthermore most interviewees reflected that in order to 
hold executives to account, portfolio committee members rely not 
only on the account given by departmental executives but also on 
citizens’ petitions and complaints.  
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According to those interviewed in the NW, action is expected to be 
taken by the provincial legislature, citizens, the national 
government, the Premier, the Treasury, AG and public service 
commission. But the experience of interviewees revealed that every 
stakeholder group is limited in the actions they can take when 
holding government executives to account. They further indicated 
that the current accountability framework of accountability allows 
certain stakeholders to hold departments’ executives to account. 
According to all of the interviewees in the province, previous 
actions that have been taken by portfolio committees and the 
national Treasury as part of the holding of departments to account 
include: reducing fund allocations as a result of under-spending, 
the recalling of MECs and losing voting constituents to political 
party opposition.  
 
According to department interviewees, the plausibility and 
practicality of holding government executives and administrators to 
account is dependent on who is doing it. The HODs and directors 
interviewed argued that provincial citizens are not in a position 
to hold departmental executives to account on a regular basis. 
Instead, they give accountability to citizens as being mainly 
delivered through elections that take place every five years. But, 
according to many of those interviewed, waiting for five years to 
hold executives to account is discouraging to provincial citizens 
to be active in this role. Ashworth and Skelcher (2005) suggested 
that the ballot box is a measure used by citizens to hold government 
executives to account. But, according to one interviewee, there are 
other measures used by citizens to hold government to account, such 
as the decision to riot over public services. Furthermore the 
interviewee emphasised that the government often understands 
citizens better when they riot.  
 
Many citizens around the province recently added their voice to a 
culture of putting pressure on the government by public 
demonstrations. Riots are perceived  as a measure of holding 
government to account for poor service delivery and a lack of 
accountability (Jain, 2010). Citizens frequently riot to draw the 
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attention of political and government executives and, at times, 
suggest the removal of underperforming executives. There are no 
proper measures to allow citizens to recall the executives of 
provincial departments as part of a process of accountability. 
Citizens’ riots are forcing the representatives of government 
departments’ to listen to citizens’. However as other interviewees 
argued, they are not effective for holding government to account.  
 
The other  deficiency of the current process of voting is that, 
during national elections, citizens are allowed to vote for their 
political organisations but not the individual political head 
(Álvarez-Rivera, 2010). The Premier has the authority to remove or 
to replace political heads in government. This is perceived by 
interviewees as a measure to enhance redress even though this 
process is yet to be implemented consistently.    
 
a. Portfolio committees role  
One of the interviewees highlighted that members of portfolio 
committees can exert pressure on MECs and HODs through verbal 
questioning during the summons as part of holding them to account. 
Committee members may further request department representatives to 
submit performance reports for the scrutiny of evidence of 
performance attainment. A view shared by the majority of the 
interviewed departmental representatives is that recommendations 
are often made to the Premier to either recall the MEC or to impose 
sanctions on a particular department. The portfolio committee is 
limited to making recommendations when exercising the holding of 
MECs and HODs to account on their performances. This view is 
supported by the representatives of the legislature interviewed. 
Some of the HODs interviewed are concerned that they are expected 
to give an account to the legislature committees, yet committees 
are unable to use such explanations to hold them to account.  
 
The current practice is for the political heads of departments and 
their administrators to give both a quarterly and a monthly account 
to portfolio committees on their performance and use of finance.  
After each meeting, resolutions are taken by portfolio committees 
regarding the account given by government. In particular, 
135 
 
resolutions that can recall the MECs are given to the Premier. It 
is of further importance to note that it is the prerogative of the 
Premier and the MEC concerned to implement the resolutions given by 
portfolio committees, according to departments’ representatives. 
One example was given of a scenario where the portfolio committee 
had recommended that the MEC from a poorly performing department be 
recalled following a trend of poor performances in his department, 
but the recommendation was not implemented by the Premier and the 
portfolio committee could not force the Premier to implement such a 
recommendation.  
 
The departmental representatives interviewed in this research 
overall argue that the role of the provincial legislature in holding 
MECs and HODs to account is significantly weak. They attribute the 
weaknesses to various factors including the political affiliation 
of both members of the committees and departmental political heads. 
According to interviewees, all chairs of the portfolio committees 
and MECs belong to the same political organisation which makes it 
rather difficult for the former to hold the latter to account in 
certain cases. The other interviewees argued that having MECs and 
chairs of portfolio committees being members of the same political 
party leads to internal political party conflicts with regards to 
accountability. There are four main political parties represented 
in the house of the legislature: the African National Congress (ANC) 
with 25 seats, the Congress of the People (COPE) with 3 seats, the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) with 3 seats and the United Christian 
Democratic Party (UCDP) with 2 seats. 
 
There are currently eight portfolio committees created from all of 
the afore-mentioned thirty-three seats. All committees are led 
(chaired) by ANC members and all of the political heads delegated 
to lead departments are ANC members. According to interviewees, this 
set-up makes it challenging for fellow political members to hold 
each other to account. Table 4.2 illustrates various portfolio 
committees and government departments with both their chairs and 
MECs respectively. Indeed, all the leaders of portfolio committees 
are members of the same political organisation as that of MECs. The 
table was prepared from the data displayed in the North West 
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provincial legislature website during the year 2012. It is these 
relationships and structures that make it difficult in certain 
cases, for the portfolio committees to hold government executives 
to account.  
 
According to interviewees there have been improvements in trying to 
enforce the resolutions by provincial legislature even though much 
still need to be done.      
 
Table 4. 2 Provincial legislature political representations NW 
Portfolio committee and department name 
Chair 
members of 
the 
committee 
Politic
al 
affilia
tions 
Members of executive 
council (MEC) 
Agriculture, Rural Development, 
Conservation & Development 
Hon Dodo 
Baloyi ANC Hon. Desbo Mohono  
Education, Sports, Arts & Culture 
Hon Fenny 
Motaldiile ANC 
Hon. Tebogo Modise & 
Hon. Moruakgomo L 
Mabe  
Human Settlement and Public Safety 
Hon. M.L 
Matsemela ANC Hon. Nono Maloi 
Health, Social Development, Women, Youth 
& People with disabilities 
Hon. K.V. 
Kekesi ANC 
Hon. Dr. Magome 
Masike & Hon. 
Mosetsanagape 
Mokomela-Mothibi 
Local Government & Traditional Affairs 
Hon. A.J. 
Mothupi ANC Hon. China Dodovu 
Public Works, Roads & Transport 
Hon. G.H. 
Galeng ANC Hon. Raymond Elisha 
SCOPA 
Hon. H.P. 
Chauke ANC   
Economic Development & Tourism 
Hon. O.R. 
Kasienyane ANC 
Hon. Motlalepula 
Rosho 
Source: Websites of NWPG (NWPG, 2012, NWPL, 2012) 
 
b. The Premier’s role in holding into account 
Five of the HODs who were interviewed were all asked about their 
views on the Premier’s role with regards to holding executives to 
account. Only one of them was able to give a straightforward response 
while the other four seemed unprepared to be critical on the Premier. 
They argued that they would not say much due to their lack of 
authority about their roles and responsibilities. The other 
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interviewee argued that the Premier should always see to it that 
the portfolio committees’ resolutions are implemented in government. 
She is also in a position to see to it that the executives of 
government departments are held to account on their performance and 
use of public finances. The representative of provincial 
departments’ who responded to the question of whether the Premier 
is holding departments executives to account as expected was not 
convinced that the Premier is playing her role as expected.  
 
He argued that there are examples that discredit the Premier in 
holding executive to account. Out of the eight departments 
represented in the interview processes, only three HODs were 
comfortable to respond to whether the Premier holds executive to 
account. The other five did not want to submit their views, which 
seems to suggest that the Premier is neither doing well nor not 
doing well with regards to holding executives to account. Other 
interviewees argued that the Premier has other measures that she 
uses to hold HODs and MECs to account. An example was given of the 
weak role of the Premier with regard to the Department of Public 
Works, which recently created a trend of receiving unsatisfactory 
audit reports on their financial management and failing to attaining 
their targeted performance. According to the officials interviewed, 
there is not much evidence to suggest that the Premier holds the 
MECs and HODs of the department of public works to account on their 
performance despite the continuous failure to manage public funds 
and meet performance targets.  
 
According to interviewees, many departments’ performances have 
deteriorated rather than improve, as a consequence of the Premier’s 
failure to hold the MECs and HODs to account. There are many claims 
of corruption in different government departments that had not yet 
been investigated and resolved. The current Premier has been in 
office since the year 2009. But the NW cabinet has experienced more 
than one reshuffling by the Premier since she took office. The 
reshuffling of the MECs or their being replaced by new MECs has 
meant the reallocation of departments to some executives also with 
the removal of others. Multiple reshuffling is seen as an attempt 
of the Premier to hold underperforming MECs to account by recalling 
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them. Yet many interviewed executives argue that the Premier is not 
doing enough to hold political heads to account.    
4.2.4. Redress and corrective steps: North West Province 
For the purposes of this thesis, the notion of redress concerns 
processes and measures put in place within government departments 
to remedy unsatisfactory government performance with regard to its 
citizens. In this PATIGAHAR dimension the focus is on determining 
whether provincial government departments have measures in place to 
allow citizens to complain about poor service delivery and for such 
complaints to be addressed. Redress further determines whether 
citizens are able to receive corrective measures on any grievance 
they have about public services(Ashworth and Skelcher, 2005). 
According to the departmental representatives interviewed these 
remedial steps are imposed through recommendations and the 
introduction of new policies by the portfolio committee members, 
the Premier, provincial citizens, the Treasury, the national 
government and AG and PSC.  
 
Many interviewees argued that remedying the dissatisfaction of 
citizens with government services is difficult to achieve in the 
current accountability system. They further argued that government 
departments do not have effective performance management systems 
that enable them to measure and determine whether citizens gain 
redress where public services are poor. Departmental interviewees 
revealed that the lack of an effective performance management system 
is attributable to various reasons, including: the lack of a 
systematic framework to identify poor services, the lack of 
acknowledgement of the poor quality of certain departments and the 
fact that not all government departments have service standards for 
their public services. According to the departmental officials 
interviewed, Batho Pele was introduced by the national government 
to support government departments in redressing poor public 
services.  
 
But, according to many interviewees, as an accountability measure 
Batho Pele has not achieved its desired purpose since its 
introduction in government departments more than a decade ago. 
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Chapter Seven of the thesis will analyse in detail Batho Pele as an 
accountability measure.  
 
a. Unsatisfactory performance for redress 
According to interviewees, provincial departments do not have a 
common measure to identify unsatisfactory performance, but they have 
a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework from which departments 
reflect on the achievements of the targets envisaged. Programme 
managers within departments prepare quarterly reports on target-led 
performances, indicating poor performances where applicable. These 
reports are presented to HODs by program managers on a monthly and 
quarterly basis. According to interviewees, the HODs make use of 
these reports to determine whether the department has achieved 
targeted performance and service quality. In the interviewees’ 
experience, it is at this stage that redress measures would be 
determined to the service users and citizens concerned. All public 
managers reflected on the unsatisfactory performance with action 
plans to improve their performances.  
 
One interviewee emphasised that in the cases where underperformance 
and poor service quality persists, department HODs and MECs should 
investigate the reasons. In this case, where underperformance is 
due to lack of skill the manager concerned is sent for the entire 
skills development program necessary with the objective of improving 
his skills. The impact of the training is often positive, and this 
is further attributable to the fact that managers play a role in 
determining the skills development gap and the type of training 
course to be attended. But this process does not always benefit the 
department concerned, with cases of some of the officials resigning 
subsequent to skills development. Some interviewed representatives 
raised concerns that such cases leave departments with a vacuum and 
thus little progress in redressing the underperformance. As one 
department official stated, in cases where the HOD and MEC attribute 
underperformance to negligence or laziness, disciplinary enquiry 
are commissioned on the part of the programme managers.  
 
As a result of these disciplinary hearings, redress measures should, 
according to the officials interviewed, be put in place where poor 
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performances have been identified in the departmental public service 
management process. The experience is that not all hearings are 
effective in bringing redress to underperforming departments. The 
failure is attributable to delays in implementing disciplinary 
hearing recommendations, often due to the interferences of 
politicians or labour organisations. According to two HODs 
interviewed, labour organisations make the case that their members 
departments’ employees are unfairly treated in disciplinary 
hearings. The process of allowing labour organisations to present 
their cases has an adverse effect on improving service delivery. 
The process focuses on identifying and analysing unsatisfactory 
performance within departments and introducing measures to 
redressing them.  
 
Externally, portfolio committee have two processes, according to 
interviewees, from which they identify whether the service rendered 
by the government is satisfactory to citizens. The first process 
takes performance reports audited by the AG as well as reviews 
findings and evidence. The portfolio committee members subpoena MECs 
and HODs to give an explanation where the AG has found them to have 
underperformed and a poor service being rendered. Committee members 
rely on the work of the AG to identify underperformance in provincial 
government departments. The impact on citizens and service users of 
this underperformance is also considered by the portfolio 
committees. According to interviewees, while the MEC and HOD justify 
their actions on audit performance reports, committee members 
prepare lists of remedial actions to be implemented. These remedial 
actions are dependent on the extent of the underperformance 
reported.  
 
Remedial actions take the form of either punitive measures or 
capacity building measures, as has mentioned earlier in this 
section. The majority of the interviewee’s experience echoed that a 
popular punitive measure often recommended by committee members is 
the commissioning of special investigations into the root causes of 
underperformance and the corrective measures to be implemented 
subsequently. The investigations outcome often justifies the 
recalling of the HOD, the implication of unsatisfactory performance 
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by the MEC or the lack of measures introduced to prevent the 
recurrence of poor performance. There have been many forensic 
investigations taking place in some of the provincial government 
departments in the North West (Mthembu, 2011). Forensic 
investigations were given as examples to support the evidence of 
the departmental representatives interviewed that investigations 
were commissioned to redress unsatisfactory performance.  
 
The second process of identifying underperformances takes place 
during the year of THAT performance when portfolio committee members 
visit service delivery areas and government projects. The process 
allows committee members to verify whether departments are indeed 
providing the intended service to citizens. Portfolio committee 
members use the opportunity to seek citizens’ views on government 
performances. Visiting service delivery points gives portfolio 
committee members the opportunity to determine the impact of the 
service provided by the provincial government. With committee 
members engaging with citizens and service users, it is expected 
that constituents’ underperformance would be identified.  
 
One interview gave an example of when his department promised 
to make sure that all social grants available under the umbrella 
of the child support grant are given to beneficiaries through 
their bank accounts rather than being made available as cash in 
hand. The purpose of using this approach was to eliminate delays 
in providing grants to beneficiaries and also to provide 
courtesy to disabled beneficiaries. But in one rural area, 
visiting committee members noticed that an old system was still 
being used. It was at this point that portfolio committees 
demanded the redress to the grant recipients.  
 
The use of the old system was seen by portfolio committee members 
as a failure to provide good service. The committee members 
subsequently went to the HOD and demanded that he apologise and 
rectify the wrongdoing. 
 
b. Implementing corrective steps  
According to departments’ interviewees, provincial citizens are 
prevented from gaining redress due to the lack of interest in 
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government departments’ executives in implementing corrective 
steps. Corrective steps are either recommended by portfolio 
committees and AG and PSC. It is often the prerogative of both 
departmental MECs and HODs to decide whether to implement corrective 
steps. The experience is that not all corrective steps are always 
implemented, regardless of the degree to which poor performance has 
been correctly identified and investigated. The culture is generally 
one of a lack of appetite to implement the corrective steps 
recommended by external bodies (external from department, e.g. 
portfolio committees) as opposed to those suggested by the 
departmental management team.  
 
Although the implementation of corrective steps in government 
department is monitored by those recommending them, it is not always 
the case that actions are taken over poor implementation. HODs and 
MECs are able to monitor the remedial steps recommended since they 
are at the reach of department management. External stakeholders, 
like portfolio committees and AG, follow-up on the implementation 
of corrective steps by government departments. According to many 
interviewees this supervision is not enough as many departments do 
not completely implement the remedial actions recommended. The PC 
and AG rely on the MEC and the HOD to monitor and report on the 
progress of remedial actions.  
 
c. External interference on redress 
The lack of implementation of remedial action is often attributable 
to external interference, such as political parties wanting to 
protect deployed members, this was according to the interviewees. 
Such external interference may relate to the use of political 
connections to derail the implementation of corrective measures. 
Interference may come from other members of the legislature, those 
belonging to the same political organisation, delaying the 
imposition of punitive measures where needed. Interference in the 
implementation of remedial measures often occurs in circumstances 
where the MEC and HOD are recalled from their positions as a result 
of consistent underperformance or corrupt activities. Other members 
of the legislature cite unfair processes or procedures used to 
recall MECs and HODs.  
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Members interfering with redress measures either argue that 
allegations of poor performance and maladministration are not 
factual or should be proved in the court of law. Recalling MECs is 
otherwise perceived by opposition parties as a failure of the ruling 
political party, meaning that other members of the same party would 
rather dispute poor performance regardless of the evidence. 
According to most of the government department representatives 
interviewed these interferences often lead to delays in redressing 
poor performance by the government departments concerned. Most of 
the time these cases drag on for longer periods but in other 
instances they end up in out-of-contract settlements between the 
department and the MEC concerned, without admission of poor 
performance. In cases of corruption allegations, MEC often 
voluntarily resign from their position or are redeployed to other 
positions in or out of the province.  
 
According to the remaining period of contract in cases of voluntary 
resignation the departments concerned pay the salary of the 
resigning MEC. The ruling political party (ANC) recently 
acknowledged the weakness it is facing where redress is not 
effectively implemented with regards to its politically appointed 
executives. The ANC initiated the debate surrounding this problem 
of holding political heads accountability in its recent policy 
conference that was held in June 2012 (Zuma, 2012). The weakness 
acknowledged here was that when the MECs of various departments were 
accused of corrupt activities, it often took longer to prove the 
facts in government. As a result, citizens do not fully gain redress. 
Other external interferences cited to the implementation of redress 
measures, relates to labour organisations complaining that their 
members are unfairly treated.  
 
Recalled departmental officials and political heads make use of 
their labour representation to challenge any attempts to recall them 
due to alleged poor performance. Labour unions often challenge 
remedial actions aimed at imposing punitive measures on their 
members, and this is regarded as being unfair to the members 
concerned.  
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An example was given of when the HOD of the Department of 
Education had been recalled by portfolio committee members 
(through the office of the premier and the MEC) for poor 
performance, maladministration and corruption. The HOD was 
suspended for a period of two years with full pay and sent his 
labour organisation to fight on his behalf. The HOD was later 
reinstated although he later resigned to further his political 
career in another province. He was given a ‘golden handshake’ 
paying him for the remainder of his contract.  
 
There was political interference from national government in the 
provinces to make sure that he was not found guilty and recalled. 
This was the example given by one HOD interviewed, worried that 
these interferences lead to poor redress being achieved for 
unsatisfactory performance.  
 
4.3. Gauteng Province 
Gauteng and North West are similar in their provincial government 
framework of accountability between departments and various 
stakeholders. However, according to the experience of government 
executives interviewed in the research, their understanding of 
implementation varies. The interviewees explained that amongst the 
reasons for these variations is that the accountability frameworks 
developed by the national treasury are to be implemented based on 
the understanding of respective provinces. In this section of 
Chapter four, differences in terms of understanding, experience and 
implementation of accountability frameworks between GP and NW are 
highlighted. Section 114 of the constitution gives provincial 
government powers to devise their own policies and frameworks that 
would ensure accountability and service delivery are provided both 
economically and efficiently (Constitution of Republic of South 
African act of 1996, Chapter 6).  
 
Here an analysis follows a similar approach to the PATIGAHAR model 
with four accountability dimensions to analyse interviewees’ views. 
This section analysis places an emphasis on varying views and 
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experiences of government accountability in contrast with that 
raised by North West province interviewees.  
 
4.3.1 Taking into account: Gauteng Province (GP) 
a. Taking into account and portfolio committees  
As with the North West province, government officials interviewed 
in Gauteng argued that it is important when considering government 
decisions to ‘take into account’ the views raised by members of the 
legislature. However according to both the departments and 
legislature representatives interviewed the relationship and 
diverging sphere of responsibility between provincial government 
and portfolio committees need clarification. According to the views 
of provincial government department representatives, there is often 
uncertainty about what is the relationship between the executive 
and legislative authority. The majority of the executives 
interviewed argued that legislature members don’t often uphold their 
responsibility for guiding departments by giving their views on 
performance. There are equally those interviewees arguing that it 
is not the responsibility of the legislature to give views that are 
to be taken into account by departments.  
 
Accordingly to interviewees in GP, ‘taking into account’ provincial 
legislature members’ views in government decisions is the government 
executives prerogative. They further indicated that legislature and 
provincial departments are separate and autonomous arms of 
government, meaning that they cannot impose views on each other. 
These interviewees further argued that they are not compelled to 
take into account the views of portfolio committee members in 
decision-making. However, they further cautioned that not being 
compelled does not suggest that HODs and MECs need not consult with 
the portfolio committees when need arises. According to interviewees 
the consultation focuses on department executives’ informing the 
legislature members on performance plans and financial spending 
forecasts. When interviewed government department executives 
emphasised that the consulting portfolio committees is very 
important in legitimizing government performance.  
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It is more important to consult portfolio committees both prior to 
the beginning of the spending year and after the year of spending. 
It is at these stages when HODs and MECs inform the legislature 
about their plans and whether they have achieved them. The 
difference between how the NW and GP government views the role of 
portfolio committees is that, provincial government departments in 
GP argue that the views of the legislature are not imposed on 
government. Gauteng officials further emphasised that they consult 
provincial legislature for the purpose of informing portfolio 
committees on planned performance and the use of public finances. 
On the other hand North West government representatives argue that 
portfolio committee members should play a greater role than just 
being informed about government plans.  
 
Another notable difference of view is that, NW interviewed officials 
argued that portfolio committee members should give inputs to be 
taken into account by government departments in their decision-
making. The government officials interviewed in Gauteng conceded 
that portfolio committee members make recommendations on their 
engagements but, department executives are not compelled to take 
them into account as government departments. According to the 
departmental representatives interviewed in Gauteng, another motive 
for consulting with members of portfolio committees is to allow 
legislature to scrutinise government’s plans based on citizens’ 
priorities. It is the prerogative of respective departments’ MEC 
and HOD to determine whether to take into account portfolio 
committee members’ views in their decisions and activities.  
 
Provincial government departments’ representatives regard portfolio 
committee members as the representatives of provincial citizens. 
From this point of view it is important for government department 
executives to regularly consult portfolio committee members. One 
HOD summarised this priority by saying: 
’Remember these are public representatives so they know 
better what the people want. So we need to consult them to 
understand public issues’ 
 
The reason why HODs and MECs regard consulting portfolio committee 
members as important is that this accountability process benefits 
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provincial citizens, since there are otherwise limited 
accountability frameworks with citizens. In comparison to the North 
West provincial government’s perspective on accountability 
engagement with portfolio committees, in the Gauteng government HODs 
and MECs do not expect portfolio committee members to influence 
government decisions. The views on how Gauteng government 
representatives understand the role of portfolio committee members 
are represented in Figure 4.8. The diagram represents common 
responses from different interviewees in taking into account 
portfolio committee inputs.  
 
There were fourteen government department representatives 
interviewed and all their views are represented in the diagram. They 
were all asked to express their views on why departments engage with 
portfolio committee members. Various views were made regarding 
whether provincial departments should consult portfolio committees 
on activities that include the budget allocation process and the 
approval of performance plans citizens’ priorities, as well as 
assisting departmental performance and holding departments to 
account. They should also oversee activities and perform a 
monitoring role, provide a mandate to department, expect an account 
from departments, interrogate plans for outcomes, and make 
recommendations to improve plans of action. These views were 
analysed according to the number of times they were mentioned by 
different government officials during interviews. All the views were 
mentioned more than once by all interviewed officials.  
 
In Figure 4.8 it is clear that ‘ensuring citizens priorities are 
taken into account’ is mentioned significantly more than other 
views, amongst 25% of responses. Ensuring citizens priorities are 
taken into account is followed by committees expecting an account 
and holding HODs and MECs to account as popular views on the role 
of the legislature. There are few responses that support the idea 
of portfolio committees approving government performance and 
financial plans with only 4% of respondents advocating that role. 
Figure 4.9 shows comparative views from the North West province 
which suggests that, of the views to be taken into account, the role 
of the legislature is more important than in Gauteng. 
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Figure 4 8 Departments views on legislature role GP  
 
      Source: compiled from data collected 
Figure 4 9 Inter-provincial comparison of legislature role NW and GP  
Source: compiled from data collected 
b. Citizen engagement 
Discussions on accountability engagements between portfolio 
committees and government departments put more emphasis on the 
citizens’ views that are taken into account and prioritised in 
government decisions. All fourteen government representatives 
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interviewed in Gauteng believe that, due to the lack of a systematic 
and legislated citizens’ engagement mechanism, it is therefore 
important to use legislature as a gateway to citizens’ views. 
According to government representatives, taking into account 
citizens’ views is a priority for the provincial government despite 
the lack of processes that collect and generate the views. Attempts 
are made by various government department executives to meet and or 
consult its provincial citizens at least once in a given twelve 
month period. In probing this claim by asking for details of how 
citizens are engaged, the evidence suggests poor citizens’ 
engagement is similar to that of NW province.  
 
It is more of a wish that all provincial departments would want to 
engage provincial citizens and take into account their views but 
they don’t. Provincial departments’ representatives are unable to 
provide evidence of citizens’ consultation and which performance 
plans were informed by inputs from citizens. Some interviewees argue 
that they use Izimbizos, public meetings with citizens and toll-
free hotlines in getting citizens views. Despite these measures 
being in place, it is still the prerogative of MECs and HODs 
departments’ to decide whether to take into account citizens’ 
inputs. It is clear that most HODs and MECs do not take into account 
citizens’ inputs in decisions and government activities, being that 
they could not have evidence to suggest regular consultations with 
provincial citizens. The recent incidence of riots amongst citizens 
gives support to the poor quality of government’s accountability 
engagements to citizens with regard to the lack of service delivery 
in the country with these riots being more prevalent in the GP 
(Jain, 2010).  
 
In his provincial trends analysis of citizens’ protests about 
service delivery, Jain (2010) reported that there were more 
dissatisfied citizens in the Gauteng. Amongst other issues raised 
by the citizens is the lack of service delivery and accountability 
from the Gauteng government according to Jain (2010). The extent of 
citizens’ riots in Gauteng supports the notion that government does 
not consult with citizens as expected. Figure 4.10 shows the number 
of citizen protests that took place in the whole country between 
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the year 2007 and 2010 (Jain, 2010). Protests are classified per 
province as a percentage of total strikes. In all the four years of 
protests, Gauteng experienced more protests from citizens than the 
eight other provinces. There are other factors to be considered like 
population disparities between Gauteng and other provinces and the 
fact that it is this province is the country’s economic hub and 
capital province.  
 
Basically, if GP provincial government departments’ executives’ 
claims of engaging with citizens and taking into account their views 
do not entirely represent the reality, and if claims are genuine, 
it would mean that this figure should show fewer citizens riots for 
Gauteng province.  
 
Figure 4 10 Protests by province, percentage of total recorded   
Sources: adopted from Jain analysis (Jain, 2010) 
 
Some of the reasons cited by Jain (2010) that have led to increasing 
protests include the recognition that citizen’ complaints are not 
being taken into account by the provincial government executives 
and government departments as they make performance plans without 
the involvement of citizens. According to some interviewees, in 
instances where the representatives of government departments do 
get a chance to meet the citizens, these occasions are often used 
to inform citizens on government programs and plans. It is less 
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about listening to citizens and taking their inputs, and more about 
giving account to citizens. ‘Giving an account’ is the third 
dimension used to analyse accountability in this thesis, but this 
happens anytime in government process. With regard to hotlines, 
citizens often use government toll-free hotlines to complain about 
corruption and maladministration, as opposed to raising the issues 
that affect government services and accountability. Citizens’ 
engagement is expected to take priority in many provincial 
government departments’ agendas, but this is not always the case.  
 
c. Accountability framework  
The views of Gauteng interviewees vary with regard to whether the 
current framework of accountability is comprehensive. Six of the 
fourteen officials interviewed argued that the framework which 
allows consultation between government departments and legislature 
committees is not comprehensive and flexible. Different department 
executives are not expected to make their own contribution towards 
performance plans, as they are required to take into account 
external outcomes of their envisaged performance. These 
responsibilities are more likely to be imposed on government in 
order to take them to account, with minimal autonomy as to the 
sphere of government. The argument is that departments should take 
into account the actions of national government, portfolio 
committees’ views and the Premier’s pronouncements. Departmental 
management views are to be regarded as additional to external views 
that determine the action to be pursued.  
 
The other concern raised is that the system of consultation needs 
to be improved with clear and specific responsibilities assigned to 
all parties. Some of the portfolio committee members lack the 
capacity to exercise their duties and it is not clear to some members 
what is expected of them. The lack of capacity relates to skills 
needed in providing oversight. The fact that focus is often on 
provincial politics as opposed to issues of government performance 
during engagements, makes the process dull and irrelevant. 
Provincial politics relates to how the current political leadership 
is viewed by the official opposition in legislature, and how the 
government-led political organisation is able to dominate the 
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official opposition parties. The other eight of fourteen interviewed 
officials believe that, with regard to ‘taking into account’, the 
accountability framework is reasonable and needs minimal 
improvement. The point was that provincial departments should create 
their own accountability framework that takes into account the 
importance of consulting all stakeholders.  
 
d. Amendment of plans 
As many provincial departments allude to the inclusivity of the 
process of taking into account different stakeholder inputs, they 
further argued that creating performance plans by taking into 
account various stakeholders’ views is not flexible enough to allow 
for any subsequent amendment. If performance and financial plans 
are approved and government spending is initiated, amendments of 
such plans are discouraged. It is important for HODs and MECs to 
make performance plans as accurate and reliable as possible. Any 
additional performance targets over the year are to be introduced 
as an appendix to initially approved plans. Not allowing amendments 
of performance plans is important for accountability and 
transparency. The provincial treasury also has restrictive measures 
that prevent government departments from amending their plans.  
 
Accordingly, limiting amendments to performance plans encourages 
departments to take into account various stakeholders’ views; this 
also limits thumb-sucking and the copying of previous years’ plans 
in future years. Provincial departments are then not expected to 
make amendments to performance plans and spending forecasts once 
the spending year has started. 
 
4.3.2. Giving an account: Gauteng Province  
 
a. Account expected 
The provincial department representatives interviewed support a 
notion that they should give an account on their performance and 
finance to the provincial legislature, citizens, the national 
government and accountability institutions. The importance of giving 
account viewed by Gauteng departments’ representatives is also 
shared by the North West departments. According to interviewees, in 
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addition to giving an account, punitive measures should be imposed 
on the MEC and HOD in cases where envisaged performance during the 
accounting stage is not attained. The Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts (SCOPA) in the House of the legislature recommends punitive 
measures to the representatives of underperforming departments 
subsequent to their giving an account.  
 
b. Account to citizens 
According to provincial interviewees citizens’ accountability is a 
Gauteng government priority and is often achieved better than in 
other provincial governments in the country. Four departments’ 
representatives argued that they are making efforts to give an 
account to provincial citizens. Community meetings, stakeholders’ 
forums and Izimbizos were cited as primary measures to give account 
to citizens. This assertion of citizens’ accountability is made 
despite the lack of evidence and indication by other sources that 
there is generally a poor level of citizens’ accountability in the 
province. More than half of the respondents argued that departments 
are not expected to directly give an account to citizens. Giving 
account on government performance to citizen is the role of the 
portfolio committee in the legislature, they argued. Provincial 
departmental executives argued that they give an account to citizens 
indirectly through the account given to portfolio committees.  
 
They further indicated that portfolio committees are in a position 
to give government performance accountability to citizens as their 
representatives. The other official emphasised further that 
Izimbizos are used by government departments to give an account to 
citizens, and that this is done annually. The role of the Speaker 
of the provincial legislature is instrumental in making sure that, 
during Izimbizos, government gives account to citizens on 
performance and the use of public finances. The quarterly 
publication of government departments and annual reports on official 
websites is seen as giving an account to provincial citizens. These 
reports are available to be scrutinised by citizens without the 
interference of government departments. The claim of making 
accountability reports available on the government websites could 
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not be verified, as some departments do not publish their reports 
on official websites timeously.  
 
Some department websites are not always available to access and 
others are slow to use. Table 4.3 gives a snapshot from all 
departmental websites in determining whether reports were published 
as departments representatives had claimed. The table reflects mixed 
results; all the departmental websites of the officials interviewed 
were working properly with the exception of the Department of Road 
and Transport. Most departments’ quarterly reports are not displayed 
on their websites with the exception of community safety, 
infrastructure development and road and transport. Not all 
departments disclosed their annual reports on their official 
websites. It is mainly annual reports that are displayed on 
departments’ websites, with only two departments not showing them. 
In Table 4.3 I use legends to reflect on which departments have 
actually displayed the expected reports. The legends are explained 
at the bottom of the table.  
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Table 4. 3 Departments website information snapshot GP  
          
 Gauteng departments  
Descriptio
n 
Health 
and 
Social 
developm
ent 
Educa
tion 
Community 
safety 
Infrastr
ucture 
developm
ent 
Housing 
and 
Local 
Governm
ent  
Roads 
and 
trans
port 
Spor
ts 
and 
cult
ure 
Economi
c 
develop
ment 
Trea
sury 
Websites 
working                   
31-Mar-12 √ √ √ √ √ ! √ √ √ 
30-Apr-12 √ √ √ √ √ ! √ √ √ 
Planning 
documents 
published                   
31-Mar-12 √ √ √ √ √ X √ X x 
30-Apr-12 √ √ √ √ √ X √ X x 
Quarterly 
reports 
published                   
31-Mar-12 x X √ √ X √ X X x 
30-Apr-12 x X √ √ X √ X X x 
Annual 
reports 
published                   
31-Mar-12 √ √ √ √ ! ? √ X √ 
30-Apr-12 √ √ √ √ ! ? √ X √ 
Legends: √: Satisfactory, X: Not Satisfactory,!:Website not working, ?: Outdated reports    
Sources: Compiled by author using departments websites 
4.3.3. Holding to account: Gauteng Province 
a. Portfolio committee’s role (PL) 
The HODs and directors interviewed do not share the view of North 
West interviewees that departments and their representatives’ should 
be held to account by the legislature. Nevertheless not being held 
to account by portfolio committees is a worrying concern to some 
department executives, with other representatives believing that 
this is due to independence enjoyed by both government structures 
legislative and executive. The SCOPA members give recommendations 
to be implemented where departments experience underperformance of 
the quality of service deemed unsatisfactory. The recommendations 
are made to hold government department executives to account. 
Departments executives are expected to take the committee’s 
recommendations implement them and report back to the committee on 
the implementation of the recommendations.  
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According to interviewees, the committee has succeeded in holding 
departments’ executives to account on their performances in this 
form of giving recommendations. It is often a preference of the 
provincial government that the committee is chaired by a member of 
the opposition political parties. Having a member of the opposite 
political party legitimises the process of holding departments’ 
executives to account. Other departments’ representatives mentioned 
that, as a legislative authority, the provincial legislature is 
barred from holding government departments to account for their 
performance and use of public finance. The legislature members rely 
on having political heads (MEC) as members of the legislature that 
are able to hold departments to account. The entire legislature 
committees send recommendations and hope that they would be 
implemented by those being held to account.  
 
This has led to the criticism of the current government 
accountability system with the legislature being unable to enforce 
accountability in the provincial government. Members of portfolio 
committees are willing and able to hold departments’ executives to 
account but the fact that they cannot recall an MEC or HOD makes it 
difficult to enhance accountability. Table 4.4 shows the chairs of 
portfolio committee members and their political affiliations. They 
all belong to the same political organisation as that of MECs. It 
is argued that this makes it difficult for committees to hold MECs 
to accounts when belonging to the same political party.  
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Table 4. 4 Provincial legislature political representatives GP 
Portfolio committee and department 
name 
Chair members of the 
committee 
Political 
affiliations 
Agriculture and Rural Development 
Portfolio Committee 
Mam Nokuthula Sikakane 
ANC 
Community Safety Portfolio Committee Mam Sizakele Malobane ANC 
Education Portfolio Committee Mam Mamonare Chueu ANC 
 Roads and Transport Portfolio 
Committee 
Honourable Member 
Thuliswa Nkabinde’s ANC 
Health and Social Development 
Portfolio Committee 
Mam Molebatsi Bopape 
ANC 
Housing and Local Government 
Portfolio Committee 
Mr Errol Magerman 
ANC 
Infrastructure Development Portfolio 
Committee 
Mr Joggie Boers 
ANC 
Roads and Transport Portfolio 
Committee 
Mam  Nomantu Nkomo-
Ralehoko ANC 
Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture 
Portfolio Committee 
Mam Nompi Nhlapo 
ANC 
Economic Development Portfolio 
Committee 
Honourable Member Mafika 
Mgcina ANC 
Source: Gauteng provincial legislature 
b. The Premier’s role and uncertainty 
The responses to whether the Premier is able to hold departments to 
account on their performance were also somewhat mixed in Gauteng 
province. However as compared to the North West province respondents 
there were more responses from department representatives in Gauteng 
willing to share their views on the role played by the Premier on 
accountability. There are those departments that agree with the 
notion of the Premier not being able to demonstrate that she is 
holding departments’ representatives to account. As one Head of 
Policy in one department said: 
‘It would be the Premier’s prerogative to make sure that 
the recommendations are implemented, but whether this is 
really happening I do not know.’ 
 
There are many government departments in the province that are not 
attaining targeted performances every year, but there is no evidence 
suggesting that the Premier has held MECs and HODs of these 
departments to account. One department interviewee mentioned that 
her department receives a thirty per cent budget, which is a 
considerably high amount of the available budget annually, and since 
the department receives such high amount of budget this has led to 
the Premier wanting to ensure that money and performance is 
accounted for all times. As a result of high budget allocation, the 
Premier should ensure accountability is attained on every occasion.   
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4.3.4. Redress: Gauteng Province 
a. Effect of remedial steps 
There have been measures implemented by various departments to 
redress unsatisfactory performance, but interviewees argue that 
there is a lack of clear evidence reflecting whether redressing poor 
performance improves accountability and subsequent performance. 
Some of the departmental representatives interviewed argued that 
there are signs of improvement in performance as a result of remedial 
actions taken. The common measure used to redress poor government 
performance relates to the recalling of political heads and head of 
department, and sending officials on capacity-building initiatives. 
These recommendations are brought about by portfolio committees’ 
recommendations to the Premier in order to be implemented by 
government departments. It is important to note that this relates 
to few cases where recommended remedial actions were actually 
implemented by the summoned department.  
 
It is not always the case that departments implement remedial 
actions, as departments they would rather initiate their own 
internal process for redressing any underperformance. One official 
argued that she could not remember any remedial actions having an 
effect on performance, and is quoted as saying:  
 
‘I do not see that firing people, punishing people or taking 
away their bonuses would improve performance but demoralize 
them. I do not know of any example to use. In theory it 
could work where you have an organizational performance 
system linked to the personnel performance contract could 
work. It would be important to see a strong leadership that 
would build morals of people working in government 
organizations’.  
 
Another interviewee supported this sentiment by saying,  
 
‘So far I have not seen any effect. But I can tell there 
is a level of creating unbearable working environment. 
Maybe in long term it could improve performance. I do not 
think the corrective steps do not have effect on subsequent 
performances.’ 
 
There were other respondents who argued that the effect would also 
depend on the type of remedial action taken.  
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4.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter performance accountability arrangements in 
provincial governments were analysed based on views of both the NW 
and GP government interviewees. In the context of the thesis 
provincial departments through their executives and other 
representatives are classified as agents in a principal-agent model. 
Basically this chapter summarises agent views about accountability. 
In summarising the views about both the NW and GP accountability, 
there are agreements between provinces about how well the 
accountability framework is implemented and how badly it is 
implemented in other cases. There were also disagreements between 
how accountability arrangements work at provincial level amongst 
their representatives. The analysis further identified views from 
which both provinces may benefit each other in terms of 
accountability. 
 
The NW and GP provincial executives’ description to accountability 
could be summarised with three different understandings. 1. At first 
accountability is seen as a process of enhancing democracy between 
government and the voters. Political executives of the political 
parties are to give explanations about their plans, achievements 
and redressing mechanism to those voted into power of government. 
2. Secondly other departments’ executives see accountability as a 
process of preparing financial and performance reports and making 
them available to those who need them. This process is often more 
favourable to the stakeholders allocating funds to departments. 3 
Lastly accountability is seen as, by other executives as a process 
where government executives consult various stakeholders on their 
views about government performance.  
 
But the executives are quick to clarify that this should not be 
interpreted as imposing views on government strategies. Both 
provinces departments’ executives agreed that there are currently 
documented and undocumented accountability arrangements between 
government departments and various stakeholders including 
provincial legislatures, Auditor General, National government, 
Treasury office, Public service commission and citizens. The 
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accountability arrangements are mainly described through the acts 
and legislations passed by National government and Treasury 
including, the constitution, Public Finance Management Act. But 
despite this legislation and policies, provincial government 
departments’ executives in both provinces prioritise their 
accountability to stakeholders that either give finance or some form 
of support to be used by government departments.  
 
These stakeholders include Treasury office, National government and 
Auditor General. Provincial performance accountability frameworks 
are further strengthened and attainable in cases where the 
legislation is explicit about expectation of accountability, e.g. 
Departments executives should present on their websites or to AG 
performance and financial reports with specific contents and details 
as accountability measure. But unfortunately both the NW and GP 
governments are currently struggling with strengthening 
accountability to their citizens. Lack of proper and explicit 
accountability frameworks about citizens is attributable to poor 
government accountability to citizens. As part of provincial 
government accountability, the current lack of certainty in terms 
of budget accountability further weakens accountability in both 
provincial governments.  
 
The uncertainty is brought up by department executives arguing that 
the allocation of provincial budgets for performance to be pursued 
is the legislature’s prerogative yet the legislature argues that 
executives decides on budget allocation. Some government executives 
make use of budget uncertainties as an excuse for poor 
accountability for example; many department executives in both 
provinces blame the lack of implementation of Batho Pele as 
accountability on lack of funds allocated by the provincial 
legislature to implement the policy. Both the NW and GP provinces 
executives are convinced that lack of clarity about the role of the 
provincial legislature members with regards to holding executives 
to accounts weakens accountability. Many departments’ executives 
give account to legislature committees but it is not often that 
actions are taken for poor accountability or performance.  
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Departments’ executives would like to see legislature members taking 
actions against poor accountability and performance. The process of 
accountability suggested by department executives should also be 
explicitly documented in accountability frameworks and legislation 
prescribed to all government institutions. Many interviewees believe 
that members of the legislature should be inducted about their roles 
in holding departments’ executives to account. Both provincial 
governments’ executives argue that citizens’ accountability 
initiatives are not well institutionalised, for example Izimbizos 
is a good accountability model but not many departments implement 
it. Despite both provinces executives agreeing on accountability 
arrangements that work well and that don’t work well, there were 
also disagreements with regards to understanding and experiences of 
accountability arrangements.  
 
Many executives in the NW are of the view that the provincial 
legislature should play a more influential role in determining the 
performances on which departments are to be accountable. The NW 
departments’ executives’ argument is raised from the principal-agent 
model where the principal gives the agent directives on performance. 
In GP, departments’ executives argue that provincial legislature 
may not influence performance and financial plans from which 
accountability is expected. NW executives further argue that since 
there are currently poor accountability frameworks between 
government departments and citizens, the provincial legislature 
accountability may strengthen citizens’ participations and 
accountability since legislature members regularly meet with their 
constituents. But GP executives disagrees, urging development of 
further citizens’ accountability mechanisms and strengthening the 
use of Izimbizos and Batho Pele as citizens’ accountability 
measures. 
 
The use of the provincial legislature process like regular 
consultations as part of government citizens’ accountability should 
be considered by government departments’ executives in GP as is the 
case in NW. But GP executives are currently using the local 
government process to enhance both citizens’ participation and 
accountability in their provinces. Local governments currently have 
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direct access to various citizens groups from which views are sought 
and accountability is given. The local government process may 
improve citizens’ accountability if they are systematically and 
comprehensively implemented, as many executives are using the 
measures for accountability. The summary of main findings in this 
chapter as shown in Table 4.5 below  
 
In Chapter Five the various accountability institutions including, 
auditor general, public service commission and treasury views to 
provincial government accountability are analysed. The comparison 
is made of whether accountability institutions share similar views 
about accountability as those analysed in chapter four.  
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Table 4. 5 Summary of findings in this chapter 
 
NW Provincial 
Governments 
GP Provincial 
Governments 
Summary of accountability views 
Executives 
Views 
Executives 
Views 
     
Pursuing political manifestos and giving an account in 
relation to any failure to attain promises services 
improves democracy.  Agree Agree 
     
Preparation of financial and performance reports to 
funding agencies improves accountability  Agree Agree 
     
Consulting various stakeholders about government 
public services improves accountability, but 
stakeholders may not impose their views to be taken 
into account.  Agree Agree 
     
Specific processes of accountability are described in 
the legislation like, PFMA, Constitutions and other 
acts. It is through these legislation accountability 
is meant to be achieved. Agree Agree 
     
There is poor accountability to citizens due to lack 
of specific process from the legislation  and policies Agree Agree 
     
Uncertainty to ultimate provincial budget 
accountability weakens the accountability process, due 
to fact that many executives use excuse of lack of 
sufficient budget to attain intended performances. E.g 
Batho Pele  Agree Agree 
     
Uncertainty about the role of legislature members 
about holding departments executives to account 
weakens accountability  Agree Agree 
     
Lack of institutionalised citizens’ accountability 
initiatives weakness attempts to, take into account 
and give account to provincial citizens. Agree Agree 
     
Provincial legislature members are expected to 
influence performance plans, but government executives 
are expected to give accountability of such plans. Agree Disagree 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ACCOUNTABILITY IN PROVINCES ACCORDING TO, 
AG, PSC AND TREASURY 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, performance accountability in both the North West 
and Gauteng provincial governments is analysed from the viewpoint 
of accountability institutions. The South African constitution makes 
provision for the development of institutions that independently 
review, analyse and enhance government accountability (Constitution 
of the republic of South Africa, Act of 1996, Chapter 9 and 10). 
The institutions were developed to uphold the implementation by 
government departments of constitutional provisions of good 
governance throughout the entire country. Constitutional provisions 
are to be adhered to by government departments during the process 
of providing public services and accountability for use of public 
finance and their performance. Accountability institutions should 
determine whether government departments adhere to constitutional 
provisions.  
 
The accountability institutions are expected to provide regular 
reports and feedback to the legislative authorities, citizens, 
treasury, national assembly and other governing bodies on whether 
government executives are accountable and adhere to legislative 
requirements. These accountability institutions are known as: the 
Office of the Auditor General (AG), the Public Service Commission 
(PSC), the Office of the Public Protector, the Human Rights 
Commission, and Commission of Gender Equality, the Electoral 
Commission and the Broadcasting Authority. These accountability 
institutions are commonly known as Chapter Nine and Chapter Ten of 
the constitution. The institutions fundamental role is to determine 
whether the South African government governance and accountability 
frameworks are upheld by all government departments.  
 
They perform their role by reviewing the activities of government 
institutions and through consultation with the managers of 
government departments. It is important to note that not all of 
these constitutional institutions participated in this research; 
but only the office of the Auditor General (AG) and the Public 
165 
 
Service Commission (PSC) participated in the thesis study. The AG 
and PSC are constitutional institutions that are directly involved 
with government accountability and matters of governance. Other 
chapter nine and ten institutions have specific mandates that are 
partly involved with government accountability and governance. Both 
of the mentioned accountability institutions were formally invited 
to share their views on accountability and matters of service 
delivery in both provinces.  
 
All provinces have an office representing these accountability 
institutions. For the purpose of the thesis, the accountability 
institutions are classified as the principals of the principal-agent 
model. The provincial treasury is also included in this category of 
accountability institutions since it is expected to hold provincial 
departments accountable on the use of public funds. But the Treasury 
is a provincial government department accountable for its functions 
to the Legislature, national government, citizens and other 
stakeholder groups. The Treasury plays the role of both an 
accountability institution with regards to expecting accountability 
from provincial departments for use of public finance, and a 
government department with respect to government performance 
accountability. Other government departments like, education, 
health, social development and others are expected to give account 
for to the provincial Treasury the use of finance and performance.  
 
Treasury interviewees’ views on provincial government 
accountability are analysed later in this chapter. Figure 5.1 
illustrates accountability relations between accountability 
institutions and the provincial government departments. The Figure 
5.1 has been developed from the ‘main accountability framework’ from 
Figure 4.1 in Chapter Four. According to the illustration on Figure 
5.1, provincial departments denoted by (1) give an account (process 
denoted by (a)) of both performance and finance to accountability 
institutions denoted by (2). Accountability institutions in turn 
verify and scrutinise the account given by government and send the 
reports to provincial legislatures denoted by (4) and audit 
committees according to both departments and institutions’ 
interviewees. Accountability institutions also account to 
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provincial citizens denoted by (3) on whether the account given by 
government is fair, complete and reliable.  
 
Reporting to provincial citizens by accountability institutions is 
done through various public media platforms, the process shown by 
(i), including their websites, newspapers and television briefings. 
The views of accountability institutions interviewees on provincial 
government accountability are analysed in this chapter. Gauteng AG 
interviewees’ views on provincial government accountability are 
compared to those of NW provincial AG. A similar approach is taken 
to the PSC interviewees’ perspectives on provincial government 
departments’ accountability.   
 
Figure 5. 1 Accountability framework per accountability institutions  
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Source: Compiled from South African legislative framework 
5.2. Office of the Auditor General (AG) 
As created through provisions of Chapter nine of the Constitution, 
the AG is tasked with auditing and reporting on public institutions’ 
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use of finance and performance delivery across South Africa (Public 
Audit Act 25 of 2004, Chapter 2). Provincial government departments 
are amongst the public institutions to be audited by AG 
(Constitution of the RSA Act of 1997, Chapter 9). The government 
audit reports on the use of finance and performance by public 
institutions are submitted for further scrutiny to both the 
legislatures in the provinces and to the parliament of the national 
government according to AG interviewees. The audit reports are first 
submitted to the audit committees of respective government 
departments in the province according to interviewees.  
 
The submission of reports to the audit committees, the provincial 
legislature and the national parliament is part of a universal 
financial and performance management requirement (Public Finance 
Management Act of 1999, Sec 8). The AG is an institution independent 
of government departments and receives its working methodologies 
through the audit legislation called the PAA (Public Audit Act 25 
of 2004, chapter 2). According to the AG interviewees, the PAA puts 
the emphasis on AG representatives to express an opinion of the 
performances of government departments and use of public finance. 
AG interviewees noted that in earlier years, prior to the year 2004 
introduction of the Public Audit Act, AG was not expected to audit 
governmental departments’ performances. According to the AG 
interviewees, auditing of governmental performance is a relatively 
new concept in AG’s programs.  
 
It is new in comparison with the requirement to audit the use of 
public finances which has been AG’s requirement. According to 
interviewees, financial audits bear clear and understandable audit 
opinions to the users of the financial information. An audit opinion 
expressed about government performance is different to that 
concerning the use of public finances. Financial audit reports 
opinion can either be unqualified, qualified, disclaimer and adverse 
according to audit frameworks. The interviewees emphasised that each 
of these four financial information reports give users an 
understanding about the fairness of the financial account being 
given, the users include provincial legislature, funders, national 
government, audit committees, portfolio committees and citizens. AG 
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representatives interviewed in both provinces complained about the 
absence of similar audit reporting systems with regard to the 
auditing of government departments performance. While similar 
government performance audits may be conducted, various audit 
executives may arrive at different performance audit outcomes.  
 
Each of the AG’s performance audits is conducted at the end of every 
spending year as required by the audit act. According to AG 
interviewees auditing at year end creates an opportunity for 
portfolio committees’ members to review government departments’ use 
of finance and their performance for the year. The detailed process 
involved in conducting a performance audit requires that government 
departments give performance and financial plans and financial and 
performance reports to AG executives for audit purposes. The AG 
executives conduct further interviews with senior and other 
management officials of the departments where the very account is 
given according to interviewees. According to the AG executives, 
interviewing departmental managers allows the AG to collect further 
evidence to determine whether the HOD’s account is fairly presented.  
 
It is through these processes that the AG executive recommends how 
portfolio committee members and other stakeholders should hold 
departmental HODs and MECs to account on performance and use of 
public finances. As part of issuing his opinion on the audit 
performed, the AG executive provides recommendations to the HODs on 
how to improve on the weaknesses that led to unsatisfactory 
performance and poor use of public finance. The AG’s recommendations 
are to be taken into account by the HODs and MECs in government 
decisions, this according to interviewees. The interviews reflected 
that the AG executive then makes regular follow-ups on the 
implementations of his recommendation by government departments. 
According to AG interviewees, as a constitutional institution the 
AG is accountable for its function to the national assembly. But 
every province has an AG representative who performs the audit and 
reports to the provincial legislature.  
 
The provincial AG presents his audit outcomes to the provincial 
legislature and audit committees in every province. According to 
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interviewees the AG’s audit outcomes are published on the AG’s 
website. These reports can be accessed by anybody interested in 
holding departments to account via their representatives. The AG 
representatives in both North West and Gauteng provinces raised 
concerns about weaker government accountability towards provincial 
citizens on the part of provincial government departments and their 
executives. According to the AG interviewees in both provinces in 
general, the state of accountability in both provinces is of a mixed 
view, with financial accountability viewed as having improved over 
a period of time.  
 
5.2.1. North West Provincial AG views on government accountability   
 
a. Taking into account:  
Provincial legislature  
In response to the question of whether the provincial government 
departments should ‘take into account’ the views of portfolio 
committees’ members to explain decisions and determine their 
performance, the AG executive interviewed agreed that this is 
important for accountability purposes. He further argued that both 
the MECs and HODs of government departments give regular account to 
their respective portfolio committees, with both departments’ 
representatives and legislature raising issues to be ‘taken into 
account’ with regard to government performances. However the AG 
executive criticised the current process as being ineffective and 
weak in ensuring the views of the portfolio committees are ‘taken 
into account’ in government departments’ decisions. According to 
the AG executive, the process of accountability should involve 
portfolio committee members ‘dictating’ to the HODs and MECs on 
performance targets that provincial departments are to pursue.  
 
In his view, the MEC and HOD should receive their performance mandate 
from portfolio committee members, as opposed to the latter merely 
giving recommendations for the sake of complying with legislation, 
as it currently appears to do. The argument was that the current 
process of accountability between the committees and departments is 
not comprehensive and it is mainly done to comply with legislative 
requirements. Some of the departmental HODs interviewed agreed with 
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this AG’s representative’s point of view with regard to being told 
by the legislature about what performance to pursue. These HODs 
advocate more support from portfolio committee members with regard 
to the performance pursued by government and how such performance 
should be obtained. These points are analysed in detail Chapter 
Four. The AG interviewee’s point of view aligns with the philosophy 
of the principal-agent model where the principal gives a mandate to 
the agent.  
 
As government department representatives, the HOD and MEC are agents 
of the provincial legislature. According to AG representatives, 
therefore, they fulfil through the portfolio committees the role of 
principal providing both money and activities to be performed. Based 
on the AG representative’s view, portfolio committees are comprised 
of political members elected to represent the citizens of the 
province. Portfolio committees are thus further made the agent of 
citizens that elected them through engagement with their political 
manifestos. The citizens pay taxes that the legislature will 
allocate to government departments to spend in delivering public 
services. According to the AG’s representative, though the 
relationship between the legislature, citizens and government 
departments creates multiple principal-agent relationships, 
provincial legislature should give a mandate to government.  
 
According to the AG interviewee, the lack of comprehensive 
government to citizen accountability frameworks makes the role of 
the legislature more relevant since citizens are dependent for 
government accountability and participation in government 
activities. It is the linkages between government and legislature, 
and the legislature and citizens that created multiple agencies and 
the principals’ relationship. But it is also the fact that AG is a 
member of the national assembly which makes the AG the citizens’ 
agent while the citizens’ communities are represented as principals. 
The role of the AG as central to the citizens’ principal-agent 
relationships is clarified by account given to citizens (making all 
audit reports available to the public). In an attempt to emphasise 
how MECs and HODs should be accountable to the portfolio committee, 
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an AG executive made an inference to the ‘customer and shop keeper 
relationship’:  
‘For example if I am a customer and I want to buy something, 
that other person (the seller) is not going to tell me, “No 
man buys this, don’t buy that”. I mean if I want something 
and would be paying for it I will tell you what to do for 
me and you must do it.  I do not think the seller/ service 
provider can tell me no let me rather give you this services 
as opposed to what you wanted’. 
 
According to the AG representatives interviewed it is therefore 
important that government departments should get their mandates from 
the portfolio committee. The performance mandate taken from 
portfolio committees should be streamlined according to the needs 
and concerns of provincial citizens he further highlighted. The 
government performance that is informed by citizens needs may 
improve government departments’ accountability. But the current 
system of accountability does not take into account citizens views, 
hence accountability is weak as the AG interviewee argued. 
Furthermore the AG interviewee provided the fact that based on their 
experience, portfolio committees’ views are not taken 
comprehensively into account by government departments. The AG 
interviewee further argued that the role of government departments 
should be to determine how to inform citizens of the performance 
targets to be attained rather than decide what performance to pursue 
as is currently the case.  
 
Government departments should come up with innovative ideas on how 
to efficiently attain citizen-informed performances. The 
interviewee argued that developing measures to attain the targets 
envisaged as government responsibility would reduce the burden for 
many departmental administrators. HODs would be prevented from 
coming up with unrealistic performance targets and stop trying to 
convince the legislature to give them the finance for those 
unrealistic plans.  Another concern raised by the AG interviewee 
was that the process of planning and determining the performance to 
be pursued by government departments is unnecessarily long and 
ambiguous. In particular, provincial departments set long, 
unrealistic performance targets that they intend to pursue as 
performance. The AG executive noted that most of the targets set by 
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governments are often unattained and there is often a lack of 
evidence on whether plans are achieved; hence they are dubbed 
unrealistic.  
 
The AG executive further argued that the performances targets of 
certain departments’ are intentionally made to be unrealistic by 
political heads. Making plans unrealistic works to the advantage of 
departments that are aware that they often fail to achieve their 
performance targets. Moreover, it is not easy to determine how 
performance targets are determined during audits. But having 
unrealistic performance targets makes government accountability 
unachievable. According to AG interviewee the role of portfolio 
committees’ members in performances planning process of government 
departments is uncertain to many departmental representatives. 
Whether departments should take into account their views or not, it 
is the prerogative of the HOD and MEC to take them into account.  
 
Some departments do take into account the provincial legislature 
views in determining performance as part of accountability while 
others don’t. Nevertheless, many departments representative argue 
that portfolio committees should provide an oversight to government 
performance and accountability. According to the AG representatives 
despite the term oversight, departments make different 
interpretations of the meaning of oversight.  
 
National government views 
According to the AG interviewee, provincial government departments 
give a priority to 'taking into account’ national government inputs 
in decisions and activities. The national government executives 
drafts plans and policies that are implemented at the provincial 
and local level. Having national policies implemented at a 
provincial and local level means that there should be a sufficient 
accountability measure. National government is a principal and 
provincial government is an agent within the principal-agent model. 
According to the AG executive more than seventy per cent of the 
provincial government performance targets are influenced by ‘taking 
into account’ national government performance plans and policies. 
According to interviewees there are various mechanisms used by 
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provincial departments to take into account national government 
policies and plans at a provincial level.  
 
Some of the methods used to take into account national government 
inputs include: service level agreements, ministerial forums, the 
state of the nation address, and the finance minister’s budget 
speech. According to AG representatives, these mechanisms have led 
to provincial government performances being informed by national 
government policies. The national policies and plans are often made 
public early at the beginning of the spending year; for example, a 
medium policy framework statement (MTBPS) by the national minister 
of finance is given every October and six months before the spending 
statement for the year in question. But, as the AG official 
emphasised, it is important to indicate that ‘taking into account’ 
national government views does not necessarily mean that provincial 
performances are directly informed by national government.  
 
Most government departments’ performance plans are not directly 
indicative of national policies, and this is based on the AG 
representative’s experience in reviewing provincial departments’ 
performance plans.   
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The Premier’s views 
According to the AG interviewee the MECs and HODs of various 
provincial departments expect the Premier to make her own annual 
pronouncements. He further indicated that the Premier’s speech is 
to be taken into account by the executive authority in the decisions 
and performance to be pursued by the provinces. The Premier annually 
announces publicly on performances targets that she and her 
provincial government intend to achieve. This process takes place 
during the opening of the provincial legislature during February of 
previous years. In the view of the interviewee from the AG, the 
Premier’s announcements are received and then taken as commitments 
towards both the citizens and the legislature. According to the AG 
executive, in the North West province the Premier’s pronouncements 
are often not expected to deviate significantly from the national 
government’s public statements.  
 
According to the AG interviewee, this process affirms national 
government performance plans in the province. Provincial 
departments’ representative should ‘take into account’ the Premier’s 
public announcements in their decisions. The AG interviewee 
highlighted that despite the Premier’s announcements, provincial 
departments both take into account and give priority to the national 
government’s pronouncements and policies. According to the AG 
executive, only twenty per cent of the provincial Premier’s 
announcements are taken into account by government departments. This 
follows the hierarchy of importance made by the AG executive; 
namely, that seventy per cent of provincial government decisions 
are influenced by national government, twenty per cent by the 
premier, and the remaining ten per cent by the legislature and 
respective departmental managers. 
 
MEC and department management views 
Since the MECs are full members of the legislature their own views 
are taken into account in government decisions and activities. 
Though their views are not expected to be the main inputs to be 
taken into account, they have authority on which views are to be 
taken into account. It is clear in most cases that MECs and HODs 
present their own views on what government accountability should be 
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attained. The AG interviewee supported this view based on his 
experience of which responses from various departments’ executives 
are taken into account when determining a performance programme. 
 
Provincial citizens’ views 
According to the AG representative, there are currently insufficient 
processes in place to enable citizens’ participation in provincial 
government decisions and activities. As part of the audit process, 
departments’ HODs are expected to indicate how performance plans 
decisions are informed. It is at this stage that the AG audit team 
is able to determine whether citizens’ views are given due 
attention. There are a few cases where citizens’ views are taken 
into account in government decisions, but the AG representative 
believes that these instances are insufficient. The AG 
representative attributed the lack of citizens’ engagements and 
accountability by provincial government to insufficient enthusiasm 
by departmental MECs and HODs, and public managers in general. He 
further argued that there is also a lack of awareness by citizens 
on the role they should play in government accountability. 
 
b. Giving an account 
Provincial government departments represented by MECs and HODs are 
required by legislation to give an account for the use of allocated 
funds and performance target realisation (Public Finance Management 
Act of 1999, chapter 5). According to the AG interviewee the account 
to provincial citizens is expected from provincial government, but 
this is not being comprehensively achieved. The departmental HODs 
prepare quarterly and annual reports on behalf of his/her 
department. These reports are tabled to the portfolio committees on 
a monthly, quarterly and annual cycle. These reports of account-
giving cover both the finance and performance accounts being given. 
In ‘giving an account’ on performance, the HOD reports on every 
target he set at the beginning of each spending year. The fact that 
the HOD gives an account of all predetermined targets makes the 
process comprehensive.  
 
According to the AG interviewee generally, audit outcomes have 
improved in the North West provincial government for the past five 
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year period. Audit outcomes relate to the type of opinion awarded 
by the AG to government entities, based on the verification of 
evidence presented (Public Audit Act of 2004). The improvement of 
audit outcomes is attributable to regular guidance from the AG and 
new public managers willing to change behaviour and seek support 
where necessary from various HODs in government departments. In 
previous years HODs would not give accurate accounts on their 
performances and lack of evidence proved to be another significant 
problem. But, in the experience of the AG interviewee, all of these 
issues are improving. Some of the HODs did not understand what was 
expected of them in giving an account.  
 
However, according to the AG interviewee, there have been 
improvements in clarity on accountability expectations over the last 
five years. The improvement in account-giving is evidenced by the 
enhancement of audit opinions issued by AG for the province in the 
past five years. The areas that have not improved as significantly 
as others are the absence of account for not achieving targets and 
frequent deviation from the targets pursued. According to the 
experience of the AG interviewee in auditing many departments, many 
HODs would not give an account for their failure to achieve targeted 
performance and no measures are taken by portfolio committees to 
minimise the recurrence of incidences. Figure 5.2 and 5.3 
illustrates comparative five year trends on audit outcomes. This is 
a comparison between various departmental outcomes for five years 
from the year 2007 until 2011.  
 
Figure 5.3 was compiled using AG audit outcomes publicly reported 
on their website. Figure 5.2 reflects mixed results comparing views 
expressed by AG executives. In the year 2007 only three of eleven 
departments received an unqualified (good report) report from AG. 
The number of departments increased to five departments in the 
following year (2008) and then increased to eleven departments. But 
the years 2010 and 2011 have seen a decrease then a stabilisation 
in the number of departments receiving clean audit reports. There 
is also similarly a mixed improvement with regards to Gauteng 
government, and this is reflected in Figure 5.3. These trends are 
supported by the improvement of an audit opinion issued, with the 
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worst expressing adverse opinion to the best expressing unqualified 
opinion in the North West Province. Most of the unqualified opinions 
relates only to the financial section of the report and not the 
performance part.  
 
There has been a blend of audit opinions in the North West province 
illustrated in the Figure 2.2. These results are mixed because there 
was no trend towards improvement in the types of audit opinions 
achieved by provincial departments. According to the AG 
representative interviewed, the instability in the administration 
of government departments has contributed to the poor account given 
by many executives. 
 
Figure 5. 2 Five years provincial departments audit outcomes for NW  
 
Source: Compiled from AG reports  (AGSA, 2012) 
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Figure 5. 3 Five years provincial departments audit outcomes for GP 
 
Source: Compiled from AG reports  (AGSA, 2012) 
 
According to the AG executive, the lack of giving a comprehensive 
account for not achieving targeted performances by many government 
departments has been a worrying factor for the past five years. The 
interviewee added that, the HODs and MECs are also accustomed to 
lack of being held to account for the absence of giving an account. 
This negative trend perpetuates the incomprehensibility of the 
accountability process.   
   
c. Holding to account 
Holding government executives to account is important for 
strengthening other processes of accountability, according to 
representatives of the AG executive, though he concluded that HODs 
and MECs of many departments are not comprehensively being held to 
account as they should be. There is a process that holds all 
departments to account, but this is not being implemented. The 
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corrective steps against senior managers who either underperform or 
incur irregular and unauthorised expenses.  
 
According to the AG interviewee, there is insufficient evidence that 
HODs of many departments are being held to account. The MECs are 
also expected to hold the HOD to account for either underperformance 
or incurring irregular expenses. However in the wide experiences of 
the AG interviewee this accounting has not been comprehensively 
implemented. For research purposes, the Department of Public Works 
in the North West province is used as an example. This department’s 
objectives are to look after the provinces’ infrastructure which 
includes the maintenance of buildings and management of the 
government fleet, this according to AG interviewee. Yet North West 
roads are some of the worst in the country. According to the AG 
interviewee, having poor road infrastructure is an indication that 
the public works department has not been performing well.  
 
The incidence of poor infrastructure has been further supported by 
disclaimer audit reports that have been given to the same department 
for the past three years in succession. In the view of the AG 
interviewee, there is a clear indication that the MEC and HOD have 
not performed their duties in holding department management to 
account. Moreover, the HOD and MEC have not been held to account by 
the legislature for not attaining an acceptable level of 
departmental performance. The failure to apply a comprehensive 
accountability process may have led to the subsequent failure to 
hold the department MEC and HOD to account. According to the AG, 
this department holds information for the legislature to make 
informed decisions about the state of accountability in the 
department. 
 
According to the AG interviewee, negative political interferences 
by non-governmental politicians in provincial government 
administration are also a contributing factor to the lack of 
accountability in the province. The AG executive makes reference to 
political interference because the political organisation in 
government is seen as not being sufficient in holding its political 
deployed executives to account. According to the AG interviewee, 
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there are often justifications for poor performance, 
maladministration and the failure to reprimand fellow politicians, 
despite the fact that this is not beneficial for accountability 
purposes. At times, recommendations are given either by other 
political organisations in the house of legislature or from 
accountability institutions on how to hold executives to account.  
 
The legislature interviewee argued that for example, they could 
recommend recalling the MEC of an underperforming department even 
though this was often not taken into account by the members of the 
legislature. There is evidence of failure to reprimand fellow 
politicians. In addition to HODs and MECs not being held 
comprehensively to account, the AG executive cited the reference 
made by other research interviewees from the National Department on 
performance monitoring and evaluation executive as evidence that 
not enough is being done to hold executives to account. According 
to the National Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation 
Executive, current provincial systems of performance management make 
it difficult for the provincial legislatures to enhance 
accountability in their provinces.  
 
He argued that the South African constitution does not provide the 
provincial legislatures with all the necessary powers and authority 
to enforce government executive accountability in their respective 
province. In his own reaction to this point he said: 
The legislature is weak in attaining accountability from 
the provincial government (the legislature oversight is 
weak). This is also the case in the national government 
where the parliament is weak in holding the national 
government department accountable. The stronger 
accountability would be to both the office of the premier 
and the national department. 
 
Accordingly, the office of the Premier and national government have 
the authority provided by the Constitution to hold provincial 
government departments’ executives to account and enhance 
accountability argued the interviewee from the National Department 
of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation. But both the office of 
the Premier and the national government are not comprehensively 
enforcing the expected level of accountability he further argued. 
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There is also a culture of reluctance and not wanting to be ‘nasty’ 
to fellow colleagues that is practiced by members of the provincial 
legislature. Hence departments’ executives and HODs are not being 
held to account by portfolio committees. The AG interviewee argued 
that deficiencies in holding provincial government departments’ 
executives to account are further perpetuated by the fact that some 
members of the portfolio committees are friends and allies to those 
underperforming political heads and executives. 
  
The HODs and MECs may perform corrupt activities on behalf of the 
members of the legislature using their departments’ budgets and 
facilities. According to the AG executive, there is a problem of 
those charged with responsibility being reluctant to suction 
underperforming executives and MECs in government. His responses 
were that: 
‘People do not want to be nasty to other people. But the 
problem is that there is no discipline in the government 
system. You do not want to apply it a lot but people must 
know that there is some mechanism in place for poor 
performances. For example if you take corruption, the 
disincentives are quite low, yet incentives are very high. 
If they get caught doing corruption the worst thing that 
could happen is to lose your job. The organisational culture 
of enforcing accountability at the moment is not punitive.’  
 
d. Redress 
According to the AG interviewee, the HODs and MECs give quarterly 
and annually performance and financial reports that indicate whether 
targeted performance is satisfactory or not. Provincial departments’ 
executives make use of quarterly and annual reports to present 
performance to portfolio committees, citizens, national government 
and other interested stakeholders. According to the AG 
representative, these reports are scrutinised by the portfolio 
committees’ members for various reasons. In scrutinising the 
reports, portfolio committees’ members take into account all the 
citizens’ complaints and issues raised with regard to government 
public services, according to the interviewee. As part of scrutiny 
of the performance reports, the committees determine whether public 
services are being delivered at the high level of quality required.  
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Citizens’ complaints are obtained through petitions and regular 
meetings held with members of the provincial legislature. According 
to the AG interviewee, portfolio committees are further expected to 
identify poor service delivery on behalf of provincial citizens and 
other government service users. According to the AG interviewee, it 
is the portfolio committees’ members’ responsibility to make sure 
that the citizens gain redress for any poor service delivery 
experiences from the provincial government. Portfolio committees’ 
members make annual recommendations to all government departments 
on how to ensure citizens gain redress for unsatisfactory 
performances. Some recommendations are implemented but, in the 
experience of the AG interviewee, these recommendations are not 
consistently implemented by the government department MEC concerned. 
He further indicated that various reasons are attributable to the 
failure to implement redress measures. 
 
An example is the recent recommendations made by a committee to 
provincial departments that continuously failed to attain 
performance targets for recurring spending years. Department MECs 
and HODs were asked by the committee for action plans with specific 
deadlines to redress the poor performance. The action plan was 
agreed between the portfolio committee, the HOD and MEC of the 
departments concerned. In subsequent spending years only one out of 
five departments concerned implemented the corrective measure 
recommended by the provincial legislature. According to the AG 
interviewee, the portfolio committees did not follow up on the 
departments to determine whether recommended remedial actions were 
indeed implemented. Another example he gave relates to remedial 
action: the HOD and the MEC of one department were given a sufficient 
budget to ensure that a vacant post were filled within a year since 
the vacant post adversely affected departmental performance. 
 
According to the AG interviewee, vacant posts are a contributing 
factor towards poor performance by certain government departments. 
In subsequent years, many provincial departments still had more than 
fifty per cent of their posts vacant. By the end of the year the 
citizens had still not obtained redress from poor public services 
which remained below standard. According to the AG interviewee, the 
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lack of implementation of redress measures by some departments’ 
executives highlights the importance of the role that portfolio 
committees are to play in ensuring redress is attained by provincial 
citizens. For the redress measure to be implemented comprehensively, 
portfolio committees members should be robust and consistent in 
encouraging departments to adhere to accountability measures.  
 
Not every MEC and HOD are reluctant to redress poor performance, 
there are those seen to be strict in ensuring the implementation in 
their departments of redress measures recommended by portfolio 
committee members. The role played by the Premier and MEC to ensure 
redress is also very important. In the experience of the AG 
interviewee, the role of the Premier and MEC in government 
accountability has also been given less attention by the MEC and 
also the Premier. A recent public statement by the AG raised concern 
that the failure to hold officials to account is becoming the norm 
in government (Visser, 2012). AG executives complained about 
government departments and their representatives not being held to 
account in obvious cases of poor performance and lack of good 
governance. 
 
The Gauteng AG executive holds somewhat contradicting views in 
regard to the performance and financial accountability of government 
departments and their executives. His opinion varies on whether 
departments’ executives should be held to account. These views are 
analysed in the following section. 
 
5.2.2 Gauteng Provincial AG views on government accountability 
a. Taking into account 
Government accountability in Gauteng is viewed more differently by 
the AG executive interviewed, in comparison with the perspectives 
of the AG interviewee in the North West. According to the AG 
interviewee, it is the prerogative of every department’s MEC to 
‘take into account’ portfolio committees’ members views in their 
decision-making and for accountability purposes. There are regular 
meetings between the MECs of various departments and the portfolio 
committees. These meetings are initiated by departmental executives 
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and are for both the legislature and departments representatives to 
raise issues to be taken into account during the MEC’s during 
planning process. Subsequent to these meetings, the MEC should agree 
with his HOD on the views to be ‘taken into account’ in regard to 
inputs given by portfolio committee inputs.  
 
HODs ‘take into account’ committees’ members’ views in preparing 
the departmental strategy and the annual performance plan. Such 
plans are, at times, too generic and not indicative of how 
performance targets would be attained, according to AG interviewee. 
For example, some performance plans do not take into account whether 
there is an availability of provincial budgets to meet the plans 
and this leads to ambiguity, according to the interviewee. Failure 
to take into account the funds availability and the lack of 
indicative of how plans are attained makes performance plans 
unrealistic and over ambiguous. According to the AG interviewee, 
there is no evidence to suggest that provincial departments’ 
executives take into account any other stakeholder views in 
determining the performance to be pursued, except the views of the 
legislature and management.  
 
According to the AG interviewee, the views of national government 
departments’ executives are not taken into account for provincial 
performance, except in the cases of allocation of conditional grants 
by a specific national department to a specific provincial 
department. Furthermore, the interviewee notes that there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Premier’s provincial outcomes are taken 
into account by HODs and MECs in their performance decisions. But 
the Premier’s address to the legislature at the beginning of every 
year of spending is expected to be taken into account by provincial 
government departments for accountability purposes. According to 
the interviewee, the process of taking into account various 
stakeholders views is implemented with the HODs and MECs 
prerogative. In his experience, departmental executives are not 
always taking into account all the views expressed by their 
portfolio committees.    
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b. Giving an account 
Government departments in their respective provinces use a 
comprehensive process of giving an account for their performance 
and use of finance, according to the AG representative interviewed. 
The HODs of various departments initiate the process of giving an 
account through submitting monthly and quarterly reports for the 
MEC’s scrutiny. Quarterly reports are prepared and presented to the 
MEC by the HOD. These include details of the targets to be attained 
with reasons for a level of performance unattained. The MEC further 
summons the HOD for further account on a verbal level, this according 
to the AG representative interviewed. The MEC holds the HOD to 
account by demanding a plan of action taken against underperforming 
managers. According to the AG interviewee, this process takes place 
subsequent to the MEC receiving both verbal and a documented account 
from the HOD.  
 
According to the interviewee, a similar account is subsequently 
given to the portfolio committees members by the MEC together with 
the HOD. Despite the process being clearly stated, the AG 
interviewee had concerns about the credibility of accounts given. 
The credibility of the account given is often low and not enough is 
done by those receiving an account to determine whether the account 
is a true reflection of the activities of departments, this 
according to the AG interviewee. He supported this claim by saying 
that frequently, the reports giving an account do not provide 
evidence of whether performances were indeed attained and the impact 
they had on communities. The HODs and MECs do not always scrutinise 
an account given to them by departmental managers. Portfolio 
committees also rely on MEC and HODs to ensure the reliability of 
the reports.  
 
The AG can only validate the reports at the end of the year and by 
that time three quarterly reports have already been seen and 
approved by the portfolio committee. According to the AG 
representative, the process of giving an account is often weak 
during the spending year, with lesser scrutiny given to the account 
from managers to executives.  
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c. Holding to account 
Contrary to views raised by the North West AG executive, the Gauteng 
AG executive does not support a notion that HODs and MEC are supposed 
to be held to account. The AG executive argued that those portfolios 
committees should interrogate government departments’ performance 
plans to determine if they are realistic and credible. Portfolio 
committee members are expected to interrogate and review 
departments’ performance plans, and by comprehensively reviewing 
the government plans it would not be necessary to hold government 
to account. He further argued that it is unfair to hold the HODs 
and MECs to account for unsatisfactory performances, citing problems 
that entail these performances being beyond departments’ control. 
The deficiency in holding departments MECs and HODs to account is 
attributable to reasons that are beyond provincial government 
departments’ control argued AG interviewee.  
 
Reasons substantiating the failures to hold departments’ executives 
to account that are also beyond department’s controls includes: 
insufficient budget allocation by legislature contributing towards 
poor performance in many instances; high vacancy rates in many 
departments; the lack of a skilled labour force; and the lack of 
stability in government departments’ configuration. The merging and 
de-merging of provincial departments has continued to take place in 
the province, according to the AG interviewee. The process involves 
certain departments being discontinued and/or merged with other 
provincial departments. The process of merging and de-merging 
provincial departments adversely affects departments’ performances 
and their attainment of targets and, from the AG interviewee’s 
experience, the process is beyond departments’ control.  
 
Apart from disagreeing with holding departments to account, the AG 
executive argues that there has generally been an improvement in 
government performance accountability since it was introduced and 
current accountability measures are more effective than before. 
According to the interviewee, the accountability measures that seem 
to be effective include allowing departments to account on their 
own performance with minimal actions taken. Figure 5.3 substantiate 
the point raised about how much provincial government departments’ 
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accountability has improved over time. The figure was compiled using 
audit reports published on the AG South African website (AGSA, 
2012). Eight out of twelve departments have consistently received 
an unqualified audit with the exception of the year 2007 and 2010. 
In 2007 a higher number and in 2010 a lower number of departments 
received unqualified audit reports from the AG respectively. It is 
in these years that departmental configurations, de-mergers and 
mergers took effect in the province. Unqualified audit reports 
provide assurance to the users of accountability reports that the 
account given is fair and less misrepresentations exists within the 
province.    
Figure 5. 4 Provincial department audit outcomes for Gauteng  
 
Source: Compiled from AG reports  (AGSA, 2012) 
d. Redress 
Redress to provincial citizens on unsatisfactory performance is 
achieved through recommendations made by either the AG or the 
provincial legislature to various departments’ executives, this 
according to the AG representative. Both the AG and legislature 
subsequently perform verification and scrutinise accountability 
reports prepared by the HODs, while MECs should recommend corrective 
steps to be implemented by departments that have performed poorly. 
Corrective steps are made such that the citizens can gain redress 
on public services. The implementation of recommended corrective 
steps by government departments is monitored through regular follow-
ups, both from the AG and the legislature, to determine whether the 
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HODs implemented recommended resolutions. According to the AG 
executive, not all departments MECs and HODs implement recommended 
corrective steps with some blaming factors beyond their control, as 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, for not comprehensively 
implementing recommendations.  
 
5.2.3. Effect of accountability on government performance 
The effect of performance accountability given by government 
departments is an empirical question to answer, according to the 
interviewees from AG. They further argued that there is no direct 
evidence to support the effect of performance accountability on 
subsequent departmental performance. But in their opinion there were 
mixed responses from the AG and PSA as well on the effect of holding 
government departments to account for changes subsequent 
performance. In terms of the AG interviewee, changes to subsequent 
government performances are often brought about by having 
knowledgeable executives newly appointed individuals in either 
departments or departmental programs. The recommendations and 
correctives steps of other knowledgeable managers are often not 
implemented; for example, the legislature often recommends the 
recalling of a political head, but this seldom takes place without 
delays.  
 
The lack of implementation of recommended correctives steps is more 
evident if such corrective measures are suggested by the portfolio 
committees. In other provincial government departments, some of the 
recommendations go without being implemented and as result redress 
is not realised. But there is less evidence to suggest that 
provincial government performance accountability affect subsequent 
performance. 
 
5.3.  Public Service Commission (PSC) 
The PSC is an accountability institution formed under provision of 
Chapter Ten of the Constitution (Constitutions of the Republic of 
South Africa of 1996, Chapter 10). Similar to AG the commission 
functions independent of government departments and is accountable 
for its functions to the Parliament at national level and the 
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provincial legislature in the province. Each province has a 
commissioner who is accountable to the national chairperson of the 
Commission according to interviewees. The PSC conducts its work on 
an annual basis monitoring government institutions performance and 
their use of finances as well as other functions. Provincial 
government’s departmental reports on the monitoring process produced 
by the PSC are submitted to both the HODs of various departments 
and the provincial legislature, this according to interviewed PSC 
representatives.  
 
The PSC has its own process independent of government departments 
through which monitoring is performed in provincial government. The 
PSC makes its own plans on which government institutions are to be 
monitored each spending year. According to the PSC representatives 
interviewed, these plans are informed by various inputs, from 
citizens’ concerns to legislature concerns and commissioners’ views 
and experience. The functions of the PSC are not the same as that 
of the AG. The latter is required by constitutions and audit 
legislation to audit all government institutions on the use of 
public finance and performance and produce audit reports annually, 
but with the PSC the Commissioner decides on which information will 
be collected and verified from government institutions. According 
to the interviewees, the PSC is not compelled to monitor all 
government institutions, unlike the AG.  
5.3.1. North West PSC’s views on accountability 
Performance plans and budget and accountability 
The provincial legislature should play an influential role in 
support of the provincial departments in delivering high standards 
of public services, according to the PSC interviewee. In his 
statement he places an emphasis on the role that the legislature 
should play in representing citizens’ views that could not be 
addressed directly to the provincial government departments. His 
emphasis is as follows:    
‘Provincial government departments should draw their 
mandate from the provincial legislature pronouncements. 
Each department must take cognizance of the state of the 
province address by the Premier in their performance and 
financial plans. Their strategic plans are drawn from the 
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state of the province address and then they draw their 
annual performance plans. Remember the politicians have the 
mandate to deliver services to the public. They make use 
of the provincial government to make sure that the promises 
made to the citizens are realized’ 
 
The executives of the provincial government department prepare 
performance and financial plans to be presented to the provincial 
legislature as a means of bidding for the funds to realise planned 
performances, according to the interviewee. MECs and HODs request 
public funds from the legislature using their strategic plans and 
annual performance plans. It is these plans and actual performance 
that the PSC monitors in holding provincial departments executives 
to account, the interviewee emphasised. 
 
Achievement of plan  
According to the interviewee, the provincial legislature is expected 
to play a further role in monitoring the implementation of 
performance and financial plans that take place in the government. 
As a result, the Legislature expects the provincial government 
departments’ executives to constantly update the members of the 
Legislature’s committees during the year on progress made on the 
target plans. The PSC representative was concerned that there is 
frequently a lack of commitment from both the legislature and 
government in the monitoring process, and this leads to a 
destructive role where the achievement of the performance plans and 
budget usage is often not probed. The PSC interviewee raised further 
concerns that the role to be played by opposition political 
organisations is often undermined by the political organisation that 
is in government.  
 
According to the PSC representative, at times political opposition 
organisations members are accused of derailing the government 
accountability process for political gains. Opposition political 
organisations often demand accountability from the MECs more 
comprehensively than the ruling political organisation in the 
legislature, argued the PSC interviewee. The demand for government 
accountability by opposition parties is often seen as political 
point scoring by the ruling political organisation members. As a 
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result, the judgements of ruling political organisation members on 
government accountability are clouded by the failure to distinguish 
themselves for fellow political party members during the 
accountability process.  
 
a. Taking into account 
Provincial departments executives are expected to take into account 
the portfolio committees’ members’ views in their decisions and 
government activities, according to PSC interviewee. The MECs and 
HODs of various departments in the province should prepare the 
budget speech and strategic plan respectively. Both the budget 
speech and strategic plan are legislated as documents that indicate 
the performance to be pursued by departments for a given period 
according to PSC interviewee. According to the PSC interviewee in 
these planning documents, the HODs and MECs ‘take into account’ 
various stakeholders’ views, including the Premier’s pronouncements 
that she makes prior to the beginning of spending years. The Premier 
makes use of the state of the province address (SOPA) to give 
provincial plans. In preparation of SOPA, political manifestos and 
provincial strategy are also ‘taken into account’ according to the 
PSC interviewee.  
 
The various departmental MECs’ budget speeches and strategic plans 
indicate that the Premier’s pronouncements are taken into account, 
according to the PSC interviewee. The preparation of the 
departments’ budget speech takes into account the availability of 
public finances and the implications of performance the MEC intended 
to pursue. The departmental budget speech is presented to the 
portfolio committee for scrutiny and approval according to PSC 
interviewee. Portfolio committees members are expected to approve 
the budget speech and strategic plans of all departments in the 
province, according to the PSC interviewee. Approving the plans 
gives departments’ executives the right to implement both the budget 
speech and strategic plans. Submitting the budget speech and 
strategic plans to portfolio committees is an initial stage of 
accountability between the legislature and government according to 
interviewee.  
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Furthermore according to the PSC interviewee, there is currently no 
clear process indicating whose views are to be taken into account 
in provincial government decisions. For the PSC, the lack of clear 
process on views to be ‘taken into account’ compromises government 
accountability. All departmental executives and HODs defend their 
budget and strategic plans in front of portfolio committees 
according to the PSC interviewee. Furthermore in defending their 
plans, departmental representatives justify their envisaged 
performance and spending. Portfolio committees expect departments 
to prove that their plans have taken into account inputs from the 
SOPA, national outcomes and the manifestos of other political 
organisational. The PSC representative often made a complaint that 
it is not always clear whether citizens’ inputs are taken into 
account by government plans and that the facts are not often 
scrutinised by legislature. 
 
b. Giving an account 
According to the PSC representative, giving account to the portfolio 
committees is legislated for and mandatory. The MEC and HOD prepare 
quarterly and annual reports for portfolio committees as their form 
of giving account. Both reports contain both the performance and 
finance accounts given to the legislature. The interviewee explained 
that it is the responsibility of the legislature to make use of 
these reports and other measures to enhance accountability by 
scrutinising the reports and summoning departmental executives where 
the account given is not satisfactory. Having members of other 
political organisations in the legislature is a helpful measure to 
enhance government accountability, emphasised the PSC interviewee. 
Accountability is enhanced thanks to their continuous enquiries on 
poor performance and reported maladministration.  
 
According to the PSC representative, political organisations other 
than the governing party often encourage the MECs and HODs to account 
comprehensively. The extensive and detailed accountability debates 
between opposition political party members and government executives 
create, at times, political differences between the political 
organisation in government and other political parties. According 
to the PSC interviewee, the perception of the governing political 
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organisation’s members in the legislature is that it is only them 
who can demand account from government departments.  
 
c. Holding to account 
According to the NW PSC interviewee, similar to the process of 
giving an account, portfolio committees’ members have the authority 
to hold the MECs and HODs to account subsequent to receiving account. 
But due to the lack of will and specific measures, the interviewee 
argued, the process of holding departments’ executives to account 
is not happening as it should be. Some provincial government 
departments consistently receive poor audit reports subsequent to 
their performance being audited. The MECs and HODs of unsatisfactory 
departments are often summoned by a portfolio committee expecting 
to be held to account according to the interviewee. However in many 
departments poor performance continues even after action against 
performance been commissioned. In recent years, according to the 
interviewed PSC representative it has been proven that current 
accountability processes between provincial government and various 
stakeholders are not effective in holding the executives and 
administrators to account.  
 
The Department of Public Works recently obtained a qualified audit 
report from AG, and the HOD and MEC were called and given 
recommendations to rectify any problem. But the following year they 
received the worst audit report, a disclaimer. The provincial 
legislature continued to allocate funds to the same department that 
underperformed with minimal evidence of improvement, according to 
the PSC interviewee. He further blamed political interference, where 
fellow members of the legislature from the same party as that of 
the poorly performing MEC failed to reprimand them where necessary. 
 
d. Redress 
The PSC and other accountability institutions in the province 
identify unsatisfactory public services independently from the 
government and report them to the provincial legislature, according 
to the interviewee. The PSC makes use of citizens’ surveys where 
questions are asked to provincial citizens on whether they are happy 
with public services. Feedbacks obtained in these citizens’ service 
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reports are used for research purposes but are given to provincial 
departments and legislature. The PSC further recommends corrective 
steps to departments’ HODs and MECs concerned to ensure that 
citizens gain redress, according to the interviewee. The monitoring 
reports produced by the PSC are also submitted to the provincial 
legislature. The legislature members make use of the reports in 
holding departments’ executives to account. In addition, the reports 
allow legislature to enforce remedy within various departments, 
according to the interviewee.  
 
Corrective steps recommended by the PSC are used by the legislature 
and departments as part of ensuring that citizens gain redress where 
unsatisfactory performances are identified. There is concern from 
the PSC interviewee that many departments in the province have 
difficulty in implementing measures of redress.  
 
5.3.2. Gauteng PSC 
a. Taking into account 
The MECs and HODs of provincial departments are not compelled in 
their decisions to take into account any stakeholders, including 
portfolio committees, national government and citizens’ views. This 
view is contrary to that held by the PSC interviewee in the North 
West province. According to PSC interviewee in Gauteng, portfolio 
committees’ members often make recommendations to both the MECs and 
HODs to be considered for government planned activities. It is the 
HODs and MECs’ prerogative to take such recommendations into 
account. Some departments take recommendations into account while 
others don’t take the views of the legislature into account. The 
role of the portfolio committees’ members is to provide an oversight 
but not to prescribe performance for the provincial government, 
according to the PSC representative. Portfolio committees’ duties 
are mainly related to holding the HODs and MECs to account for their 
failure to provide adequate public services to the public. The 
legislature also considers departments’ performance and financial 
plans and offers recommendations on how policies may be improved, 
but this is not a directive.  
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b. Giving an account 
The duties of the portfolio committees in the legislature are 
exercised during this process of receiving account from provincial 
government, argued the PSC interviewee. It is at this point that 
the HODs and MECs give detailed finance and performance reports to 
portfolio committees. A financial account is given monthly to the 
portfolio committees and a performance account is given quarterly 
and annually. In addition, provincial departments’ executives make 
the accountability reports available to the citizens through various 
media platforms.  
 
c. Holding to account 
Holding provincial government departments’ executives to account 
has not being a clear and easy task for many legislature members 
according to PSC interviewee. The ideal process is that, subsequent 
to account being given, portfolio committee members should take 
actions against MECs and HODs. Actions are to be taken against 
executives not achieving the planned performance and for misusing 
public finances, but the current policy of deploying politically 
affiliated to ANC executives in strategic government positions is 
not effective for accountability purposes, the interviewee argued. 
According to the PSC, executive political parties allocate political 
executive positions to their members without clarifying whether the 
person deployed has the necessary skills and knowledge. The purpose 
of this political policy is to guarantee the implementation of the 
political organisation policies and strategies in government.  
 
The recent years’ experiences show that the deployment policy is 
being abused by both political organisations and political 
executives. The policy further perpetuates delays in holding 
departments MECs to account on public services. Instead of holding 
HODs and MECs to account, members of portfolio committees protect 
them from scrutiny by other political parties. Many underperforming 
political appointed executives (MECs) are moved from one government 
institution to another, as opposed to being completely removed from 
government activities. The process of moving them around is 
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called‘re-deployment’ and it seems to make it difficult to hold 
department representatives to account. 
 
d. Redress 
Provincial citizens and other government service users do not always 
gain redress in cases where poor public service is identified. 
According to the PSC executive, most provincial government 
departments do not invest sufficient time in understanding whether 
provincial citizens and other government services users are 
satisfied with the services that government provides. The lacks of 
government measures that evaluate public services make it pointless 
for the MECs and HODs to implement any corrective measures to improve 
performances.  
 
5.4 Treasury’s views on government accountability 
5.4.1 North West province Treasury 
Taking into and giving account 
Provincial government departments cannot be easily accessed by their 
citizens in comparison to the access that local government (LG) has 
to its citizens, according to the treasury representative. The lack 
of access to citizens for provincial government has negative 
implications for citizens’ accountability and quality of public 
services argued the interviewee. These were some of the issues 
raised by the treasury executives interviewed. Most of the time, 
provincial governments rely on other government institutions 
processes to engage with citizens for accountability and better 
quality government services. Provincial government departments make 
use of local government processes within the province to access 
provincial citizens for accountability in regard to public services. 
 
Other departments rely on the Provincial Legislature (PL) process 
of engaging with their constituents for accountability and a broader 
understanding of citizens’ views on government. The reliance of PL, 
LG and accountability institutions like AG and PSC to provide 
government accountability and public service to citizens has mixed 
outcomes for the province. Most of the time provincial government 
is able to achieve the desired outcome of providing accountability 
and obtaining the views of citizens. Some of the processes 
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unintentionally delay accountability to citizens. But processes like 
Izimbizos and Batho Pele are used by the provincial government 
departments to bridge gaps created by engaging citizens through an 
otherwise indirect process. 
 
Accountability and government performances  
Many government departments are struggling to determine the impact 
that public service have on provincial citizens, according to the 
treasury executive interviewed. It is important to determine the 
impact of public service for citizens as this analysis should be 
taken into account in subsequent performances. Impact analysis helps 
government to improve performance and accountability to citizens. 
But since citizens’ needs change frequently, it is also challenging 
to determine the impact of government public services. The varying 
needs of citizens for public services undermine accountability 
arrangements. Government accountability is often seen as irrelevant 
since public service needs continuously change. Provincial 
government accountability is often undermined by a self-inflicted 
process of approving plans; a process coined ‘red tapes’. An example 
was cited of the problem of a lack of primary education provision 
in a particular rural area. The problem was explained as follow: 
‘Other delays in having impact are due to the government 
red tapes. The other time there was a political approval 
to build a school in an area but it took six years to 
build the actual school. By the time the school was built 
there were no longer kids to attend the school. Basically 
we are also seeing that the timing of the intervention 
for performance being problematic as well due to the fact 
that it took longer to provide services to areas that 
needed services urgently due to the current process of 
determining performance. E.g. about floods in Taung where 
the budget was approved four years later.’     
In essence, provincial government performance should align with 
citizens’ views and needs. But it is the legislature’s 
responsibility to approve the plans that are in line with citizens 
views, according to the treasury interviewee. Citizens’ 
accountability is enhanced through the process of approving 
government plans that are aligned with citizens’ views. 
 
Holding to account and redress 
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Government departments have measures to be used to hold executives 
and other managers to account for their performances, this according 
to the treasury interviewees. It is done through the reduction of 
bonus incentives and imposing punitive measures like disciplinary 
hearing, though punitive measures are not commonly commissioned 
according to the Treasury interviewee. But the implementation of 
punitive measures is not often monitored and the lack of monitoring 
further undermines accountability. 
 
5.4.2 Gauteng province treasury views on government accountability 
Taking into and giving account 
The provincial treasury has the responsibility of holding provincial 
departments and their entities accountable on the use of public 
funds and to monitor attainment of ‘predetermined targets’, 
according to a treasury executive. The purpose of the principal-
agent model was to clarify the accountability relationship between 
the legislature, treasury and provincial government. According to 
the treasury representative, the agent should account to the 
principal, but giving account is preceded by performance directives 
from the principal to the agent. The departmental MEC and 
legislatures are classified as the principal and the departments as 
the agent. The MEC should enter into a public service level agreement 
with the Premier from which accountability will then be sought by 
the legislature, treasury and citizens. In relation to the 
provincial legislature, citizens’ representatives should provide 
government departments with inputs that are to be taken into account 
in achieving service level agreements. The process of giving views 
to be taken into account by government department is classified as 
an ‘oversight’ process.  
 
According to the treasury executive interviewed, the treasury’s role 
in determining performance (from which accountability is expected) 
is to consolidate all the provincial departments’ performance plans. 
Consolidated plans are submitted to the national treasury from which 
financial accountability is to be submitted by every government 
institution. National treasury and other national departments should 
acknowledge performance plans in each province in terms of which 
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accountability is given during and at the end of the spending year. 
The challenge of provincial government accountability lies in the 
failure to engage with citizens, this according to the treasury 
interviewee. Izimbizos are a fundamental platform from which 
government should be in a position to take into account citizens 
views for accountability purposes. But this platform is not 
effectively utilised by the provincial government. Lack of proper 
utilisation of Izimbizos undermines government accountability, 
according to the treasury interviewee. Provincial government should 
make use of the Izimbizos to give account to citizens and other 
service users, but this is not comprehensively realised. 
 
5.5. Conclusion  
This chapter set out to analyse views by research interviewees from 
accountability institutions. These institutions include the Office 
of the Auditor General (AG), the Public Service Commission (PSC) 
and the office of the Treasury. The views analysed in the chapter 
relate to provincial government departments’ performance 
accountability taken through the perspectives of these institutions. 
All the accountability institutions indicated in the above paragraph 
have accountability arrangements with provincial departments in both 
provinces. Similar to chapter four, there are agreements, and 
disagreements in views on what is done well and not done well in 
terms of accountability amongst the accountability institutions. 
Some of the views of accountability raised by accountability 
institutions are similar to those that of government executives in 
chapter four.  
 
Every province has a representative of these institutions of 
accountability. The institutions are either legislated or expected 
to seek accountability from government departments. A summary of 
accountability findings in this chapter are illustrated in Table 
5.1. Government accountability means fulfilling conditions attached 
to allocated budgets and aligning provincial citizens’ needs with 
government programs according to accountability institutions. 
Failure to adhere to the above noted processes leads to poor 
accountability in the views of accountability institutions. But the 
provincial government accountability is further strengthened by 
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roles played by other stakeholders like, national governments and 
provincial legislature. But there is currently uncertainty between 
the government executives and members of the legislature on what is 
the role of the latter with regards to accountability.  
 
The perceived uncertainty about the role played by members of the 
legislature weakens accountability. There is further disagreement 
between accountability institutions in GP and NW on what the 
legislature role should be. The NW institutions argue that it is 
the legislature role to create an environment of accountability for 
the government and further playing a middleman for government 
citizens’ accountability. But the GP institutions insist that 
government accountability is the responsibility of government 
executives to all the stakeholders concerned. Both provinces 
institutions’ further agreed that the role of opposition political 
parties in the legislature would significantly improve 
accountability if it was more constructive as opposed to be 
oppositional.    
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Table 5. 1 Summary of accountability views 
 NW Province GP Province 
Summary of accountability views Participants  take Participants  take 
Accountability means adhering to 
directives from funding stakeholders' 
in providing public services 
Agree Agree 
Consulting and including citizens views 
in government programs may enhance 
accountability according accountability 
institutions. 
Agree Agree 
Provincial legislature should create an 
environment for accountability by 
imposing performance and budget for 
government and demanding 
accountability, but this is not taking 
place comprehensively 
Agree Disagree 
Provincial legislature improves 
accountability of the government to 
citizens. 
Agree Disagree 
Uncertainty with regard to provincial 
legislature members role in holding 
executives to account weakens 
accountability 
Agree Agree 
Provincial government prioritises 
accountability to national government 
and other financing institutions but 
pays less attention to citizens with 
accountability 
Agree Agree 
Lack of stability in government 
structures like merging and demerging 
departments weakness accountability. 
Agree Agree 
Political interference by fellow 
politicians weakens accountability in 
many cases, particularly where 
executives should be held to account 
Agree Agree 
Provincial legislature does not have 
sufficient authority to hold executives 
to account 
Agree Agree 
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CHAPTER SIX: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY BY 
LEGISLATURE 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The South African constitution, introduced in 1996, makes provision 
for every province to have a provincial legislature, an office where 
the elected representatives of citizens reside. According to the 
constitution provisions the legislative authority of every province 
lies with the provincial legislatures. This authority includes the 
power to enact new provincial laws, oversee the performance of 
government and assign its legislative powers to local government 
(Constitution of the republic of South Africa Act 1996, Chapter 6). 
The executives of the provincial government departments are 
nominated and appointed from the body of serving members of the 
provincial legislature. All the members of the provincial 
legislatures are voted into the office by the provincial citizens 
during general elections which take place after every five year 
term.  
 
The process of selecting the provincial executives, usually known 
as Members of the Executive Council (MEC), is initiated through the 
election of the Premier of the province. The Premier then selects 
her team to serve on the provincial executive (i.e. cabinet). 
According to interviewed representatives the provincial 
legislatures regularly summon provincial executives and make them 
accountable for the following: government performance, future 
policy, complaints from citizens and proposed regulation. Most of 
the legislature’s functions are performed by portfolio committees 
on behalf of the entire legislature house. Portfolio committees also 
known as sub-committees are formed from all the members of the 
legislature who have not been selected to serve on the provincial 
executives’ council.  
 
According to interviewees it is these sub-committees of the 
legislature that, in practice, hold various government departments’ 
executives and their administrators (HOD) to account. After engaging 
with the representatives of various departments for accountability 
purposes, the committees’ members report back to the House of the 
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Legislature on both the issues that arose and the resolutions taken 
concerning government accountability. In this chapter I analyses 
the views of the provincial legislature representatives on 
government performance accountability in the North West (NW) and 
Gauteng (GP) provincial legislature. Concerns about government 
accountability are raised by representatives in both the NW and GP 
provincial legislatures. For example, some government departments’ 
executives are not clear on what is the role of portfolio committees 
with regard to government accountability.  
 
As a result provincial departments’ executives are sometimes not 
aware that they are being summoned to be held accountable by the 
legislature and this means the discussions can be confused with 
cross-purposes, with minimal benefits for both the legislature and 
government departments. The representatives of the provincial 
legislatures interviewed argued, in addition, that the role of the 
departments’ MECs is important in enhancing government departments’ 
accountability. An argument for the role of the legislature in 
government accountability was also brought up by a significant 
number of departments’ interviewed representatives. They argued that 
the legislature is unable to perform their expected duties of 
holding government departments’ executives to account. A detailed 
analysis of the views of provincial government departments on 
accountability is given in Chapter Four.  
 
In this chapter, views of two provincial legislature representatives 
interviewed are analysed. Each province’s legislature as an 
institution had one representative which I interviewed for this 
thesis. 
 
Government accountability 
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the accountability relationships 
between the legislature and government departments. Figure 6.1 is 
based on an analysis of data collected from representatives of the 
legislature and departments in both provinces. The diagram firstly 
shows that the provincial legislature members are voted into office 
by citizens. However, the provincial legislature is represented by 
various portfolio committees. Portfolio committees provide inputs 
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that are taken into account by the provincial executive council in 
their decisions. The inputs given by portfolio committee members 
are related to public services. MECs would then give account to the 
portfolio committees on their performances and use of public 
finances. Finally, portfolio committees hold the members of the 
executive council to account for the account that they have given.  
 
Individual members of the executive councils ‘take into account' 
strategic views raised regarding departmental performances on a 
provincial level. The members of executive councils (MEC) are 
accountable to the provincial executive council. The Premier holds 
the MECs to account on the account that they provide. 
 
Figure 6. 1 Provincial legislature accountability diagram: PL and PG 
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Figure 6. 2 South African government spheres (3): Legislature and Executive  
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Executive Authority(EA): Premier and MECs leading Provincial Departments
      EA has legislated accountability relationship with PL
Legislative Authority (LA): Provincial legislature (PL) members voted by 
citizens
284 Local governments Comprise: 
For every local government:
Executive Authority (EA): Mayor and Member of the Mayoral Committee
  EA has legislated accountability relationship with CM
Legislative Authority (LA): Council Members(CM) voted by citizens
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In Figure 6.1 different actors are denoted by the numbers while the 
process is denoted by alphabetical letters in the diagram. This 
diagram is composed of both the views of the two legislature 
interviewees and the legislation that prescribes the relationship 
(constitution and pfma). The provincial government departments are 
denoted by (1) in the diagram indicating the account giver in the 
accountability relationship, with (2) and (3) representing EXCO and 
Legislature as account receivers respectively. Provincial 
government departments are represented by MECs and HODs in their 
accountability engagement with the legislature. But interviewees 
noted that in the provincial government and legislature 
accountability relationship, the provincial executive council also 
contributes to this relationship. The provincial executives’ council 
is denoted by (2) in the diagram. The EXCO, as it is often known, 
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is a committee that comprises of the Premier and all the MECs in 
the province.  
 
It is important to note that I did not interview EXCO members for 
the purpose of this thesis. The provincial legislature is denoted 
by the number (3). In the diagram, the actual accountability 
relationship processes are represented by alphabetical letters in 
the diagram, from (a) until (f). The provincial legislature (3) is 
represented by various portfolio committees which give 
recommendations (d) to various departments MECs and HODs to be 
‘taken into account’ in government decisions and performances. 
Provincial government departments go through their MECs and HODs to 
give an account to portfolio committees on their achievements. But 
according to legislature representatives interviewed in this thesis, 
various portfolio committee members have further similar 
accountability relationships with the entire ‘provincial executive 
council’, also denoted with (2) in the diagram.  
 
The provincial executive council plays an important role in 
providing a strategic direction to the provincial government, this 
according to legislature representatives interviewed. The 
provincial executive council expects an account from individual 
members (MECs) on the performance of their respective departments.   
 
6.1.1. Accountability in the provinces 
The provincial legislature interviewees’ own understanding of 
accountability and their views - those based on my analytical 
framework – will be analysed later in the chapter. In exploring and 
understanding the conceptual framework of the accountability process 
in Chapter Two, various academic and professional views were 
analysed. In the analysis of Chapter Two, some researchers argued 
that accountability should be described only within the context 
concerned (Day and Klein, 1987, Behn, 2001, Dubnick, 2002).  
 
Other academics see accountability as a process in which the 
relationship of giving and receiving account is fostered 
(Stapenhurst and O’Brien, 2008, Schedler, 1999, Stewart, 1992). 
Parker and Gould (1999) defined government accountability as a 
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process in which citizens demand an explanation from government 
institutions for public services. Moreover, Parker and Gould (1999) 
hold that for accountability to be demanded there should have been 
an expectation created that there would be such accountability. 
According to Parker and Gould (1999), in cases where accountability 
is not given satisfactorily, actions should be taken to complete 
the accountability process. The provincial legislature interviewees 
take government accountability to be a process that includes the 
regular taking of views and giving of an account to the citizens by 
the provincial government departments.  
 
The legislature interviewees also note that the accountability 
process involves provincial citizens voting the politicians into 
government office in accordance to political manifestoes. 
Interviewees explained that this process is initiated by citizens 
because they have entrusted their elected government with the 
responsibility to provide public services through their involvement 
in government administration. The interviewees also note that any 
lack of provision for the public services promised in political 
manifestos is viewed as poor performance and reflects a lack of 
accountability to citizens. The interviewees further argue that 
government accountability does not necessarily mean that the views 
of every citizen are to be ‘taken into account’ in regard to all 
the activities of the provincial government. But the provincial 
government should explain its public service plans to its citizens.  
 
According to both provincial (NW and GP) legislature interviewees’ 
lack of comprehensive accountability to citizens by various 
provincial departments weakens the accountability framework. The 
role of the provincial legislature is also to contribute to 
government accountability by helping departments’ executives to 
develop a five year plan according to which provincial government 
departments and their executives are to be held to account on their 
agreed commitments. The legislature interviewees emphasised that if 
the provincial legislature does not have such a five year plan, then 
government accountability is often weakened because it would be 
difficult to hold government executives to account. From the 
legislature interviewee’s point of view, in the North West Province, 
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government accountability demands that all public services 
stakeholders play their role as expected.  
 
Such an obligation includes: the government meeting its public 
service commitments and ‘giving an account’ of such; the legislature 
providing an oversight and holding the executives to account; and 
provincial citizens’ views has been taken into account with regard 
to issues that concern them. The provincial legislature is further 
expected through its portfolio committees to allow provincial 
government to provide public services. According to the legislature 
interviewees, by allowing provincial government to function in 
autonomy the legislature can enhance the accountability of 
government departments because all departments are expected to 
account for their self-determined performance and finance plans. 
The emphasis on the meaning of accountability is that it is two-way 
process acting between the executives of government departments and 
the various stakeholders who expect accountability.  
 
The legislature interviewees of both provinces share the view that 
government departments’ executives and those expecting 
accountability should contribute one way or another towards the 
attainment of government accountability. The next sections of this 
chapter analyse provincial legislatures’ views on government 
performance accountability using the PATIGAHAR analytical model 
using the themes ‘taking into account’, ‘giving an account’, 
‘holding to account’, and ‘redress’. The research interviewees were 
asked to express their views based on the PATIGAHAR four themes 
subsequent to expressing their understanding and experience of the 
concept of accountability. These views are analysed separately under 
each province.    
 
6.2. North West provincial legislature 
Chapter Two explored alternative approaches from the management 
literature that define performance according to the study of results 
attained through the pursuit of various targets over a period of 
time (Kane, 1996). Furthermore performance was  also defined in 
terms of a study of the performer’s processes, rather than in terms 
of the results attained (Brumback, 1988). Kane’s (1996) approach to 
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defining performance influenced our analysis of performance in 
provincial government. According to the views of the  majority of 
government department interviewees that were analysed in Chapter 
Four, government performance is defined as a process where 
departments’ executives reflect on whether predetermined targets 
have been achieved or not. This argument supports Kane (1996) 
approach to performance.  
 
According to the legislature interviewees, the process of reflection 
on the status of predetermined targets involves government 
departments’ executives giving reports to the portfolio committees 
on whether performance targets have been met or otherwise. In cases 
where performance targets are not met, MECs make commitments to the 
legislature committees on how to improve his or her department 
performance. According to the representatives of the provincial 
legislature interviewed, the performance of provincial government 
departments is related to various MECs and HODs making commitments 
on targets and ‘giving an account’ of the fulfilment of these 
commitments. The interviewees view government performance as a 
process of attaining predetermined targets over a period of time. 
According to the interviewees from the provincial legislature 
accountability is based upon committed targets.  
 
Detailed analysis of the legislature interviewees’ views about 
performance accountability will be undertaken using the four 
dimensions of ‘taking into account’, ‘giving an account’, ‘holding 
to account’ and ‘redress’. 
 
6.2.1. Taking into account various stakeholders’ views 
According to the representatives of the provincial legislature, 
departments’ HODs and MECs are frequently summoned by portfolio 
committee members for accountability purposes over the spending 
year. The process of government accountability is initiated when 
government department executives commit to the legislature 
committees on performance targets. In the view and experience of 
the legislature’s representative, the executives of government 
departments should ‘take into account’ various stakeholders inputs 
in decisions of performance targets. These stakeholder inputs 
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include the recommendations of the members of portfolio committees 
and resolutions on any matters that members deem important. 
According to the interviewee, the MECs are full members of the 
provincial legislature as a constitutional requirement.  
 
Other members of the legislature not serving as MECs expect the 
political heads of every department to also consider and ‘take into 
account’ their inputs in determining performance targets. But 
according to the legislature interviewee, MECs are not compelled to 
‘take into account’ the views of other members of the legislature 
in performance and financial plans. The implication is merely that 
the MECs should listen to any views raised by the portfolio committee 
members and then make their own decisions on whether or not to 
include them as part of government decisions. According to the 
interviewee, MECs do not expect guidance from fellow members of the 
legislature on how and what performance to be pursued. The 
legislature interviewee further argues that in serving as members 
of the legislature the MECs are knowledgeable on issues to be 
included in government programmes.  
 
The interviewee further acknowledged that many provincial department 
executives and administrators rather expect non-MEC legislature 
members to provide legislative inputs that are ‘taken into account’ 
by government. She indicated that these departments expect the 
legislature to provide guided input to provincial government 
performance that is oriented towards citizens’ needs. However the 
representative of the legislature also argued that the role of the 
legislature is one of oversight rather than acting as a middleman 
between citizens and government. According to the interviewee, in 
addition to considering the input to the legislatures made by 
departments’ executives, consideration should also be given to 
citizen-related queries that are raised through petitions. 
Provincial citizens often express their dissatisfaction with 
government performance through processes such as petitions to the 
provincial legislature.  
 
According to the interviewee these are transmitted through 
constituents’ forums. The representative of the legislature further 
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highlighted that there is evidence that not all citizens’ petitions 
have been ‘taken into account’ by departments’ executives. This was 
seen by an interviewee as evidence of poor accountability. 
Furthermore the interviewee reflected that, MECs are somewhat 
compelled to ‘take into account’ the national government inputs in 
their provincial performance decisions. In various meetings with 
the members of departments’ portfolio committees and departmental 
MECs, the former verify whether departments’ performance plans are 
in line with national government plans. The interviewee highlighted 
that, the accountability sessions of portfolio committee members 
and government departments’ executives are spread out through the 
year of government spending.  
 
Most of the accountability processes are prearranged through the 
planning stage of the legislature. According to the interviewee, 
prearranging meetings allows both parties to be aware of each 
other’s expectations during accountability sessions. 
   
6.2.2. Giving an account to various stakeholders 
Based on the participating interviewee’s perspective, as part of 
the accountability process between portfolio committees, MECs and 
departments’ HODs, the latter ‘give an account’ on the attainment 
of targets and use of public finance. Provincial government 
departments’ executives make commitments to portfolio committees’ 
members on performances to be pursued prior to the beginning of the 
spending year. According to the interviewee, the members of 
portfolio committees have to receive an account on the fulfilment 
of commitments made by government departments on a quarterly and 
annually base. The interviewee further highlighted that, during the 
process of ‘giving an account’ on the part of department executives, 
portfolio committee members review the account regarding respective 
spending patterns and the achievement of the department targets.  
 
In ‘giving an account’, department executives explain to members of 
various portfolio committees which targets have been attained and 
the reasons for targets remaining unattained. The interviewee argued 
that the process of ‘giving an account’ is comprehensive, and that 
this process is substantiated by the consistent summonses of various 
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departments’ HODs and MECs; that is, when portfolio committee 
members deem this necessary without favouritism. But, according to 
the interviewee, this does not require the legislature members to 
subpoena government executives to account if government account is 
not given because the government is required under law to give 
accountability. The interviewee emphasised that summonses of 
government department executives are additional power that can be 
placed at the discretion of the legislature members to enhance 
government accountability.  
 
The use of the power to subpoena by the members of the legislature 
is exercised when members see it fit. According to legislature 
interviewee, the members of portfolio committees should satisfy 
themselves that government departments are in compliance with laws 
and regulatory framework like the PFMA, so that their ‘giving an 
account’ to the legislature allows a compliance review to takes 
place. Provincial legislature members mainly rely on work 
performance by other agencies like AG to determine whether there 
are any cases of non-compliance in government departments. Every 
provincial department gives a further account of the use of public 
funds and the attainment of performance targets to the national 
government and auditor general (AG) on an annual basis. According 
to the interviewee, ‘giving an account’ on government performance 
to bodies other than the legislature committees is done differently.  
 
Provincial government department executives compile accountability 
reports which are then sent to the national government and AG for 
accountability purposes. But, according to the experience of the 
legislature representative, the national government makes use of 
provincial accounts for recording purposes except in cases of 
conditional grants. In case of conditional grants national 
government scrutinises accountability reports for any discrepancy 
with conditions attached to allocated funds. ‘Giving an account’ to 
the AG is also a matter of compliance, since, according to the 
interviewee, the AG cannot hold the government to account, but the 
AG is expected to scrutinise accountability reports submitted by 
government executives. In addition, both the AG and the national 
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government may not follow the legislature process in summoning 
government executives.  
 
The legislature makes further use of the account given by government 
to hold MECs and HODs to account in turn. According to the 
interviewee, it is also used to report back to respective 
constituencies on government public services that are often promised 
during the voting periods. These processes are in line with the 
requirements of the budgetary process and other treasury regulations 
frameworks. According to the legislature interviewee, account is 
given in multiple processes to make sure that the process is 
comprehensive. For legislature committees to hold government 
executives to account, an account should first be given by the 
executives. It is for this reason that many legislature members 
believe that departments should give an account for their 
performance.  
   
6.2.3. Holding to account departments’ executives 
In response to the question of whether provincial government 
departments’ executives are and should be held to account, the 
legislature interviewee was very sure that this should be the case. 
The legislature interviewee further believes that holding government 
departments’ executives to account is very important to enhance and 
legitimise government accountability processes. According to the 
interviewee, the fact that the provincial legislature allocates 
spending budgets to government departments makes it imperative to 
determine whether the funds are used for the intended purpose 
through reports scrutinised by AG. If the budget is not used for 
the intended purpose, then the relevant departments’ executives 
should be held to account by the legislature committees. It is also 
important for portfolio committee members to hold departments’ 
executives to account for poor public services on behalf of the 
citizens of the province, the interviewee further expressed.  
 
However in regard to the question of how departments’ executives 
are actually held to account, the interviewee could not provide a 
positive response. According to the interviewee’s experience, 
portfolio committee members make recommendations on the corrective 
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steps to be implemented by either the Premier or the MEC of a 
department concerned. It is this process that constitutes holding 
government executives to account. Yet the interviewee acknowledged 
that the process as it stands has proven to be ineffective in terms 
of holding executives to account. It is not always the case that 
corrective steps are implemented by departments. The interviewee 
stated that the legislature is unable to hold executives and their 
departments directly to account as otherwise expected. Members of 
the provincial legislature are voted in by the citizens to represent 
their interests in government activities.  
 
The interviewee argued that their elected status gives the portfolio 
committee members further authority to hold departmental executives 
to account on behalf of citizens. But the actual processes of holding 
the executives to account are weak as they currently stands. The 
provincial legislature makes use of the portfolio committee 
resolutions which recommend how to hold government departments to 
account. According to the interviewee, in these resolutions the 
legislature committees gives the specific steps required where, for 
example, targets are not met or performance is not achieved. But 
the implementation of these resolutions is the prerogative of the 
respective departmental executives. These steps or resolutions are 
to be implemented by the political heads and heads of departments 
for each department that has been held to account, this according 
to interviewee.  
 
The resolutions are often accompanied by specific dates on which 
they should have been implemented. Any failure to adhere to these 
resolutions should then be explained to the legislature committees 
by the executives concerned. But as mentioned earlier and affirmed 
by the interviewee, the main challenge to these resolutions is the 
prerogative of the MEC and HOD concerned to implement the 
legislature resolutions. The interviewee complained that it is this 
prerogative that weakens accountability being that some MECs take 
longer than the deadline if not failing completely to implement 
these legislature resolutions. The interviewee indicated that the 
deadlines for implementing the portfolio committees’ resolutions 
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are, for various reasons, sometimes ignored by departmental 
executives.  
 
The provincial legislature committees may not enforce the 
implementation of their resolutions because they may be interpreted 
as having interfered with government activities. The legislature 
relies on MECs and HODs to provide an account of whether resolutions 
have been implemented or not. Depending on the MECs to implement 
these resolutions can lead to the resolutions having a minimal 
effect on departments’ performance, producing an additional 
weakening of accountability. E.G without mentioning names: 
 
‘Recently, portfolio committee members recommended that the 
MEC take action against the HOD in his department. The HOD 
was implicated with maladministration and non-achievement 
of expected targets.  But the MEC could not give a specific 
indication to the legislature that corrective steps were 
taken against alleged HOD.  The portfolio committee 
members’ initial corrective steps recommended could not 
evidently improve accountability as similar problems 
persisted in the department concerned’ 
 
According to the interviewee, the provincial legislature committee 
has more authority to hold departments’ executives to account for 
their performance than any other principal stakeholder group, 
including the national government, AG, treasury and PSC. But the 
interviewee raised concern that in many instances the holding of 
departmental executives to account has not been applied. The 
legislature portfolio committees’ members further rely on the 
Premier to hold MECs to account on behalf of the legislature, this 
according to the interviewee. The interviewee also noted that the 
provincial legislature relies on the Premier because she has 
appointed MECs to serve on the provincial cabinet, yet the 
commitment holding them to account in turn often remains 
unfulfilled. 
 
6.2.4. Redress poor performance and lack of accountability 
According to the interviewee, the provincial legislature makes use 
of government reports, the verbal presentations of MECs and HODs 
and citizens’ petitions to identify poor public service delivery. 
It is this process that helps portfolio committee members to 
determine whether departments have achieved performance targets. 
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Following this process, each departmental MEC is expected to 
commission remedial actions if predetermined standards of 
performances have not been attained, this according to interviewee. 
The interviewee also reported that portfolio committee members often 
put ‘political pressure’ on MECs to ensure that remedial action is 
commissioned in their capacity as members of the provincial 
legislature. The provincial legislature and citizens rely on 
remedial actions commissioned by the MECs to redress poor public 
services.  
 
According to the legislature representative, the process of 
commissioning remedial actions often requires investigations to 
determining the reasons for poor performance. Investigation is 
followed by the development of internal controls, staff training 
and the resignation of staff implicated in maladministration. 
Portfolio committee members expect regular updates from MECs on the 
redressing of poor public services, this according to the 
interviewee. But it is not always clear whether the intervention by 
MECs of other executives redress poor performance and 
accountability. The interviewee reflected that recently the Premier 
of the NW province adopted an approach of ‘reshuffling’ the MECs of 
underperforming departments’ from their offices. For the 
interviewee, reshuffling involves replacing MECs with fellow 
legislature members and switching MECs between departments.  
 
This measure has been introduced to try to minimise and to redress 
recurrent underperformance in government. But according to the 
interviewee, the process has not yet received comprehensive 
cooperation as some MECs regard the approach as a political 
conspiracy against them on the part of the Premier. According to 
the interviewee, MECs have argued that the Premier has removed them 
from offices without a proper investigative process determining the 
root cause of poor public service. The MECs who have been subject 
or who are the potential subject for removal from office further 
argue that there are political reasons from outside government 
performance (i.e. other than evident poor performance) that has led 
to their being removed from office. For example, a failure to agree 
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to views raised by the Premier could lead to the removal of the MEC 
from offices.  
 
According to the interviewee, these negative perceptions often delay 
the redressing of poor public services. The failure to implement 
widely a process of redress has adversely weakened government 
accountability. The role of the Premier in redressing poor 
performance has recently been affirmed by the Committee for 
Standards in Public Accounts (SCOPA) that demanded she remove two 
of the most poorly performing MECs (Tshehle, 2012). 
 
6.3. Gauteng Provincial legislature views on accountability  
According to the interviewee representing the Gauteng legislature 
(GP) the accountability relationship between the provincial 
legislature and its departments may need to be explored in detail. 
There remain some uncertainties in terms of the various roles played 
with regard to accountability. According to the interviewee, the 
lack of a common understanding of government accountability by both 
members of the legislature and departmental executives affirm the 
call for a detailed exploration. The representative of the 
legislature interviewed pleads for academics and government 
administrators to study the efficacy of the current accountability 
arrangement between government and legislators and also calls for 
guidelines on useful practices to be provided. The interviewee 
argued that the current government accountability mechanism 
sometimes favours the government over the legislature.  
 
Not much detail was given of which part of the accountability 
relationship between legislators and executives this concerns, but 
clearly some accountability processes are not favourable to the 
legislature. For example, accountability for the provincial 
government budget spending is expected from the legislature, yet 
government executives only preside over how the provincial 
government budget is to be spent with minimal input from 
legislature. Other issues will be detailed later in this analysis. 
The interviewee emphasised that a comprehensive study of South 
Africa’s provincial government accountability mechanism would help 
identify what works for provincial citizens. It would also clarify 
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and make it easier to manage accountability expectations from 
different stakeholders.  
 
According to the views of the interviewee, there are currently 
misconceptions from certain government executives, citizens and 
other members of the legislature about what constitutes 
accountability in GP. There are also uncertainties about the nature 
of the role of members of the legislatures and provincial government 
executives in government accountability. To give a context to the 
uncertainty surrounding government accountability, the 
representative interviewed argued that the role of the provincial 
legislature and its portfolio committees is not clearly understood 
by the executives of many government departments. According to the 
interviewee, many departmental executives do not know how and why 
they should engage with portfolio committee members in the 
legislature.  
 
The interviewee also hinted that few provincial departmental 
executives understand that the provincial legislature does not hold 
absolute authority with regard to the allocation of the provincial 
budget within government. The interviewee further substantiated his 
concerns by saying that many departmental executives blame the 
provincial legislature for not allocating a sufficient budget for 
spending. This claim is frequently made by many departments 
executives that fail to attain performance targets and therefore 
appears as an excuse for poor performance. According to the 
interviewee, in following the process of budget allocation, budget 
allocations decisions are influenced and determined by the 
provincial executive council. The role of the legislature is to 
endorse the recommendations made by the executive council on budget 
allocation.  
 
According to the interviewee, in recent years there have been 
complaints by other province’s legislatures about their role with 
regards to budget accountability. Legislatures argue that they are 
perceived to have power over the provincial budget and its 
accountability, yet the reality is very different. Many of those 
legislators, who are aware of this contradiction, are of the opinion 
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that their role with regard to budget accountability must be 
clarified. They are conscious that in many provinces conflict exists 
between the creation of legislation and its implementation. 
Legislation clearly states that budget allocation is to be performed 
by the provincial legislature. However, the evidence and experience 
of the interviewee is that this allocation is not being performed 
as expected. The executive council of the provincial government 
makes performance commitments to the legislature on an annual basis.  
 
These commitments are viewed as performances plans from which the 
legislature will measure government activity. According to the 
interviewee, holding the provincial government to account on these 
commitments is an important objective for every portfolio committee. 
The holding of departments to account takes place despite the fact 
that the legislature does not give inputs on the performance to be 
pursued. Various portfolio committee members make use of government 
departments’ performance commitments to develop their own action 
plans on how to hold MECs and HODs to account during the spending 
year. Basically departments’ executives submit their performance 
plans to committees with specific targets to be pursued. The 
committee members make use of the executives’ commitments to demand 
accountability on quarterly.  
  
6.3.1. Taking into account views of various stakeholders 
According to the interviewee, the GP legislature does not expect 
provincial government departments’ executives to ‘take into account’ 
portfolio committees’ views in government performance decisions and 
activities. Instead, legislature members expect departmental 
executives to determine performance target commitments and inform 
portfolio committees on how they intend to attain them. In contrast, 
majority of the government department executives interviewed for 
this thesis expressed their expectation that members of the 
legislature should provide sufficient inputs to be ‘taken into 
account’ in government decision. These views were analysed as part 
of the survey of provincial government interviewees in Chapter Four. 
 
However, according to the legislature representative interviewed, 
the provincial legislature regularly summons government 
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departments’ executives for various reasons, but not to influence 
decisions taken by government on performance targets.  
 
Some of the reasons for engaging with government departments’ 
executives include: understanding government performance plans; 
understanding how performance plans would be attained; forwarding 
their constituents’ concerns to government; and holding executives 
to account. According to the interviewee, these engagements take 
the form of information sessions uniting two tiers of government. 
That is, the executives of provincial government departments inform 
provincial legislature members about intended performance plans and 
the implications for their related budget. For the interviewee, the 
relationship between legislature and government departments should 
be seen as supportive rather than adversarial. The interviewee 
emphasised that the legislature is not to be viewed by provincial 
departments’ executives as a watchdog over provincial government. 
Members of portfolio committees always give inputs towards 
provincial government activities but whether they are ‘taken into 
account’ or not are the prerogative of the respective departments’ 
executives.  
 
According to the interviewee, portfolio committees’ members do not 
compel government executives to ‘take into account’ their inputs. 
The representative of the GP regional legislature furthermore 
highlighted the relationship between the government departments’ 
executives and portfolio committees’ members could not be classified 
within the principal-agent model. In the principal-agent model the 
agent obtains his performance mandate from the principal, which is 
not the case for the relationship between the government and 
legislature. The Premier is expected by the legislature to hold 
executives to account. The point to remember here is that provincial 
departmental executives are led by political heads (MEC) serving as 
full members of the legislature, suggesting that both institutions 
work together without interfering with each other. The interviewee 
argued that MECs are members of the provincial legislature, so 
giving them access to issues that are discussed in parliament and 
subject to resolutions and recommendations by other members.  
 
221 
 
Other stakeholders’ views 
According to the interviewee, one of the functions of the members 
of opposition political organisations serving in the house of the 
legislature is to raise issues that should be ‘taken into account’ 
by various departmental executives. In many cases, these members 
often raise views that are related to weaknesses in government 
performance and maladministration in government. According to the 
representative of the legislature, the role of the opposition 
parties is to enhance government accountability in every respect, 
to the extent that ‘taking into account’ their views creates the 
impression that accountability has been enhanced. However, the 
interviewee was adamant that their views are frequently not taken 
into account to the extent that might be expected. 
 
The views of provincial citizens    
‘Taking into account’ the views of provincial citizens on government 
activities and decisions are a major challenge for the majority of 
government departments, according to the interviewee from the 
province. There is currently an absence of systematic approaches 
that allow a sustainable accountability relationship between 
government and citizens in the province. As a result, citizens’ 
views and interests are frequently not ‘taken into account’ in 
government decisions. A number of departmental executives make use 
of well-known, informal platforms made available by the Premier and 
other executives which are called ‘Bua Le Sechaba’ (speak to the 
nation) and Izimbizos. These platforms are used to foster citizen 
participation in the province. However, according to the 
interviewee, these measures have not yet been evaluated to determine 
their effectiveness.  
 
6.3.2. Giving an account  
Portfolio committee members expect various departments to ‘give an 
account’ regularly for the use of public finances and the attainment 
of performance targets. In the interviewee’s experience, special 
arrangements are made between the executives of government 
department and certain portfolio committee members on when and what 
account is to be given. Departmental representatives make verbal 
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presentations and also submit reports to portfolio committees 
annually during pre-arranged account-giving meetings. In addition, 
portfolio committee members summon political heads (MECs) and heads 
of departments (HODs) to review their progress on the commitments 
made. Both quarterly and annual accountability reports are published 
on government departments’ websites and then submitted to the 
provincial legislature through portfolio committees. 
 
6.3.3. Holding to account departments’ executives 
According to the interviewee representing the provincial 
legislature, there are growing misconceptions and perceptions 
created in the public media about accountability. One is that 
opposition political parties, like the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
amongst others, play an important role in enhancing government 
accountability in the province. The perception is that opposition 
parties drive government accountability by insisting on holding the 
MECs and HODs of departments to account for their performance and 
use of public finance. The interviewee argued that these 
misconceptions are genuine fallacies used by the media to increase 
the political credibility of opposition political parties. No 
evidence could be provided to substantiate the claims raised by the 
interviewee.  
 
Nevertheless, the interviewee strongly believed that the level of 
government accountability has to be improved by all members of the 
legislature regardless of their political affiliation. Apparently, 
opposition members of political parties in the legislature often 
demand that MECs be removed from office when evidence exists that 
they have underperformed. According to the interviewee, the process 
of holding to account on the part of opposition parties occurs when 
portfolio committees subpoena MECs and HODs to appear at the 
legislature to give account. The interviewee added that members of 
opposition political parties often take a lead in demanding actions 
to be taken against MECs of poorly performing departments. Since 
different political parties can demand an account for any 
unsatisfactory performance and misuse of public finance, there is 
the risk that the ruling political party would be seen as tolerant 
to government executives.  
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The interviewee stated that these are perceptions that have been 
created in the media. Moreover, according to the legislature 
representative, these perceptions are not a true reflection of who 
holds government department executives to account in the 
legislature. The interviewee argued that legislature members 
belonging to the ruling political party, the African National 
Congress (ANC), make use of various mechanisms to hold government 
executives to account. He further emphasized the role of ANC 
legislature members in holding departmental executives to account:  
Yes, opposition parties are perceived to be holding 
government to account, but the ruling party makes use of 
its own political process to hold MECs to account at 
political party level. MECs are taken for disciplinary 
hearing at political party level for their respective 
departments’ poor performance.  
According to the interviewee, it is at political party levels where 
some government performance targets are agreed with MECs, and they 
are hence held to account there. In addition to disciplinary 
hearings, some MECs are recalled from office at political party 
level, with such motions being adopted on majority rule in the 
legislature. But the recalling of MECs is often preceded by an 
investigation of the facts that led to poor performances. Here, the 
interviewee further clarified the processes of holding executives 
to account. There are also political party caucuses and ‘provincial 
lekgotla’ that takes place at government level. Here the ruling 
political party holds its deployed executive to account, with both 
of these events being driven by political parties to ensure clear 
government strategy and enhance accountability, according to 
interviewee. 
 
The interviewee further argued that the ruling political party, ANC 
is perceived to be lenient on political heads (MECs) with regards 
to holding executive to account. However, this is not the case 
because, in his view, ‘holding to account’ is the priority of the 
ruling political party. Portfolio committee members additionally 
expect MECs to hold department officials to account on poor 
performance and misuse of public funds. Nonetheless, according to 
the interviewee, it is also a fact that the provincial legislature 
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and its committees have a limited capacity for functions related to 
accountability; they have fewer than the needed members. The 
interviewee stressed that having few members at the legislature 
makes it difficult for some government departments to be held to 
account where need arises. Nevertheless the interviewee acknowledged 
that the legislature rely on work performed by other agencies like 
AG and PSC.   
 
Another result of the limitation in the number of members is that 
more and more members of the provincial legislature appear to be 
doing more administration work than actually holding the government 
to account. The interviewee further argued that lack of training on 
the part of newly elected members of the legislature also impedes 
the legislature from fulfilling its mandate of holding departmental 
executives and their administrators to account.  
 
6.3.4. Redressing accountability  
The interviewee argued that it is the prerogative of the Premier 
and the MECs to ensure poor performance and accountability to 
citizens are addressed. The interviewee could not provide further 
views as to whether citizens receive redress on poor accountability 
and performance from the provincial government.  
 
6.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter the views of the provincial legislature 
representatives about government accountability are analysed. 
Unlike various views raised by interviewees in chapter four and 
five, in chapter six both provinces interviewees from legislature 
agree on every aspect of accountability they raised except that the 
GP legislature interviewee does not believe that the legislature 
can hold executives to account. It is this view that the NW 
interviewee strongly argued that it is a fundamental point of 
accountability relationship between executive and legislative 
authority. Both the NW and GP interviewed representatives believe 
that MECs and their HOD are not expected to take into account 
legislature inputs for accountability purposes. According to these 
interviewees provincial government executives have a prerogative to 
decide on issues to give account to.  
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But there are further concerns by the legislature representatives 
that some of government executives are not aware of the 
legislature’s role with regards to government accountability. The 
government executives are accusing the legislature representatives 
for not holding them to account. Legislative representatives further 
believed that current process of control over provincial budget 
makes it difficult for legislature to make a meaningful 
contribution. The uncertainty regarding who controls the provincial 
budget at times weakens provincial government accountability.  
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Table 6. 1 Summary of accountability views from legislature in NW and GP 
 
NW Provincial 
legislature 
GP Provincial 
Legislature 
Summary of accountability  Views Views 
     
Executives not compelled to take into 
account legislature members but national 
policies for accountability.  
Agree Agree 
     
Provincial legislature does not hold 
government executives to account on 
behalf of the citizens. 
Agree Agree 
     
Executives are required by the 
legislation to give account on 
performance and use of finance as a 
result there minimal need for subpoena by 
legislature.  to give account 
Agree Agree 
     
Members of the legislature should hold 
executives to account on the basis of the 
account they give, and also using AG and 
other agency reports. 
Agree Disagree 
     
Legislature members lack necessary 
authority and capacity to hold executives 
to account as expected  
Agree Agree 
     
Accountability is weakened by the fact 
that it is government executives’ 
prerogative to implement redress measures 
that at times implicate them. 
Agree Agree 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: BATHO PELE AND ACCOUNTABILITY AT 
PROVINCIAL LEVEL 
                                                                 
Part A 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the use and implementation of the Batho Pele 
(BP) model as a government to citizens’ accountability mechanism in 
provincial governments. BP is a government initiative intended to 
enhance citizen participations and access to government 
institutions. It was introduced by the South African government as 
a legislative framework in 1997 (Skweyiya, 1997b). BP is a concept 
initiated by the National Departments of Public Service 
Administration (DPSA) whose objective is to transform South Africa’s 
public services and achieve a greater focus on ensuring that 
citizens’ views and concerns are ‘taken into account’ at all times 
this according to Kroukamp (1999). It is important at this stage to 
emphasize that BP was not entirely intended to be a government 
accountability mechanism.  
 
According to Edward and Dick (2001) instead, BP was meant to 
transform South African public service delivery from the apartheid 
government led public service into a modern, inclusive and efficient 
process. The heightening of government accountability to citizens 
was just one of the objectives driving the introduction of the BP 
model into the public sector. Building on my overall research 
objective, this aspect of citizen accountability is central to the 
thesis. An additional objective for BP was to improve the quality 
of service provided by the government to citizens and also to improve 
the general access to government services for the majority of 
citizens. But to achieve a full analysis of BP, the entire concept 
has first to be clarified and the conclusions drawn then applied to 
the government’s record of citizen accountability at a provincial 
level.   
 
Both government departments and service providers under BP are 
required to consider the impact of public services on citizens and 
the needs of other service users. According to the National 
Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) executives 
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interviewed, the BP model is intended to encourage government 
departments to continuously obtain citizens’ views about public 
services. The implementation of BP is achieved through an adherence 
by government departments to eight principles in providing services. 
The eight principles of BP are: 1) citizens’ consultation, 2) the 
setting of service standards for government services, 3) providing 
access to government for all citizens, 4) the courteous treatment 
of government service users, 5) availability of all government 
information, 6) openness and transparency about government 
activities, 7) redress of citizens’ complaints related to government 
services and 8) ensuring value for money on government 
services(Skweyiya, 1997b). 
 
The DPSA interviewees explained that all national, provincial 
departments and local governments are expected to integrate BP 
within their strategies and service delivery operations. According 
to the interviewees, departmental strategies for implementing BP 
are intended to ensure that government service delivery mechanisms 
adhere to BP principles. Moreover, according to the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) and DPSA interviewees, the offices of the Premier 
in various provinces are expected to monitor the implementation of 
BP in different government departments. In this chapter, the views 
of various government and non-government interviewees are analysed 
with regard to the implementation and impact of BP as an 
accountability measure of government performance. This chapter also 
analyses the BP reports produced by PSC on the implementation and 
impact of government services.  
 
An analysis of these reports will provide insight into whether, as 
a measure of accountability, BP has improved provincial government 
performance accountability. Provincial government departments’ 
executives in both NW and GP give their views on BP. They indicate 
how they have implemented the BP model and its impact on service 
delivery. The PSC representatives from both NW and GP also gave 
their views and experiences with regard to the implementation of BP 
by the provincial government. According to interviewees the role of 
the PSC is to make significant enquiries within provincial and 
national government on the implementation of BP. The institution’s 
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reports on BP form a significant part of this chapter’s analysis. 
The reports are readily available in the public domain.   
 
Secondary analysis on Batho Pele    
The analysis in the thesis of the implementation of BP as an 
accountability measure relies on the views of interviewees and 
research reports published by the PSC and the literature on BP. A 
general perception held by government departments’ representatives 
interviewed is that BP is poorly implemented in government. The 
perception exists because the majority of government departments in 
both NW and GP are yet to evaluate BP implementation. This perception 
has led to many of the interviewees being unable to respond to a 
question as to whether changes in government performance and 
accountability are as a result of BP. As a result of fewer 
interviewees being unable to provide clear views on effects brought 
by BP in government service delivery and accountability, I employed 
a secondary analysis on the published research and other reports to 
supplement the analysis of BP in the thesis. 
 
Heaton (2008) defines secondary analysis as a research approach that 
reuses the published research more than once for different purposes. 
The PSC conducted various studies of national and provincial 
government departments’ implementation of BP and the impact on 
service delivery. The PSC’s reports are published and available for 
public use on their website(PSC, 2013). The reports are used in the 
thesis, while PSC representatives in both NW and GP were further 
interviewed to compare their objectives and methodology used for 
the purpose of analysis in the thesis. Some of the PSC research 
report findings and recommendations considered in the thesis were 
also tested against the views of those interviewed from provincial 
government departments. This chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first section, Part A, supplies a context to the BP model in 
relation to government accountability.  
 
The second section, Part B, analyses the provincial government 
departments’ implementation of BP as a citizens’ accountability 
tool. In the third section, Part C, the views of interviewees from 
non-provincial government institutions and reports are analysed 
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concerning the impact of BP. A conclusion and summary concerning 
the implementation of BP in relation to provincial government 
accountability is provided in the third section, Part C of this 
chapter. The Conclusion makes use of both secondary reports and the 
views raised by various interviewees. 
 
7.2. Batho Pele Principles 
According to Tshandu in 1997 South Africa’s government introduced a 
white paper on the transformation of the public service delivery in 
an attempt to keep up with new public management discourses in most 
of the OECD member countries(2010). In the white paper, the Batho 
Pele model was introduced to the public sector to improve the 
government’s approach to public services and enhance government 
accountability to citizens. The phrase ‘Batho Pele’ is derived from 
one of South African’s official languages called Setswana. In direct 
English translation the term means ‘people first’, meaning that 
government public services ought to take into account, at all times, 
issues raised by citizens in service delivery. Tshandu argued that 
the introduction of government initiatives like BP in the public 
sector meant an alignment of the South African public sector with 
the debates surrounding new public management. BP strategies were 
integrated within government performance plans, but not as a stand-
alone government policy, according to NDPSA interviewees. 
 
Part B 
7.3. Provincial government and Batho Pele 
The NW and GP provincial government departments’ executives gave 
views about BP and there were mixed responses from interviewees 
about the implementation of BP in government accountability. More 
than half of all the interviewees seemed uncertain about whether 
the implementation and monitoring of BP is the responsibility of 
provincial government departments. As a result of being uncertain 
many suggested that BP is to be implemented by departments but that 
monitoring is to be commissioned by independent agencies. The 
majority of those who shared their views about respective 
departments’ implementation of BP were concerned that the intended 
objectives of BP had not been achieved. The interviewees attribute 
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the lack of comprehensively implementing and monitoring of BP to 
different factors.  
 
Many of the government interviewees attribute the lack of 
comprehensive realisation of planned BP objectives, such as 
citizens’ accountability and improved public service, to government 
departments and executives absence of will to implement the model. 
Other interviewees argued that it is not easy to integrate the 
concept into the performance plans of their respective departments. 
As one of the interviewees put it: 
“It is not easy to put some of Batho Pele principles like, 
value for money and adhering to service standards into 
individual managers’ operation plans” 
 
Instead of giving evidence of the impact of BP on government 
accountability to citizens, many of the interviewees created a list 
of reasons for why it has not been comprehensively implemented. Some 
of the explanations common to the interviewees are explored in 
detail in the following section. Fewer interviewees argued that the 
implementation of BP has improved and still improves access to 
public service and citizens’ accountability by government 
departments in both provinces. Even fewer interviewees complained 
that the implementation of BP has been delayed by the lack of budget 
allocation from the legislature. Other interviewees argued that the 
implementation and monitoring of BP is the responsibility of 
national government or accountability institutions like the PSC. 
Some of the reasons cited by various government departments’ 
interviewees for not comprehensively implementing and evaluating BP 
are analysed in the context of government accountability in the 
following section.  
 
7.3.1. Provincial government not responsible for BP 
The majority of the interviewees from government departments concur 
with each other in the view that if BP were implemented 
comprehensively then government accountability to citizens could be 
improved. In addition to this view, they further argued that BP 
principles are entrenched within the service delivery programmes of 
various departments. As a result, regional government has 
implemented BP in its service delivery processes. But these 
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interviewees explained that it is a function of external 
institutions like the PSC, the Office of the Premier and the DPSA 
to monitor and evaluate BP impact on service delivery and 
accountability. At least eight out of the sixteen government 
department interviewees argued that it is not the responsibility of 
provincial government departments to monitor the principle of BP. 
 
The interviewees argued that provincial departments are able to take 
into account BP principles in their performance. However, the PSC, 
the Office of the Premier and the NDPSA should derive a mechanism 
to monitor and support departments in the implementation of BP. Some 
interviewees noted the inability to comply with some PB principles 
– such as consulting citizens - was due to a lack of budget 
allocations. This justification of failure was also one of the key 
findings noted by the PSC study on the implementation of the 
principle of BP, going under the name of ‘consultation of citizens’. 
In their study, which interviewed senior government officials and 
reviewed both national and the provincial departments’ citizens’ 
consultation process, the PSC noted that consultation frameworks 
have been developed but have become obsolete due to lack of funds 
for implementing the programmes (Sangweni, 2007). 
 
The lack of consultation of provincial citizens as part of 
accountability is mirrored in all categories of interviewees carried 
out for this thesis (i.e. departments, legislature and 
accountability institutions). According to a majority of the 
research interviewees’ provincial government accountability is 
weakened by many departments in both provinces due to the absence 
of an institutionalised mechanism of ‘taking into account’ and 
‘giving an account’ to citizens’ views. The views of government 
interviewees on BP have also underlined that this as a root cause 
of poor citizens’ accountability.   
 
7.3.2. Lack of Batho Pele champions 
In addition to shifting responsibility for the implementation and 
monitoring of BP, interviewees from the three government departments 
expressed concern that the lack of BP ‘champions’ in each province 
also weakens BP. They argued that each of their departments have 
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different strategies for BP, but further indicated that a single 
government institution strengthening the BP strategy would be 
preferable to eliminating differing approaches in the current BP 
‘status quo’. This single institution might be named as the BP 
champion, supporting all the other government departments. Two of 
the research interviewees argued that the office of the Premier has 
the responsibility of holding departmental executives to account 
for not implementing BP and for poor accountability in general. 
However, many argued that the office of the Premier is not fulfilling 
this function. 
 
They further argued that the Office of the Premier’s support to 
various government departments in both provinces is insufficient in 
the implementation of BP. The role of the office of Premier in both 
provinces is viewed by a majority of departments’ interviewees as 
vital with regard to BP and government accountability. According to 
the interviewees, the Premier is often involved with initiating 
Izimbizos at a provincial level as part of a strategy for encouraging 
executive members to take into account and give an account to 
citizens. This process is seen by many interviewees as helpful in 
enhancing accountability but needs to be institutionalised for 
greater impact.   
 
7.3.3. Poor evaluation of BP implementation 
During the process of interviewing departmental representatives, a 
few interviewees argued that BP is part of their performance 
strategy. According to these interviewees, BP principles are 
displayed in their departments’ offices and websites. They further 
indicated that senior management contracts are based on senior 
managers implementing BP principles. Some further argued that it is 
the policy of government departments that all new employees should 
be inducted based on the implementation of BP principles. According 
to all of these interviewees, there are insufficient mechanisms in 
place for BP implementation. Moreover, they argue that government 
service users, and particularly citizens, should be educated about 
BP when receiving government services. 
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Educating citizens and other government service users about BP would 
allow government departments to evaluate whether BP has been 
implemented as expected and its impact on service delivery and 
government accountability. The interviewees further argued that the 
decision to implement BP as expected is dependent on individual 
managers and employees within their departments. The interviewees 
all agreed that the challenge of BP is to evaluate the impact it 
has on accountability and citizens’ participation as opposed to its 
actual implementation. The interviewees claimed that there has been 
improvement in government accountability to citizens, but 
accountability could be further improved if the implementation is 
properly evaluated. The interviewees emphasised that such an 
evaluation should be performed by independent institutions and 
provide departments with practical guidelines on how to enhance 
citizens’ accountability.     
 
7.3.4. Lack of training and the will to implement BP 
Some interviewees argued that all employees are trained on the 
implementation and observation of BP principles, while other 
interviewees from different departments argued that the poor 
implementation of BP in their departments is attributable to the 
lack of frequent training. One official raised a concern that there 
is a perception within many government departments that BP is not a 
government policy. As a result, there is generally a lack of 
determination amongst many government executives to implement BP. 
He further attributed the poor implementation of BP and impact to 
accountability; to a poor culture of policy implementation that has 
been recently experienced throughout government departments. But 
the same interviewee conceded that government has introduced various 
measures, such as an employee awareness program, to improve employee 
participation in government initiatives.  
 
As a result of these weaknesses, many interviewees believe it is 
important to provide continuous training to various government 
executives on the implementation of BP. According to interviewees 
this training would seek to encourage these executives to oversee 
the implementation of BP in their departments.   
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7.3.5. The role of citizens in BP  
A minority of government departments' interviewees accused the 
citizens of the provinces of failing to demand or participate in 
the provincial government accountability process. These 
interviewees argued that BP effectiveness is equally reliant on 
citizens participating in government initiatives that seek to 
enhance their participation. According to government 
representatives many government initiatives that involve citizens’ 
participation are often poorly implemented due to only a small 
number of citizens taking part. According to interviewees, citizens 
are perceived to want to engage government departments on their own 
terms as opposed to both government and citizens’ terms. An example 
was given of the recent riots of citizens over public service, which 
have been increasing in the country according to Jain(2010).  
 
According to the interviewees from government departments, citizens 
often take to the street and riot instead of participating in 
government initiatives like BP and Izimbizos to raise their 
dissatisfaction with government performance. As a result of weak 
participation by citizens in government initiatives, BP’s impact on 
accountability and government performance has not improved as 
intended. According to the interviewees, the lack of enthusiasm from 
provincial citizens for participating in government initiatives like 
BP has led to a poor accountability from government to citizens. 
According to interviewees, holding government departments’ 
executives to account for poor public service has not taken place 
as expected. The more than fifty percent of the interviewees 
attribute the lack of a comprehensive system of holding executives 
to account to weaknesses of legislature’s participation in 
accountability processes.  
 
All of the problems identified by different government departments’ 
interviewees of poor implementation of BP were identical to those 
that were raised by the Auditor General, the PSC and the legislature. 
Judging by all the comments and experiences of government 
departments’ representatives, it is clear that BP has not yet been 
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completely integrated in provincial governments’ performance 
programs. 
 
Part C 
7.4. DPSA – Views on implementation of Batho Pele 
The executives interviewed from provincial departments argued that 
the implementation and monitoring of BP in all government 
departments is to be overseen by the national government’s DPSA and 
PSC. They further claimed that the BP framework was introduced by 
the national department in 1997 and hence should be supported in 
its implementation by the DPSA. As part of understanding the 
implementation of BP and its relations to accountability and 
government services, I interviewed DPSA officials on their views 
and experience of the effect of BP on accountability at provincial 
level. Two officials, both senior and executive, were interviewed 
in this department and both gave their views on BP implementation 
and monitoring of at a provincial level. According to the 
interviewees, the political head of the DPSA is accountable on an 
annual base to the national assembly with regard to the impact of 
BP on public services.  
 
But according to the interviewees the process of accountability of 
BP to the national assembly is dependent on the inputs of every 
provincial government on the implementation of BP. This is due to 
the notion that MECs at the provincial level are also accountable 
to their legislatures on BP. The interviewees argued that every 
government department, both provincial and national, is expected to 
have a BP implementation and monitoring strategy. The interviewees 
categorically refuted some of the claims made by the interviewees 
from provincial government departments with regard to BP 
implementation and monitoring. The claim that BP is not the 
responsibility of provincial government was refuted by interviewees 
from national office. The interviewees further argued that all 
government departments at both provincial and national level are 
expected to implement and monitor BP in their programs.  
 
The office of Premier in every province is then expected to 
corroborate the outcomes of BP in respective provinces; in other 
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words, the Premier oversees the implementation and monitoring of 
BP. The interviewees nonetheless acknowledged that processes 
followed in the initial stages of the introduction of BP might have 
led to its poor implementation. According to the executive 
interviewed, when the national government introduced BP it was not 
given comprehensive recognition by many government institutions 
until in more recent years; in particular, the monitoring part of 
the process. One of the interviewees said: 
‘many government institutions might have under estimated 
the complexity generally of the government working process 
of integrating BP and monitoring thereof and as result this 
led to poor implementation of Batho Pele and its evaluation 
for the intended objective.’  
 
In addition to problems related to BP raised by the government 
department interviewees, DPSA interviewees further indicated that 
some departments on both a provincial and national level failed to 
take the BP model into account in their processes when it was 
introduced almost a decade ago. Accordingly, in initial process of 
introducing BP for implementation it was not given due consideration 
and as a result many provincial departments are struggling with the 
evaluating the impact of BP on citizen accountability. The 
interviewees emphasised that many provincial government departments 
are currently not giving account to citizens yet BP was meant to 
enhance such accountability.   
 
According to the interviewee, the role of the office of the Premier 
is also expected to play an important part in enhancing citizens’ 
accountability through BP. But the interviewees further argued that 
the Premiers of many provinces may need to improve their process of 
monitoring BP in government departments. The interviewee argued that 
lack of an effective role played by the Premiers with regard to BP 
perpetuates poor governance and damages citizens’ accountability. 
According to DPSA executives, many government departments have not 
yet comprehensively implemented BP and this has adversely affected 
government accountability to its citizens. According to executives, 
these failures are mainly attributable to the lack of 
‘institutionalisations’ of the model into a government performance 
management framework.  
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According to interviewees lack of institutionalisation means poor 
embedding of BP into government programs. Failure to 
institutionalise the model has led to slow implementation of the 
model, but there have been various initiatives to improve BP 
implementation and citizens’ accountability.  
 
7.5. Constitutional provisions on Batho Pele 
According to DPSA interviewees, BP was introduced as part of the 
constitutional provisions requiring public administration to adhere 
to the following, amongst other principles: being accountable, 
transparent and developmental; providing public services that 
respond to citizens’ needs; and ensuring that public services 
encourage citizen’ participation in policy-making. The PSC 
interviewees in both provinces indicated that since the introduction 
of BP in the late 1990’s the Commission has embarked on evaluating 
its implementation in various government departments. According to 
the PSC interviewees, the approach of various national and 
provincial departments to implementing BP has not been evaluated 
over these years. 
 
According to the interviewees and the reports published the PSC 
evaluation of BP by both national and provincial governments was 
based on a study of the implementation and observation of the eight 
principles of BP. The PSC produced research reports about the degree 
to which BP implementation attained its intended purposes in both 
national and provincial government. Various PSC report findings on 
the implementation of BP are analysed in this chapter. In evaluating 
the implementation of BP, the PSC focused on a review of the actual 
principles with the following three main objectives: 
 Assessing provincial and national departments’ guidelines and 
policies in promoting BP and its implementation. 
 Assessing the impact of implementing BP principles with regard 
to the public services provided by departments and their 
accountability. 
 Formulating and providing recommendations on how to improve 
the implementation of BP principles providing them to 
departments.    
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These objectives cannot be exactly identified with this thesis 
objective and questions of assessing the use of BP as an 
accountability tool. But the objective assists the overall analysis 
of BP and provincial government accountability that this research 
seeks to explore. The PSC reports used in this thesis were further 
supplemented by the various interviewees’ views on BP. The PSC 
findings on BP are analysed in detail below within the 
accountability context of this thesis. Only six out of the eight 
principles of BP are analysed because their reports from the PSC 
were readily available.   
 
7.5.1. Accountability institutions: Public service commission 
According to the interviewees from the Commission, the PSC in both 
the GP and NW regions has been able to verify government departments’ 
implementation of the BP model. The process of verifying whether BP 
is being implemented and the impact it has on government service 
delivery has been performed over the years. The BP model was verified 
by the PSC through the implementation of its eight principles. The 
general view on the implementation of BP and its impact on government 
service delivery is that it has not being given thorough attention 
by government institutions. Many government departments have not 
‘taken into account’ BP as part of their performance activities. BP 
is seen as an additional burden for government activities. Hence 
many government departments have not aligned their planning and 
performance activities to BP.  
 
In the NW fewer government department officials have a perception 
that the BP should be a government department on its own as opposed 
to being integrated into government activities. Lack of a dedicated 
department has led to government departments being reluctant to 
implement some of the provisions of BP. According to the PSC 
representatives interviewed, out of the eight principles of BP (i.e. 
citizens’ consultation, setting of service standards for government 
services, providing access to government to all citizens, courtesy 
treatment to government service users, availability of all 
government information, openness and transparency about government 
activities, redress citizens’ complaints related to government 
services and ensuring value for money) citizens’ consultations, 
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setting of service standards and redress have met with weak 
compliance by many government departments in both provinces. 
Accordingly, lack of citizen consultation has led to many 
departments delivering public services without taking into account 
citizens’ views. 
 
7.5.2. Methodology used by PSC 
According to the PSC interviewees the PSC makes use of self-
administered questionnaires and semi-structured interviews with 
various senior and junior departments’ executives. In collecting 
their data from various departments about BP principles in 
conducting their studies, the PSC takes into account both the 
provincial and national perspective on BP. But according to PSC 
reports not all national and provincial departments take part in 
their studies, this is due to various reasons including the lack of 
sufficient researchers and other resources to conduct the studies, 
and the fact that other departments lack provincial representatives 
making the comparison process difficult. The PSC further uses 
literature from key policy documents, legislation and published 
reports in addition to primary data in arriving at their conclusions 
and giving department recommendations. The following studies’ 
findings were analysed to supplement the process of arriving at a 
conclusion to this thesis regarding BP and its effect on government 
accountability.  
 
7.5.3. BP principle: Consultation of citizens for service delivery 
According to the PSC study, the understanding of the concept of 
consultation amongst departments varies based on its use. The fact 
that the BP white paper gives a definition to all eight principles 
and consultation means:  
‘Citizens are consulted about the level and quality of the 
public service they receive and, whenever possible, should 
be given a choice about the service that is offered.’(PSC, 
2008a) 
But according to PSC findings, the majority of provincial 
departments make use of various consultation initiatives to inform 
citizens about government services. Citizens are rarely given 
opportunities by government departments to share their experience 
about public services and the quality thereof, as the BP model 
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intends to take place in the consultation. This is one the reasons 
some citizens take to the streets and riot regarding the state of 
public services (Jain, 2010). Lack of citizens’ consultation further 
perpetuates the lack of ‘taking into account’ of citizens’ views in 
government decisions, as many department interviewees acknowledged. 
In its study, the PSC further acknowledged that many departments 
have made various attempts to improve their approach to the 
consultation process but are limited by budget allocations. 
According to PSC research report on citizens’ consultation, many 
departments’ interviewees argued that in many cases public funds 
are allocated for service delivery but not for citizens’ 
consultation process. 
 
7.5.4. BP principle: Information about public services 
The BP principle about government information is described as 
follows in the legislation: 
‘Citizens should be given full, accurate information about 
the public service they are entitled to receive.’(PSC, 
2009b) 
 
Despite the PSC survey report on government-to-citizens consultative 
processes being weak, more than two-thirds of the provincial and 
national departments taking part in the research had implemented 
various measures to provide information to citizens. According to 
the PSC reports, many departments made use of either print and 
electronic media or broadcast and published reports to furnish 
government information to citizens. Many departments 
comprehensively implement the principle of making government 
information available to those who need it. The majority of 
departments and AG interviewees in both provinces expressed trust 
in the processes of government departments in giving information 
about government activities.  
 
7.5.5. BP principle: Value for money of public services 
Value for money in the context of BP model is defined as follows: 
‘Public service should be provided economically and 
efficiently in order to give citizens the best possible 
value for money’(PSC, 2007)  
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According to PSC reports, much as with the principle of consultation 
there is a challenge of not having a common understanding amongst 
various departments’ executives. According to the PCS executives 
interviewed, the differing understanding of value for money in 
government service delivery at times derails government departments 
from focusing their services to reflect this principle. Having 
various approaches to value for money in government, leads to 
inconsistencies in service delivery between government departments. 
Inconsistencies between departments raise perceptions amongst 
citizens that some departments are better than others in service 
delivery. As a result unintended consequences are experienced by 
citizens in terms of either poor delivery or low quality of the 
actual services delivered. 
 
7.5.6. The BP principle: Courtesy in providing public services   
According to the PSC interviewees the principle of being courteous 
to citizens when providing public services is dependent on the 
attitude of individual public servants. According to the BP 
framework, ‘courtesy’ bears the following meaning: 
 
‘Citizens should be treated with courtesy and consideration 
in all the times of service delivery’ (PSC, 2009a) 
 
According to the interviewees, the PSA developed through the 
assistance of provincial departments’ code of conduct according to 
which all public servants are to conduct themselves. In the PSC 
findings it was noted that departments train all their employees 
according to the DPSA developed code of conduct. The interviewees 
also noted that many departments further developed standards of 
courtesy from which departments are evaluated according to. The PSC 
has also concluded that the meaning of both public services and the 
citizens that use them has improved as a result of frequent training 
and monitoring of standards of courtesy.  
 
7.5.7. The BP principle: Openness and transparency about government 
activities 
 
According to the report published by the PSC on the ‘openness and 
transparency’ principle of BP, government departments are required 
to publish an annual report to citizens as part of the implementation 
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of openness and transparent (PSC, 2008b). Openness and transparency 
in the BP context means: 
Citizens should be told how national and provincial 
departments are run, how much they cost and who is in charge 
(PSC, 2008b)   
 
According to the PSC report(PSC, 2008b) the majority of departments 
surveyed did not comply with this requirement of BP. Fewer 
departments now publish annual reports that are meant to be read by 
citizens. Even if many government departments do claim to be giving 
an account on their performance and use of public finance, this 
account is frequently not understood by citizens and it is not even 
intended for the average citizen to understand it. According to the 
PSC report, many departments that do not comply with the openness 
and transparency requirement claim to be using other means to give 
account to citizens; such as the Izimbizos and service delivery 
improvement plans (SDIPs). There remains a further challenge in 
setting standards of openness and transparency and then monitoring 
them, and these will have a significant effect on the implementation 
of BP.  
 
The government departments interviewed in this thesis are in 
agreement with the notions raised by the PSC report. Many of them 
argued that their form of giving an account is mainly based on 
financial and annual reports, with the information published on 
their websites. Not many of the interviewees could indicate whether 
they produce specific annual reports that are meant to be understood 
by citizens.  
   
7.5.8. The BP principle: Redressing poor public service to citizens 
 
Redress in the BP for service delivery is meant to ensure that:  
 
‘If the promised standard of service is not delivered, 
citizens should be offered an apology, a full explanation 
and a speedy and effective remedy; and when complaints are 
made, citizens should receive a sympathetic, positive 
response (PSC, 2006)’.  
 
The process of redressing citizens’ complaints about government 
services is initiated through procedures called the complaint 
handling systems. According to the PSC, the majority of both 
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provincial and national department have systems that manage all the 
complaints from citizens about service delivery. According to the 
PSC report, the main challenge in redressing citizens’ complaints 
is the resolution of the customers’ problems as well as poor follow-
ups by many departments. In certain instances some citizens’ 
complaints were not resolved for long periods of time. This poor 
approach to redressing citizens’ complaints in the majority of cases 
adversely affects government accountability to citizens.  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
The implementation of BP as an accountability mechanism is seen by 
many provincial government departments’ executives as an additional 
workload to their daily activities. Many of the department 
representatives interviewed came up with different reasons for why 
they had not comprehensively implemented the model. But according 
to the PSC interviewees and reports they produced, various 
initiatives do exist by government departments to integrate and 
implement BP. In terms of the analysis of the various PSC reports 
and work done in evaluating the implementation of the BP model, some 
principles of BP are implemented well while some are not in the 
provincial government. Many provincial departments take the 
initiative to regularly ‘consult’ citizens, but instead of gaining 
inputs from citizens they tend to inform citizens about government 
plans and programs.  
 
As a result government accountability to citizens is often delayed 
as opposed to improve through BP related initiatives. The lack of 
consistency in which citizens are engaged creates a perception 
amongst citizens that provincial government is not open and 
transparent about the activities that takes place. Some of the 
challenges experienced in implementing BP by many government 
departments are related to a lack of common understanding of 
principles that are meant to operationalize the model. The relation 
between BP and government accountability may also need to be 
clarified for the model to enhance citizens’ accountability at 
provincial levels. 
  
245 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION DISCUSSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1. Introduction  
This thesis has explored performance accountability within 
provincial governments in South African. The study is inspired by a 
continuing academic debate on what government performance 
accountability means in the context of the new public management 
philosophy that initially emerged in the last decades of the 20th 
century. The recent, rapidly increasing incidence of citizens’ 
complaints about poor government services and lack of accountability 
in South Africa as noted by Jain (2010) have also inspired this 
research. This thesis takes South African provincial government 
accountability as a case study. Accountability is explored in two 
provincial governments namely, the North West and Gauteng provinces, 
and the thesis examines the relationship of various stakeholders to 
the accountability process in relation to their own expectations. 
 
The analysis of accountability is based on interviews between the 
researcher and a sample of interviewees selected from various 
stakeholder groups in both provinces. The stakeholder groups from 
each province included: the provincial legislature, provincial 
departments, and national government departments, the Auditor 
General’s Office, the Public Service Commission, the Treasury and 
Office of the Premier. The South African National government 
introduced laws in recent years intended to enhance accountability, 
good governance and government service provision management. Batho 
Pele (BP) is an example of a mechanism introduced to improve 
accountability and citizens’ participation in South African 
government initiatives. The role and impact of BP on public service 
provision and accountability is analysed in detail in Chapter Seven 
of this thesis. As a citizens’ accountability mechanism, I found 
that BP does not seem to inspire many government departments’ 
executives.  
 
More than two thirds of the government departments studied in the 
two provinces failed to uphold BP as an element of accountability. 
The views of various interviewees on provincial government 
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accountability are analysed from Chapter Four to Chapter Seven. The 
principal-agent model is used in the thesis as a framework to explore 
accountability relationships. In the thesis, provincial government 
departments’ executives are referred to as agents, with the other 
stakeholders mentioned above referred to as principals. I developed 
the PATIGAHAR-accountability analytical model from the four 
dimensional accountability approach of Ashworth and Skelcher (2005) 
and I use it to provide an analytical framework to operationalize 
and assess accountability between the principal and agent.  
 
In this chapter a summary of my findings on accountability in 
relation to principals and agents views in both the North West and 
Gauteng provinces is given. In this chapter, findings from the 
empirical work undertaken are summarised with the aim of bringing 
together and discussing the implications of the conclusions drawn 
in earlier chapters. The implications for research and the South 
African provincial government accountability structure are set out 
in this chapter. A summary of the conceptual framework used for the 
study is also given in this chapter. My first draft of 
recommendations from the thesis, participants’ comments on those 
recommendations and my final recommendations are also set out in 
this chapter. 
 
8.2. Empirical findings  
The datasets that I have used to reach empirical conclusions for 
the thesis were collected from three categories of interviewees. 
The categories are as follows:  
 
 Provincial government departments’ executives and other 
representatives (agents) 
 Provincial legislature representatives (principals) 
 Accountability institution representatives (principals) 
 
All three categories of interviewees represented both the provinces 
central to the study, North West and Gauteng Province. The empirical 
findings seek to answer the following research questions: 
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 What are performance accountability arrangements in the North 
West and Gauteng Provinces (in South Africa) and have they improved 
over time? 
    
 How do the changes in performance accountability measures, 
such as Batho Pele, have an effect on service delivery management?  
 
The principles of the principal-agent model, alongside South African 
accountability legislation and frameworks, were used to create the 
three categories of interviewees used for empirical work as 
indicated above and this helped me to organise and structure 
research for this study. All the interviewees in each category 
discussed their understanding of and experience in relation to 
accountability within their respective provincial governments. In 
the process of analysis, interviewees’ performance accountability 
views and perspectives in both the NW and GP were compared with each 
other to emphasise common and differing opinions. As mentioned 
earlier, the PATIGAHAR-analytical model is used to analyse the views 
of interviewees in order to understand the structure and the 
intensity of the accountability relationship between the principal 
and the agent. In essence, research outputs from all interviewees 
were analysed to an equal extent for both provinces within the three 
categories. The parallel analysis approach is illustrated in Figure 
8.1 below. 
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Figure 8. 1 Framework for parallel analysis  
 
Source: Developed by the author   
 
 
 
 
 
4 Them es of accountability 2 Provinces 3 Categories of interviewees 
Principal 
and Agent 
1.Taking into account 1.North West province 1.Government executives Agents
2.Giving an account 2.Legislature representatives
3.Holding to account
3.Accountability institutions 
represesentatives Principals
4.Redress 2.Gauteng province
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Having three categories and two provinces has led to six multiple 
lines of enquiry. However, these multiple research areas taken from 
the three categories of interviewees (classified between agent and 
principal) and four accountability themes bring a cost in that they 
mean somewhat fragmented datasets and complex reporting of the 
results. The fragmentation involves forty-eight distinct sub-groups 
of data on accountability (i.e. two viewpoints from the principal 
and agent sides, covering four accountability themes, across two 
provinces and between three separate categories of interviewees). 
In an effort to reduce this fragmentation, each of the three 
interviewees categories were analysed as a chapter in the thesis. 
Chapter Four analyses the views of provincial government executives, 
Chapter Five analyses the views of interviewees from accountability 
institutions, while Chapter Six analyses the views of 
representatives from the provincial legislature.  
 
Finally, Chapter Seven analyses Batho Pele as an accountability 
mechanism at the provincial level. Every chapter provides a 
comparison between the NW and the GP, and common views and 
disparities are emphasized. Findings are summarised in this chapter 
based on the contrasting views of the principals and the agents. A 
summary of findings is illustrated showing expectations around 
accountability, the implementation of  accountability processes and 
the degree or extent of implementing accountability measures in 
Table 8.2 (Diagram: Summary of accountability per interviewees and 
extent of accountability).   
 
8.2.1. Stakeholder aggregations 
In the thesis, stakeholders are taken to be those groups represented 
by all the research interviewees participating in this thesis, set 
out in the named principal and agent categories. There is more than 
one type of interviewee within each group of principals and agents. 
The stakeholders therefore come from the following categories: 
 
 government departmental representatives,  
 treasury representatives  
 representatives from government monitoring and evaluation units  
 provincial legislature representatives  
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 office of the Premier representatives 
 auditor general representatives 
 the public service commission  
 National government departments’ representatives 
 
Under the principal and agent schema of categorization, these 
stakeholders are sorted into those that have similar views. Thus, 
representatives with similar views are grouped together. In certain 
instances, it is not easy to gain a clear indication of which 
interviewee is the principal or agent, because some interviewees 
may play the role of both principal and agent (e.g. the auditor 
general may serve the role of being the principal towards government 
departments but also an agent because he is expected to account to 
citizens on his performance of his functions). For the purpose of 
this thesis, I have decided upon an approach to organising the 
stakeholders into either principal or agent. Because my analysis of 
accountability is based on the PATIGAHAR accountability model that 
I developed, the classification of stakeholders has also followed 
this model.  
 
In classifying research interviewees as principal or agent, four 
criteria that relate to the characteristics of principal were 
developed to distinguish the principal from the agent. The criteria 
were developed based on analysis of the principal-agent literature 
and consideration of the experiences of the different interviewees 
who constitute stakeholders. For all the interviewees classified as 
principal the following criteria are satisfied: 
 Criterion one: the principal is able to have their views and 
inputs taken into account by the agent when the agent is making 
decisions  
 Criterion two: the agent is either tacitly or by legislation 
obliged to give an account to this principal  
 Criterion three: the principal does not participate in 
executing the provincial government’s performance and its 
other day-to-day activities 
 Criterion four: the principal should have some sort of control 
over provincial government budget allocation  
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The four criteria were developed mainly with the aim of 
distinguishing the principal from the agent and analysing their 
accountability relations in the context of this thesis. As I have 
mentioned, some agents also play the role of principal in certain 
circumstances, but the four criteria clearly distinguish who is the 
agent and who is the principal in any given context.  
 
8.2.2. The accountability approach in the thesis 
The accountability approach adopted in the thesis analyses the 
relationship between the account giver and the account receiver, 
and further looking at the consequences of lack of account. The 
approach of giving and receiving an account is based on the 
expectations and experiences that flow from the literature on the 
principal-agent model, which assumes that, for the accountability 
relationship to be meaningful, there should at least be one party 
provided with an account or receiving an account (Hughes, 2003). It 
is clear from the literature that for any accountability process 
and framework to warrant credibility, the account receiver should 
not have been involved with the activities in the account given. In 
this thesis one role of principals is that they may have influence 
over the allocation of public finance to government departments. 
Even though there is uncertainty about budget allocation amongst 
various interviewees, the ultimate decision on which departments 
play the role of agent lies with the principals, such as the 
legislature and treasury. 
 
8.2.3. The principal-agent model in context 
The thesis adopts an analytical approach focusing on the principal-
agent model as a management theory used for understanding provincial 
government accountability. The interviewees’ views and the perceived 
views of citizens are classified under the heading of either 
principal or agent. The classification is shown in detail in Figure 
8.2, which shows the roles and expectation with regards to 
provincial government accountability in relation to both the 
principals and the agents. 
 
Figure 8. 2 Principal stakeholders and agent classification  
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North West(NW) and Gauteng 
governments (GP)
 Head of department(HOD)
 Members of the executive council 
(MEC)
 Performance monitoring officials
 Other departmental reps
(a)
Accountability Institutions in NW 
and GP
 Auditor general senior 
representatives (AG)
 Public service commission 
commissioners (PSC)
 Treasury representatives 
 Office of the premier                                                                 
(b)
Provincial legislature in NW 
and GP 
 Portfolio committee
 Public account committee
 Citizens views
(c)
CHAPTER FOUR CHAPTER FIVE CHAPTER SIX
Agents 
 HODs
 MECs
 M & E reps 
 Provincial  departments
         (f)
Principal  stakeholders
 AG
 PSC
 Treasury
 Provincial Legislature
 Provincial citizens
 National Government
 Premier 
                  (e)
Discussion
(i)
CHAPTER SEVEN: BATHO PELE 
 Public service commission
 National department of public service and administration
 Office of the premier 
(d)
Glossary of Terms
> HOD : Head of departments
> MEC: Members of executives council
> AG: Office of  Auditor General
> PSC: Public Service Commission
> M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
Source: Developed by the author   
 
In Figure 8.2, it can be seen that the analysis in Chapters Four to 
Six is an analysis of either the principals’ views or the agents’ 
views. Chapter Four’s interviewees, denoted by label (a) in Figure 
8.2, comprise for the most part the views of agents in the context 
of this thesis. Provincial department executives and the views of 
other representatives on government performance accountability are 
represented in this analysis. Chapter Five and Chapter Six 
interviewees are denoted by (b) and (c) respectively in the Figure 
8.2, representing an analysis of views raised by principal 
stakeholders in regard to provincial government accountability. Due 
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to resource constraints, citizens as stakeholders were not 
interviewed but their perceived views are represented in other 
interviews.  
 
In particular, Chapter Seven set out an analysis of the views of 
both principals and agent interviewees denoted by (d), on the use 
of Batho Pele by various provincial government departments as an 
accountability mechanism to citizens. The analysis in Chapter Seven 
also takes into account independent published research reports about 
the use of Batho Pele in the provision of public services by 
government. The views of both principals and agents about provincial 
government accountability are summarised in Chapter Eight, denoted 
(e) and (f) in Figure 8.2. 
 
8.2.4. Government performance context in the thesis 
The concept of ‘performance’ is subject to various interpretations 
by different users. The approach used in the thesis to analyse 
government performance was discussed in Chapters Two and Four. The 
analytical approach takes into consideration both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives on performance. This analytical approach, 
together with my conclusions, is summarised here. Two different 
approaches to performance emerged from the literature review in 
Chapter Two: performance reported as the study of the executive’s 
behaviour at a given point in time (Brumback, 1988), and performance 
as reporting of the results attained after a given period (Kane, 
1996). Performance analysis was initially undertaken in the context 
of different public sector management discourses.  
 
Competing public sector philosophies were compared with each other: 
in particular, new public management (NPM) and the conservative 
approach that was labelled ‘prospective public administration’(PPA) 
by Hood (1995). In PPA, performance accountability focuses on 
government processes and inputs, while NPM focuses accountability 
on the results attained. All the research interviewees were asked 
to give their understanding of what government performance meant. 
In the view of the majority of research interviewees, government 
performance means the attainment of predetermined targets and 
objectives. There were other views expressed about what performance 
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meant, but those views also saw it as relating to attainment of 
targets or objectives. Government executives and administrators 
argued that they make use of various sources to determine the 
performance targets to pursue.  
 
According to the interviewees, some of the sources that determine 
targets include political manifestos for the legislature, budget 
speeches prepared by the MEC and national government plans. The 
interviewees who expressed views include government 
representatives, accountability institutions and representatives of 
the legislature representatives. Table 8.1 illustrates the 
distribution of representatives of these categories. 
 
Table 8. 1 Sources of provincial government performance  
Performance definition themes Gauteng  North West  
Difference 
between 
provinces 
State of Nation and Province addresses       -    12% 12% 
MEC budget Speech 20% 3% 17% 
Political manifestos through to SP 20% 9% 11% 
National Outcomes 7% 9% 2% 
Provincial legislature       -    26% 26% 
National Departments 10% 9% 1% 
Own management  27% 24% 3% 
Service delivery agreements 3%           -    3% 
Provincial Objectives/ Premier's 
office 10% 3% 7% 
Provincial treasury 3% 3% 
          -   
  
Source: Developed by the author   
 
Government performance could have different meanings for different 
interviewees based on their experience and understanding. In many 
departments in this thesis, ‘performance’ is seen as public 
spending. Even though various sources for defining performance were 
used to understand government performance in the context of the 
interviewees’ views, the strongest conclusion that I drew was that 
‘performance’ is generally perceived by departments as taking 
actions to attain targets. This view of looking at performance as 
actions to attain targets is used to contextualise the performance 
accountability that the thesis is examining. 
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8.2.5. Provincial government performance accountability 
In discussions with research interviewees from all three categories 
(government departments, the legislature and accountability 
institutions), I asked interviewees to give their understanding and 
experience of the accountability concept and further describe 
government accountability. In giving research interviewees’ the 
opportunity to provide their own views, I assured them that I would 
be careful not to impose my own thoughts and views in relation to 
government accountability. There were some common views on what 
government accountability meant among several interviewees. However 
accountability generally was defined differently by different 
interviewees. These views on accountability were analysed in detail 
in Chapter Four and can be summarised as follows: 
 
 According to the government departments’ interviewees, the 
importance of accountability is to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
democracy but it should not be used as a punitive measure that 
interferes with the activities of government departments. It should 
rather serve as a process of explanation on the part of various 
department executives to present their plans and achievements, and 
to plan corrective measures where their objectives are not attained. 
 
Provincial government department executives are concerned that the 
demand for accountability from various principal stakeholders may 
be used for unintended purposes. Even though no one particular 
principal here is accused by the agent, the argument seems to echo 
Behn’s (2001) view on perspectives of accountability. According to 
Behn (2001), those from whom accountability is expected often see 
the process as punishing them. This view further raises the 
importance of clarifying the purpose of accountability between the 
account giver and account receiver in provincial government.  
 
 To some interviewees, accountability means that provincial 
departments’ executives should submit performance and financial 
reports explaining how funds were used and which targets are 
obtained with the reasons for failures. These reports should be 
submitted to agencies which provide departments with funding of 
their programs. This description recognises accountability as a 
process of giving an account to funding providers. However, few 
interviewees believed accountability should be based on why funds 
were given and from whom funding was sought.  
 
 Other provincial executives argued that accountability is a 
process where regular consultations take place between departmental 
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executives and other stakeholders in discussions of government plans 
and achievements. These stakeholders may not impose views that could 
be taken into account by government departments’ executives in their 
plans. Many departmental executives are of the view that they are 
to determine their own performance targets based on their experience 
of public services.  
 
 Many others see accountability as the process of citizens 
voting for a political party by using party manifestoes to develop 
government programs. The voting process is seen as the initial step 
in accountability, according to the interviewees. They further 
argued that citizens should trust departmental executives to have 
their interests at heart, since they voted them into government 
initially.  
 
The views of what accountability means and whether it has been 
achieved varied between the categories of interviewees. Two out of 
the four accountability institutions from AG and PSC participated 
in the research, and their views were analysed in Chapter Five. 
These representatives see accountability in the following terms:  
 
 Government accountability means adhering to the directives and 
conditions of the funding agencies and subsequently reporting back 
to the funder on the attainment of funded plans. In reporting back 
to the funder, government departments’ executives are to indicate 
where the money was used, how it was used and whether spending 
procedures were adhered to during the spending. In this process of 
accountability, funding agencies do not include citizens as they 
have not directly provided government departments with funds.  
 
 The other description means a process where weakness in the 
financial and performance management systems are identified and 
mitigated and punitive processes are recommended and implemented. 
The failure in certain instances by departmental executives and 
legislative authorities to commission and monitor the implementation 
of punitive measures adversely affects accountability, according to 
the representative of the accountability institution interviewed.  
 
 Provincial government performance accountability means that 
the Members of the Executive Council (or MECs as they are popularly 
known) and the HODs are to consult with the citizens on public 
services, while including citizens’ concerns in their performance 
plans. During the process of consulting citizens, MECs and HODs 
ought to recognise citizens’ needs and to prioritise them in 
government programs to fulfil those needs. Failure to achieve these 
plans means poor accountability; hence citizens ought to be informed 
of the remedial actions in place.  
 
Two representatives of the legislature participated in the research 
from both provinces. Their views were analysed in Chapter Six 
regarding provincial accountability as follows: 
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 Accountability relates to a process where the citizens elect 
politicians who represent them in government. The citizens trust 
that these politically elected representatives in the house of the 
legislature will ensure that the provincial government adheres to 
political manifestos. These are political manifestos that are used 
during the election campaigns. Failure to uphold political 
manifestos is perceived as poor performance and lack of 
accountability, according to the representatives of the legislature 
from both provinces.  
 
 The interviewees further indicated that government 
accountability in relation to public services is to be measured by 
the extent to which the citizens have confidence and trust in their 
government. This is a demonstration to the citizens that they are 
being listened to and their views are being addressed by the 
government. There is a need for an empirical analysis to be done in 
this regard, but the current public media reports and extent of 
citizens’ riots against government service delivery seem to suggest 
that public confidence in government is lower than ten years 
earlier. The further implication is that current accountability 
measures have not improved government performances. 
 
In essence, this perspective on accountability suggests that, by 
voting a particular political organisation into power, citizens are 
giving the political organisation authority to use its own 
prerogative on the extent of accountability. But the PSC and AG 
argue that accountability is important at all times in government, 
regardless of the nature of the relationship between the government 
and the constituents who voted them into power. AG and PSC further 
argue that politicians belonging to the same political party in the 
house of the provincial legislature would not impose accountability 
sanctions on each other. This implies that MECs are selected from 
the political party with the majority of seats in the legislature 
and so other fellow party members trust these MECs to follow their 
political mandate in government.  
 
Trusting fellow party members as departmental political heads (MEC) 
has unfortunately led both to deteriorating accountability and 
performance in government. The argument underlying this perspective 
is that the interests of political parties align with the interest 
of the citizens who vote them into government. But, in practice, it 
is not always the case that government interests are aligned to 
those of the governing party or those who voted for it. 
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8.2.6. Understanding of accountability based on PATIGAHAR model  
 
Chapter Four analyses the views of the provincial government 
interviewees on government performance accountability. From the 
analysis, we can see that there is a common understanding and there 
are shared experiences on government accountability processes on 
the part of the representatives of most of the departments. In 
general, government departmental interviewees in the NW province 
argued for more involvement of the provincial legislature in 
influencing their performance plans, but GP government interviewees 
do not want the provincial legislature to get involved in their 
performance plans. This is a key difference in views between the 
two provinces. They both agree that, as the principal, the 
provincial legislature may get involved in the initial stage of 
accountability (at the taking into account stage), but the degree 
of actual involvement may vary.  
 
Every government department interviewee from both provinces supports 
the notion of ‘giving an account’ to various stakeholders, such as 
the legislature, citizens, treasury, accountability institutions 
and the national government. But departmental interviewees noted 
that there is a significant weakness with regard to the current 
accountability framework. There is a lack of direct and 
comprehensive citizens’ accountability and insufficient redressing 
of poor public services by many departments in both provinces. 
Despite the weaknesses in government accountability, many 
departments are adamant that they often take additional measures to 
minimise perceived weaknesses in government accountability. The use 
of Izimbizos2 and the implementation of Batho Pele are some of the 
supplementary measures to improve government-to-citizens 
accountability.  
 
Table 8.2 provides a summary of all findings from both the principals 
and agents on provincial government accountability. The summary is 
shown with three main analysis that were conducted on views raised 
by all interviewees: 1) the role expected to be played by 
                       
2 Izimbizos: means ‘gathering by the Chief’ of the citizens, were used by the 
Chief as forums where accountability was required by the Chief from his subjects 
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interviewees with regards to accountability, denoted by ER in Table 
8.2, 2) the actual role played by interviewees within the 
accountability framework denoted by AR in the Table 8.2 and 3) the 
degree and effectiveness of the role played by interviewees in the 
accountability framework, denoted by Deg. The degree of 
effectiveness in implementing an accountability mechanism in the 
diagram is based on views raised and analysed in the chapters that 
focused on this analysis. The degree of effectiveness is also gauged 
from the frequency of views raised by interviewees and their 
perceptions.  
 
The chapters which are the source of these views are also indicated 
on the diagram, denoted by Ch. 4-6. In Table 8.2, it is clear that 
an accountability framework does exist between provincial 
governments as an agent of various principal stakeholders. Though 
there are varying views on accountability processes, both the 
principal and the agent have some common agreement on whose views 
are to be taken into account, on the process of giving an account 
and on the measures for holding the agents to account. The criterion 
used in analysis of the expected, actual implementation of 
accountability process and degree of accountability between the 
principal and agent are as follows:   
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Table 8. 2 Summary of accountability and extent of accountability  
  
Accountability analysis themes 
Interviewees/Partic
ipants 
Criteria 
1: Views 
taken into 
account 
Criteria 2: 
Obligated to 
receive an 
account  
Criteria 3: 
Able to hold 
agent to 
account 
Criteria 4: 
Insist on 
redress 
measures 
Detailed 
analysis 
of views 
Chapter 
  
E
R 
A
E 
Deg
. 
E
R 
AE 
Deg
. 
ER AE 
Deg
. 
E
R 
AE Deg.   
Principal 
interviewed 
                        
  
Provincial 
legislature 
Y Y 3 Y Y 5 Y U 3 Y Y 3 
Ch. 6 
National government  Y Y 4 U Y 3 N N n/a N Y 2 
Ch. 5 
Auditor general 
(AG) 
N Y 3 Y Y 5 N N n/a Y Y 4 
Ch. 4-7 
Public service 
commission(PSC) 
N Y 3 Y Y 3 N N n/a Y Y 3 
Ch. 5 
Office of the 
Premier 
Y Y 4 Y Y 4 Y Y 3 Y Y 2 
Ch. 5 
Treasury Office Y Y 5 Y Y 5 Y Y 4 Y Y 4 
Ch. 5 
Provincial 
Executive Council 
Y Y 4 N Y 4 Y Y 2 Y Y 3 Part of 
Ch. 4 
Provincial citizens Y U 1 Y U 2 Y U 2 Y N 2 
Ch. 4-7 
Provincial 
departments: Agent 
interviewed 
  
                        
HODs Y Y 4 N N 5 Y N 3 Y N 3 Ch. 4 
MECs Y Y 4 Y Y 5 Y N 2 Y N 3 Ch. 4  
M&E executives   
                        
Legends:       
Degree of effective 
implementation       
ER: Expected Role    1 
Very weak 
implemented  4 Strong implementation 
AE: Actual Role    2 
Weak 
implementation  5 
Very strong 
implementation 
Deg.: Degree of implementation 
3 Average         
                
Y: Yes being implemented          
N: Not being implemented      
U: Uncertainties on implementation    
Source: Developed by the author   
 
Criterion 1: Views taken into account 
There are clear indications that provincial government departments 
are expected to take into account stakeholders’ views in decisions 
on the performance to be pursued as part of the accountability 
framework. All of the interviewees from all three categories are 
confident that provincial department executives should consult 
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various players in determining the performance of their respective 
departments. There are, however, disparities in terms of which 
principals’ views are taken into account. This inconsistency is also 
raised by the principals themselves. The legislatures, the treasury, 
citizens, national government and accountability institutions are 
all principals expecting an account from departmental executives, 
but for such an account to be given, account expectation is created 
through giving views to be taken into account. According to Dunsire 
(1978) and Hale (2008), principals should  create expectations for 
which account is to be given.  
 
But this is not a view supported by principals in this thesis 
because, in the context of the province legislature, the provincial 
legislature does not agree with a view of giving performance orders 
to departments’ executives as agents. Hence, the majority of 
departmental executives’ views are contradicted by the provincial 
legislature’s view of whether an account of performance should be 
given. This uncertainty of whether there should be an expectation 
that an account should be given and received between agent and 
principal weakens the entire accountability process. But from a 
principal-agent model perspective, the principal should have the 
expectation of receiving an account from the agent. The expectations 
of citizens as principal stakeholders are also not comprehensively 
represented in the account given by the provincial government 
executives.  
 
Lack of citizens’ views being taken into account is reflected in 
the low score (‘1’) in Table 8.2 given to the degree of 
implementation achieved according to the accountability criteria. 
This low score is, however, a surprise given that the majority of 
government executives acknowledge the importance and the need of 
having citizens’ views taken into account in government decisions. 
 
Criterion 2: Obligation to receive an account 
The first criterion examines which principal stakeholders’ play a 
role in creating expectations for what issues should be covered by 
the account which is to be given. The second criterion in Table 8.2 
assesses whether an account is given subsequent to the expectation 
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created by the views expressed by various principal stakeholders, 
which they expect to be taken into account. Various researchers in 
the literature place significance on this criterion in assessing 
accountability (Dunsire, 1978, Downey, 1986, Day and Klein, 1987, 
Romzek and Dubnick, 1987, Stewart, 1992, Ranson and Stewart, 1994, 
Sinclair, 1995). For these authors, accountability involves giving 
and receiving an account. Both the principals and agents considered 
in this thesis argue that giving an account on government 
performance and use of finance is a significant part of 
accountability.  
 
The legislated accountability frameworks at provincial level also 
compel the executives to give an account regularly. Departmental 
executives suggested that all the principal stakeholders in the 
thesis receive an account through various mechanisms. They suggested 
that giving an account is the criterion that strengthens 
accountability in provincial government. Account is mainly given 
through documented reports and public speeches by departmental 
executives. But a meaningful account is where the account giver is 
able to be held to account at the time of giving account. As Dunsire 
(1978) and Schedler (1999) explain, the account given here is to be 
‘evaluated against expectations’. It is also difficult for the 
principals to verify whether the account given in executive reports, 
documents and presentations is fair and accurate, given the limited 
access which the principal has to government activities.  
 
Basically, some principals are not confident that the account given 
by reports and documents is fair and accurate. As with the first 
criterion, according to both departments’ executives and principal 
stakeholders, an account to citizens is not given comprehensively.   
 
Criterion 3: Able to hold agent to account 
The action of holding  agents to account by principals clearly 
involves a distinction between  the account giver and the account 
receiver (Mayston, 2003). ‘Giving an account’ without the account 
receiver then holding the account giver to account de-legitimises 
the accountability processes. Stewart (1992) argues that giving an 
account is a prerequisite to holding to account. Subsequent to 
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giving an account, government executives are expected to be held to 
account, this also according to those interviewed for this thesis. 
But the reality is that this is simply not happening. Perhaps the 
question is what holding to account means, given that some of the 
principal stakeholders argue that they do hold government executives 
to account. Schedler’s (1999) description of accountability has two 
dimensions: answerability (giving an account) and enforceability 
(holding to account).  
 
In Schedulers’ (1999) analysis, holding to account involves either 
“rewarding good and punishing for bad behaviour”. In addition to 
this view, Hale (2008) argues that in order to hold to account or 
reward good and punish bad behaviour, the account receiver should 
have authority and the capacity to be able to exercise such 
obligations. But Sinclair (1995) and Behn (2001) argue against this 
understanding of holding to account, particularly that of 
‘punishing’ those giving an account. In the view of Ashworth and 
Skelcher (2005), holding to account relates to actions taken in 
relation to the account giver by the account receiver. Both the 
principals and agents in the thesis are in agreement that executives 
should be held to account by different stakeholders. They vary in 
their view of the actual process of holding to account those who 
are giving the account.  
 
The executives interviewed argued that principals such as the 
legislatures, treasury and citizens are limited to certain tasks 
and roles in the form of holding them to account. For example, 
legislature committees make recommendations about actions to be 
taken as part of holding executives to account. It is the executives’ 
prerogative to implement these negative sanctions imposed by 
legislature committees. If recommendations are not implemented, then 
the principal would have failed to hold executives to account. But 
the legislature representatives argue that executives are expected 
to implement corrective measures without being subjected to 
sanctions. Citizens are seen as being able to use the democratic 
process of voting to hold government executives to account, but this 
is not effective due to the current voting system at provincial 
levels where elections are held only after five years.  
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Basically as much as it is desired, the current accountability 
framework does not allow for government executives to be held 
accountable meaningfully.  
 
Criterion 4: Insist on redress measures 
The fourth criterion in assessing the provincial government 
accountability is redressing unsatisfactory performance. In the 
thesis I looked at which of the stakeholders has the authority to 
impose redress mechanisms and whether the mechanisms are actually 
being implemented and to what degree. Schedler (1999) argues that 
the accountability process should have one party that has authority 
to ‘impose negative sanctions’ subsequent to the account being 
given. Redress is one of the eight Batho Pele principles which means 
that citizens are entitled to an apology, a full explanation and 
their grievances being remedied in cases where public services fall 
below a promised standard (PSC, 2006). Mulgan (2000) looks at 
redress in terms of resolving citizens’ and other public service 
users’ complaints about ‘substandard’ public services. Basically, 
redress in accountability is equivalent to remedying poor government 
performance (Ashworth and Skelcher, 2005).  
 
In the thesis, provincial government relies on various mechanisms 
to identify citizens’ concerns about public services, including 
performance reporting, citizens’ petitions submitted to the 
legislatures, summonses from legislatures and regular research 
carried out by the Public Service Commission. The process mainly 
identifies complaints about public services without specific 
remedial processes. The main frustration from the principal 
stakeholders in regard to redressing citizens’ complaints about 
public services is in relation to the limitations on them being able 
to insist on the implementation of redress mechanisms. The majority 
of principal stakeholders I believe should instead be given the 
right to insist upon and impose the implementation of remedial 
processes on public services.  
 
For example, where poor service delivery is reported, members of 
the legislatures should be able to impose specific remedial actions 
with deadlines for implementation, where failure to implement would 
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mean punitive measures are imposed. Redressing poor public services 
is further hindered by the lack of a practical and sufficient citizen 
complaints management system within many provincial departments. 
According to a PSC research report assessing the implementation of 
Batho Pele in government, more than half of the departments are 
aware of the need to redress poor public services, but the lack of 
capacity, namely trained staff and well developed service standards, 
hinders the full realisation of redress and the application of 
accountability in general.   
 
8.3. The strategy in this thesis for operationalizing the 
approach to provincial government accountability 
 
 
8.3.1. Developing an approach to accountability: PATIGAHAR 
Model 
 
In this thesis the principal-agent model is used as a framework for 
understanding and defining the relationships which make up 
performance accountability. As accountability givers, provincial 
government departments are seen as agents, while various 
stakeholders such as citizens, the legislature, the Premier, 
National government and accountability institutions are taken as 
principals in the context of this thesis. But PATIGAHAR analytical 
model is used to operationalize and analyse accountability between 
principal and agent by using four themes: taking into account, 
giving an account, holding to account and redress. The use of the 
principal-agent model and Ashworth and Skelcher’s (2005) approach 
led to the PATIGAHAR analytical model developed in the thesis. 
 
8.3.2. Roots of the analytical approach  
There is currently a broad literature and practice that defines and 
analyses accountability in a public sector context, but there is 
less literature on a common analytical framework. Various 
researchers have defined accountability in relation to the context 
in which they use the concept (Behn, 2001, Day and Klein, 1987, 
Hale, 2008). Others see accountability as a form of checks and 
balances for work expected to be done (Farrell and Law, 1999, 
Dunsire, 1978), while for others again, accountability is a 
relationship of ‘giving’ and ‘receiving an account’(Stewart, 1992). 
266 
 
The other view to government accountability is regarded as a process 
of managing various stakeholders expectations about government 
performances(Romzek and Dubnick, 1998). Finally, others extend the 
definition to receiving and giving an account by emphasizing that 
there should be a mechanism in place to ensure that this takes place 
(Ranson and Stewart, 1994). 
 
In practice, the appropriate concept of accountability is dependent 
on how it is used because while some see it as mechanism for imposing 
punitive measures upon those failing to uphold duties, others see 
it as a measure to gain access to information that would not have 
been accessible if accountability had not been imposed. Others 
again, see accountability as a mechanism that ought to push the 
agent to pursue the principal’s objectives (Mayston, 2003). It is 
clear that there are different meanings and approaches in analysing 
and understanding the concept of accountability. However, in this 
thesis the principal-agent model is used to define the players in 
relation to whom the concept of accountability is explored. Using 
this model further minimises uncertainties about what the concept 
of accountability means in different contexts. 
 
In the South African context of accountability, accountability can 
be analysed from the perspective of provincial government 
departments in relation to both performance and financial plans. In 
terms of the principal-agent model, the role played by government 
departments is regarded as an agent’s role, since they give account 
on these performance plans. The provincial legislatures, citizens, 
the Premier, national government, the treasury, AG and PSC are 
expected to influence the provincial government in their performance 
and finance plans. Accountability is then expected to stem from the 
actual implementation of plans. In the principal-agent model 
literature this role is classified as that of the principal.  
 
In this thesis, using the approach of Ashworth and Skelcher (2005) 
to accountability has allowed me to assess the strength of 
accountability between the principal and the agent, and thus between 
government department executives and different stakeholders at four 
levels: a) taking into account, b) giving an account, c) holding to 
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account and d) redress. Once the accountability relationship is 
defined using the principal-agent model, these four levels can help 
us assess the strength of accountability. Both the principal-agent 
model and four themes of accountability led to the development of 
the PATIGAHAR, where PA represent principal-agent and TIGAHAR 
representing four themes of accountability suggested by Ashworth 
and Skelcher (2005). 
    
8.3.3. Testing the PATIGAHAR approach 
In the thesis, the participants interviewed were classified into 
either principals or agents based on the description of their role 
and the meanings of these terms that are derived from the literature. 
The method was to classify the interviewees based on the functions 
expected of them in reference to Figure 8.1. The criterion of 
classifying principal and agent seeks to distinguish the principals 
from the agents based on their expected functions. The 
classification further informed the research instruments used to 
obtain the various interviewees’ views. The classification of 
participants into principal and agent forms ‘PA’ of the analytical 
model used for a detailed analysis; PATIGAHAR model. The remaining 
part of the analytical model (‘TIGAHAR’) represents the four 
dimensions (taking into account, giving an account, holding to 
account and redress) of accountability treated as analytical themes 
for a detailed analysis of government accountability.  
 
These four themes of accountability were developed further to create 
topic guides that I used for data collection instruments. Each 
dimension was treated as an analytical theme and defined in the 
context related to how they were initially used by Ashworth and 
Skelcher (2005) and how they relate to the thesis. Interview topic 
guides were developed for both understanding accountability based 
on the interviewees perspectives as the agent and principal and by 
using the four themes as an analytical framework in both NW and GP. 
The various interviewees’ views of accountability were analysed on 
these four dimensions.  
 
8.3.4. Strengths and weaknesses of PATIGAHAR model 
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Firstly, empirically the use of the PATIGAHAR analytical model 
developed by the author proved to be a good way of operationalizing 
provincial government performance accountability, according to 
those interviewed. Many interviewees from all categories, including 
those from government departments, the provincial legislatures and 
accountability institutions, showed through their responses that 
they believe there is currently a lack of a common framework to 
assess the various accountability relationships. They also thought 
that the PATIGAHAR approach could provide a good base for a practical 
approach to assessing accountability. The PATIGAHAR analytical 
approach was particularly popular with the accountability 
institutions taking part in the research, the Auditor General, the 
Public Service Commission and the Treasury Office.  
 
Many of these interviewees were interested in further getting a 
deeper understanding of how I developed the approach and the 
implications for how the approach might be used in practice. The 
‘taking into account’ theme of accountability seems to be the theme 
which is most difficult to contextualise empirically, since there 
are currently a number of different stakeholders’ views from a 
provincial government’s perspective. Many interviewees argued that 
it is maybe uncertain which stakeholder’s view is the more important 
to take into account in government decisions. It is at this point 
that provincial government accountability could be perceived to be 
weak, with some stakeholders’ views not taken entirely into account; 
for example, those of citizens. Furthermore, it seemed empirically 
difficult to clarify the degree to which views are to be taken into 
account.  
 
For example, the majority of government departments do not take into 
account citizens’ views in executing government decisions and 
activities through their executives, yet many of them argue for the 
need for citizens’ participation in government decisions. All the 
interviewees argued that citizens’ views should be significantly 
represented in government decisions. They argued that various 
mechanisms and measures should be used to gather citizens’ views 
and be taken into account before performance plans in government 
are approved by the legislature. The redress theme of accountability 
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has been difficult to operationalise using the PATIGAHAR analytical 
model. Redress remains the important element of the thesis 
conceptual framework but also it needs to be improved as I found it 
difficult to operationalise. The difficulty in operationalising 
redress is clear in question of who should be responsible of 
redressing accountability between the agents and principals.  
 
The challenge is trying to answer a question of the type: how does 
redress fit into the other three dimensions of accountability? 
Redress, in its context, is analysed as a specific section of 
accountability, addressing how citizens’ complaints about 
substandard public service are to be resolved.  
 
8.3.5. How to improve PATIGAHAR model? 
 
In accessing the degree of accountability it would be ideal to have 
a specific question on which stakeholder’s views should be taken 
into account and why – and, alternatively, which stakeholder’s views 
must not to taken into account for accountability purposes. Clarity 
on stakeholders’ view to be taken into account would limit the 
ambiguity on the issue of which stakeholders expect accountability. 
The redressing of poor public service is currently limited to 
actions taken by the agent in regard to citizens’ complaints. It is 
difficult to explicitly distinguish ‘redress’ and ‘holding to 
account’ as accountability dimensions. A clear distinction between 
redress and holding to account may strengthen both theme of 
accountability. Redress could at times be seen as part of holding 
account giver to account.  
 
Some research interviewees argued that accountability does not mean 
there should always be a redress of poor performance. Some evidence 
from various participants has supported that accountability in 
certain instances should be analysed from both the perspective of 
the account giver and account holder. This is to say both the agent 
and the principal in a principal-agent relationship have 
accountability responsibilities. As much as the principal expects 
accountability from the agent, the principal should be accountable 
to the agent, for example in being clear about what is expected from 
the agent and what should be taken into account by the agent. However 
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in the design of the PATIGAHAR model the notion of looking at 
accountability from both the agent and principal was not considered. 
As a result the model in certain instances ignored the role to be 
played by the principal in setting a proper accountability framework 
for the agent.  
 
In improving the PATIGAHAR analytical model, I would now extend the 
analysis to cover the role of the principal’s accountability as well 
the agent’s accountability. In the thesis there were no obvious 
instances where the role of the principal’s accountability could 
not be analysed. The clarification of responsibilities of both the 
agent and principal about to redress accountability may improve 
PATIGAHAR model conceptually. 
 
8.4. Key issues emerging around the literature on public 
accountability 
 
 
Accountability is a concept that has been and is still being explored 
in the academic literature concerning both the private and public 
sectors (Mulgan, 2000). There are currently various descriptions in 
the literature of what accountability means and how it is to be 
assessed. Accountability is described in part of the literature as 
a process. Bovens (2007) looks at accountability as a process where 
a there is an audience and an actor giving account to that audience. 
The audience involves many stakeholders with an interest in the 
account given by the actor. Behn (2001) argues that accountability 
is to be defined from the perspectives of both the account giver 
and account receiver, as the meanings could differ according to the 
two perspectives. From the holdee’s point of view, accountability 
means punishment for not adhering to agreed plans, and for the 
holder it means expecting explanations for the work done (Behn, 
2001).  
 
Stewart (1992) also sees accountability as a process of ‘giving an 
explanation’ and being ‘held liable’. Farrell and Law (1999) 
simplify accountability as a process where one party is asked to 
give explanations for their actions and related conduct. In the 
various descriptions of accountability there is a common view of 
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accountability as a process of creating an expectation from both 
the account giver and the account receiver. Dubnick and Yang 
(2009)argue that accountability is seen in the public sector 
literature as a guarantee of democratic governance, yet its meaning 
is not agreed by all commentators. The exploration of the 
accountability literature during the course of working on this 
thesis has brought me to the realisation that there is currently no 
generally agreed analytical framework to assess accountability in 
the public sector that can be either replicated or strengthened.  
 
Various researchers make use of different approaches in 
understanding the concept but less emphasis is placed on how to 
conceptualise both the assessment and analytical tools that could 
be used for accountability. The accountability literature, 
particularly in the public sector, needs to be extended with the 
purpose of conceptualising an accountability assessment framework. 
The accountability literature could put more emphasis on giving and 
receiving an account, for little emphasis is placed on how the 
expectation for accountability is created; that is, whose views are 
to be taken into account before an account can be given and received. 
It should be clear before assessing accountability, who is the 
account giver and who is the account receiver, but the latter needs 
also to give an indication of what specific measures will be used 
in exercising accountability.   
  
Having clarity about whose views are “being taken into account” may 
help reduce the ambiguities that Hale (2008) argues to exist. Hale 
(2008) argues that for accountability to be attained there needs to 
be an explicit expectation of the likely possibility that an account 
will need to be given. There is a potential for developing the 
PATIGAHAR model further by taking into consideration challenges 
noted by the author.  
 
8.5. Research implications for the accountability framework 
and policies in South Africa 
 
The introduction to this thesis indicated that I will conduct an 
analysis of performance accountability between provincial 
government and various stakeholders in two provinces. As a result 
272 
 
this has led me to develop a series of recommendations. I sent these 
recommendations to all the interviewees who participated in the 
fieldwork for their comments related to the research findings. In 
getting the participants comment I am basically aiming to answer 
the following research question: 
 
What are the implications for strengthening policy and practice in 
the South African context of public sector accountability?  
 
8.5.1. Recommendations of the thesis with participants’ comments  
 
A. Provincial government accountability and provincial citizens 
 
During the interview processes and after an extensive analysis of 
various participants’ views I noted that there is currently a lack 
of systematic processes in provincial governments towards achieving 
citizen accountability. In the interview study, the interviewed 
government and non-government participants included provincial 
departments’ executives, provincial legislature representatives, 
and auditor general executives, executives from national government 
departments of public service and administration and performance 
monitoring and evaluation. Many of these research participants 
raised concerns including, lack of comprehensive government 
initiated citizens accountability processes and a lack of citizens’ 
enthusiasm in demanding accountability from government as major 
weaknesses to citizens’ accountability.  
 
Recommendations developed from the analysis 
The culture of government in relation to citizens’ accountability 
needs to be developed and clearly emphasised within the provincial 
government environment. In practical terms a policy and or 
legislation that encourage government departments through their 
executives to engage provincial citizens should be developed where 
at present it is lacking, and should be updated, monitored and 
evaluated where it exists. The following recommendations are made 
for processes that should be implemented in the legislation:  
 
Recommendation 1 
It should be mandatory that for every quarter of the government 
spending year to have a team of Executive Council Members (EXCO) 
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with heads of departments (HODs) from all provincial departments 
attend a forum or platform where provincial citizens are invited to 
raise views and engage with their government. In this thesis, I term 
these platforms and forums as ‘Quarterly Accountability Sessions’ 
(QAS). I developed the idea of QAS based on the findings of this 
thesis. In the QAS sessions both government executives and citizens 
should discuss issues that are to be ‘taken into account’ in 
government performance programs. The proceedings of the QAS should 
further give provincial government executives an opportunity to 
‘give an account’ to citizens on previously-raised issues and on 
the general progress of government performance or service delivery. 
Where necessary, citizens would also be empowered to participate in 
government decisions and to ‘hold executives to account’ on poor 
performance, where evidence exists.  
 
I further recommended that there should basically be four citizens’ 
engagement processes (QAS) for every year of provincial government 
spending. These processes should be useful in enhancing government 
accountability to citizens, while broadening citizens’ 
participation in government activities. These processes would be 
especially important if it was clear that citizens’ views were not 
only listened to but were also ‘taken into account’ in government 
programs, while those  views that were not taken into account should 
be indicated during these QAS, with clear reasons being given for 
not taking them into account. The dates of these four annual QASs 
should be determined at the beginning of the spending year and made 
known to all citizens, using various media platforms. The QAS 
processes might be similar to Izimbizos, but I believe that the QAS 
process should be legislated and therefore mandatory, and should 
take place at least four times a year with specific stakeholders 
participating.  
 
As part of the process of legitimising the QAS, provincial 
government departments’ executives should be further expected to 
account to the provincial legislature about the implementation of 
the QAS. Departments’ executives, in giving an account to the 
legislature regarding the QAS, should give details of the extent to 
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which they QAS process has worked and what hasn’t worked, with 
information on how to improve its effectiveness.  
 
Participants’ comments:  
Generally all research interviewees support the idea of 
institutionalising citizens’ accountability at all government 
levels including the provincial level. All those who were asked to 
comment on the recommendation believe this approach would enhance 
citizens’ participation. They further added that all government 
departments need to take part in all four QAS by providing details 
and answers to citizens’ questions. It was also further suggested 
that all the inputs from citizens should form part of government 
executives’ performance contracts, with specific redress measures 
for poor performance. To support the QASs, some interviewees further 
suggested that this approach would be better implemented if 
introduced as legislation passed by parliament and further supported 
by all political representatives.  
 
Some interviewees made reference to similar approaches implemented 
by other countries, like ‘Barazas’ that are implemented in Uganda 
for citizens’ accountability. Many government interviewees thought 
there are already processes in place that are meant to ensure 
government accountability to citizens, but they should be 
streamlined to fit in with this suggestion of QASs. Some 
interviewees argued, however, that two sessions per spending year 
might be more practical than quarterly meetings – this would 
recognise the intense pressure under which provincial governments 
are working.  
  
Recommendation 2 
An analysis of the responses of various research interviewees’ on 
the implementation of Batho Pele suggests that there is insufficient 
attention by provincial government departments to the implementation 
of Batho Pele”? My second recommendation is therefore that: 
 
Provincial government departments should have Batho Pele champions 
(specialists) who monitor and evaluate the implementation of the 
Batho Pele model. As part of their responsibility, Batho Pele 
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champions should create awareness both inside and outside provincial 
government departments about Batho Pele and its purposes. The 
champion should further see to it that government programs take into 
account Batho Pele principles. Government departments’ executives 
should be required to give an account annually on the implementation 
of Batho Pele during their accountability process with the 
legislature and other constitutional bodies.  
 
Participants’ comments:  
Government department interviewees argue that the lack of 
implementing Batho Pele as expected is due to lack of a budget to 
train specialists and to undertake public awareness campaigns. Even 
though many support the Batho Pele recommendations they believe that 
more funds need to be allocated by the legislature to this policy. 
However, some interviewees argue that despite a lack of Batho Pele 
specialists, they are able to implement the model in service 
provision by using processes like Izimbizos regardless of their 
limitations. The recommendation that executives should give an 
account annually on Batho Pele implementation was seen as an 
appropriate measure to encourage further implementation of Batho 
Pele. Executives should make commitments on how they would implement 
Batho Pele and be held to account on such commitments. Other 
interviewees believe that collaboration with other government 
institutions like the Department of Performance Monitoring and 
Evaluation would further minimize poor implementation of Batho Pele.  
 
There are interviewees who argue that the implementation of BP is 
dependent on a change in ‘attitude’ by many government executives. 
Some department executives are accused of lacking courtesy in 
dealing with junior staff, with the result such unbecoming behaviour 
then transferred to service users and more generally to citizens. 
Basically government department executives should be central to the 
implementation and support of BP at all levels in provincial 
departments.  
 
B. Provincial government accountability to provincial legislatures 
The analysis of the views expressed by various government 
executives, legislature representatives, AG executives and PSC 
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executives revealed that there are currently uncertainties about 
the legislature’s role with regards to provincial government 
accountability processes. Some department executives expect members 
of the legislature to influence their performance plans while some 
don’t. There are further perceptions from government executives that 
some legislature members are not entirely aware of their functions 
with regards to government accountability - for example some members 
do not criticise or reprimand MECs in the house of legislature due 
to having similar political affiliations. However the legislature 
executives disagree with some of the issues raised by department 
executives. The perceptions about uncertainties of the role to be 
played by members of the legislature in holding government 
executives to account appear to weaken accountability mechanisms in 
general between the legislature and provincial government. 
 
Section 114 of the Constitutions of South Africa gives provincial 
legislatures powers to demand accountability from state institutions 
in the province. My next recommendation is intended to build upon 
this constitutional provision and other legislature processes. 
 
Recommendation 3 
All members of provincial legislatures should be given a full 
induction on their role in provincial government and its specific 
accountability processes. Furthermore, the process of inducting the 
members of the legislature should take place before they start their 
five year term in the house, with continuous updating of the training 
during their term of office. As part of the induction process, the 
meaning of accountability (i.e. holding government executives to 
account) and other processes should be clearly made known to all 
members of the legislature. The context of accountability should 
also be specified, along with how it can be attained and measured 
over a period of time. The process of inducting legislature members 
should also be extended to the provincial government executives that 
deal with legislature members. The involvement of provincial 
government executives would minimise uncertainties in relation to 
the kind of accountability processes that can be expected by both 
government and legislature. 
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Participants’ comments:  
There is generally consensus amongst all interviewees that 
legislature members need various kinds of support as part of 
enhancing their ability to hold executives to account. Some 
interviewees further argue that the current electoral systems in 
South Africa could be perpetuating the impotence of members of the 
legislature to hold executives to account. As one interviewee said: 
My opinion is that the electoral system is a major disabling 
system because people do not elect parliamentarians but 
political parties, hence legislatures and executives end 
up paying allegiance to the political party that deployed 
them. 
 
But interviewees from the legislature, in spite of welcoming the 
recommendation of inducting new members of the house, argued that 
there are currently processes to support all members in the 
execution of their functions. Legislature interviewees further argue 
that the lack of understanding by government executives of the role 
that legislature members ought to play with regards to 
accountability could be clarified by this induction process. Other 
interviewees argued that the current processes that are used to 
induct legislature members should be reviewed and updated where 
necessary. Several interviewees argued that at both national and 
provincial level legislature members are often not well ‘equipped’ 
to hold executives to account. As a result, executives take 
advantage of the legislature members during accountability sessions.  
 
Having such an induction process would provide members of the 
legislature with much needed support in carrying out their 
accountability responsibilities.    
Given widespread perceptions about the impotence of current 
provincial legislatures, and the perception that political 
party members are failing to hold fellow party members to 
account, I make a further recommendation about legislature 
processes. 
 
Recommendation 4  
      
Policy or legislation in the house of legislature should make 
provision for most of the committees to be chaired by members of 
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opposition political parties. Requiring legislature committees to 
be chaired by members of opposition parties should be considered 
especially in cases where the majority of executives leading 
provincial government departments belong to the same political party 
as the party holding the majority of seats. Having members of the 
opposition political parties in such positions would bring a balance 
of opinions during accountability sessions between the committees’ 
and departments’ executives.  
 
Participants’ comments:  
In all three research interviewee categories (i.e. department 
executives, legislature executives and accountability institutions 
executives) there is a general belief that the opposition political 
parties should be part of accountability processes. But they all 
disagree with my suggestion that opposition political party members 
should chair portfolio committees. They make various objections. 
Some argue that the South African political system has not yet 
matured enough to allow opposition parties to be constructive as 
opposed to being oppositional. They believe that basically 
opposition parties would always want to gain supporters at the 
expense of the ruling party, if chairing these committees. Other 
arguments are that it would be impossible to implement 
comprehensively the ruling party’s policies if legislature 
committees were chaired by opposition parties. One interviewee 
opposed this recommendation by saying: 
 
‘The recommendation is only practical on paper but in 
reality it would not be possible to implement at legislature 
level’    
 
Recommendation 5 
The process by which the provincial legislature holds government 
executives to account should make provision for ‘conscience’ or 
‘free’ voting to enable members of the legislature to recall 
government executives (MEC) in cases of consistent poor performance 
or inadequate accountability. In ‘conscience voting’, members of 
the legislature are allowed to vote on the legislature motion 
without being influenced by their party whips or political parties. 
In this voting process members are allowed to exercise their vote 
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in line with what they perceive to be appropriate or inappropriate, 
rather than on party lines.    
 
Participants’ comments:  
As with the previous recommendation on independent chairs of 
legislature committees, free voting is seen by those commenting as 
political tool to enhance opposition parties’ objectives. As a 
result it is not seen as a plausible option. Many of the interviewees 
cite the lack of political maturity in South African politics. One 
interviewee gave an example about the recent removal of the local 
mayor by a vote of no confidence by fellow politicians (Plessis, 
2013) but this has led to legislative members being removed from 
office. The interviewee said:  
 
An excellent proposal but will be difficult to implement 
in our beloved South Africa. As we speak there are 14 ANC 
councillors that have been expelled from the ANC because 
they voted out the ANC Mayor out of office in Tlokwe Local 
Municipality (Potchefstroom), using a motion of no 
confidence. But the ANC as a political organisation regards 
such moves by its councillors as ill-disciplined behaviour 
and failure to carry out the mandate of the ANC political 
party.  
 
C. Provincial government accountability to accountability 
institutions 
 
Recommendation 6 
The treasury should create a generic reporting framework of giving 
an account that covers all the government stakeholders’ needs and 
expectations. This reporting framework would minimise the 
duplication of reports that many argue is currently the case. Many 
Government department executives argue that there is in certain 
instances a duplication of reports for giving an account, e.g. there 
is a need for specific reports to be sent to national government, 
and other reports to be sent to the Premier’s office, the 
Legislatures and the Treasury. For accountability purposes the 
executives argue that this duplicates the process, since the 
contents of these accountability reports are similar if not the 
same, and it could be satisfactory for only one reporting path to 
be required. As a result many executives spent time preparing these 
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reports that could have been used to enhance government performance 
and other governance processes.  
 
Participants’ comments:  
Departmental interviewees argued that a detailed and comprehensive 
accountability framework would minimise perceived duplications. 
However, the accountability institutions argue that all reporting 
frameworks that are currently in place are needed. This is due to 
different accountability impacts which are sought by various 
stakeholders. As one of the interviewee said:  
 
Context, process and content are critical when 
implementing, monitoring and reporting on the work of 
different departments/institutions in line with their 
legislative mandates. Strengthening of the planning and 
operational tools is critical as that will enable 
streamlining of processes of monitoring and evaluation to 
optimise the usage of the limited public funds.  
  
8.5.2. Final recommendations in the light of interviewees’ 
comments 
 
My initial recommendations as outlined in the previous section were 
derived from the research findings, based on various responses in 
the first round of interviews. The thesis recommendations were then 
circulated to the interviewees and they have provided their 
comments. According to these comments, most of the recommendations 
I have set out in the previous section are reasonable but some 
recommendations are implausible to implement, either because they 
are already in place in existing practice (to some extent)  or 
because some are unlikely to implemented in the current political 
climate in South Africa. I have therefore finalised my 
recommendations, taking into account the comments of the various 
respondents, as follows:   
 
 Recommendation which have remained unchanged 
Recommendation A:  
 
As part of enhancing the accountability of provincial governments 
to their citizens, QAS should be considered as part of other 
government initiatives on citizens’ accountability.  
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This initiative is supported by a majority of the thesis 
participants and some suggested legislation to support this 
initiative. Together with institutionalisation of Batho Pele the 
initiative would contribute to improving government accountability 
to citizens.  
 
Recommendation B:  
 
Opposition political party members should be appointed as chairs of 
the legislature committees. 
 
This recommendation was not favoured by many of the participants. 
Their objections were mainly based on their perceptions of the 
strength of political differences between the parties. However, I 
still believe for the purpose of accountability it is important to 
allow opposition parties to be more constructive than oppositional.  
 
Therefore, I believe this recommendation is relevant and worth 
trying, in order to reduce perceptions that the legislature is weak 
in holding government accountable, as expected in the constitution.  
 
Recommendation C:  
 
The treasury should create a generic reporting framework of giving 
an account that covers all the government stakeholders’ needs and 
expectations. This reporting framework would minimise the 
duplication of reports that many argue is currently the case. 
 
There are various reports produced by government departments as part 
of giving an account. The reports are given to various stakeholders 
including, legislatures, and treasury, national government and 
accountability institutions. The contents of these reports should 
not be seen as duplication of work by department executives.  
 
 Rephrased and improved recommendations 
Recommendation D:  
Provincial legislature members should be well equipped through 
training and having a thorough induction process with regards to 
the role they play in relation to government accountability – and 
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government executives should play a role in the training and 
induction processes.  
 
The initial recommendation suggested that legislature members should 
be trained. There was overwhelming support for this recommendation 
from legislature participants. Various department executives 
participating in this research argued that the role of the 
legislature with regards to accountability is uncertain. Moreover, 
a argued for the involvement of executives in the induction of 
legislature members. I therefore further recommend that in the 
training and induction process for legislature members, executives 
of every department should be involved, as suggested by a majority 
of government executives in both provinces. The involvement of these 
executives would further minimise any ambiguities about the relative 
roles of legislature members and government executives in government 
accountability.  
 
 Initial recommendations which have now been omitted 
The majority of research participants are convinced that the use of 
‘free voting’ as a way of empowering the members of the legislature 
to hold executive to account would not be effective. Many further 
argued that not all legislature resolutions are voted on and, as a 
result, free voting would not enhance accountability as I had 
suggested. I have therefore omitted this recommendation from the 
final list of recommendations in this thesis as it is vastly rejected 
by the research participants who would be involved in its 
implementation.  
 
8.6. Future research  
In this thesis, an analytical framework for government performance 
accountability was developed and applied to two provincial 
governments in South Africa. The PATIGAHAR model was used to analyse 
provincial government accountability based on who is the 
accountability giver and accountability receiver. Currently there 
is no common approach to operationalising accountability in the 
literature. The PATIGAHAR model as developed and used in this thesis 
for analysing accountability at the provincial government level has 
proved to be a useful approach which should be further used. However, 
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the model needs to be further tested, particularly to see whether 
it holds in wider contexts, e.g. in other countries, at local or 
national levels (or, indeed, at the level of transnational or 
international government).  
 
I therefore urge a wider research programme in the public sector to 
explore how to operationalize public performance accountability 
through application of the PATIGAHAR model. In particular I suggest 
further research on both conceptually and empirically analysis on 
how to operationalise redress in accountability relationship between 
government and various stakeholders. It is clear that the attainment 
of redress in any accountability relationship strengthen 
accountability process. (Sinclair, 1995) 
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APPENDIX A: PILOT AND MAIN DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
Pilot topic guide Updated topic guide Pilot topic guide Updated topic guide
Taking into account Taking into account Holding to account Holding to account
Do you think the provincial governm ent/departm ents 
ought to involve citizens and other stakeholders 
regarding the determ ination of governm ent goals and 
objectives?
Should the departm ent have a fram ework that 
enables consultation with various stakeholders in 
determ ining specific perform ance to be pursued?
 W hat m echanism s are developed by either 
provincial or national governm ent that allow the 
com m unity and other stakeholders to hold the 
governm ent and its officials to account on their 
actions (non- actions)?
Should the departm ent be held to accountforits
perform ance? W hy do you say that?
 W hy is the above m entioned involvem ent of 
stakeholders im portant to the provincial governm ent 
departm ent’s perform ance?
Does the departm ent have the fram ework that
enables consultation with the various
stakeholders in determ ining specific perform ance
to be pursued by the departm ent?
W hat are the m easures in place that are available to 
public com m unity and other governm ent services 
users to influence the provincial governm ent to 
account on their perform ance?
Is the departm ent been held to account for its
perform ance by the provincial legislature?
Provide exam ples of som e of these stakeholders to be 
engaged by provincial governm ent (departm ents) in 
providing contributions for the activities of the  
governm ent
Please describe the fram ework that is used by the 
departm ent to consult these various stakeholders 
in determ ining specific departm ental perform ance 
to be pursued?
Has these m easures been used exhaustively by the 
governm ent services users and citizens, have such 
m easures been effective in achieving its 
outcom es?
Are there fram eworks in place to ensure that the 
departm ent can and is held to account for its 
perform ance by the provincial legislature?
 Do you have any particular exam ples where this 
stakeholder engagem ent has been done well in the 
province?
Does the above m entioned fram ework provide
sufficient detail process on how these specific
departm ental perform ances ought to be attained?
Could you give exam ples where the above 
m entioned m easures has been used effectively has 
worked?
W hat are these fram eworks in place to ensure that 
the departm ent can and is held to account?
How do you think your provincial governm ent is doing 
regarding the above m entioned stakeholders public 
engagem ents?
W hat in your opinion is m issing in the fram ework 
which if added can im prove departm ent 
perform ance and enhance consultation process 
with various stakeholders?
Do you have any exam ples where these m easures 
have not achieved desired objectives (has not 
worked)?
Do you think these fram eworks of ensuring the 
departm ent is held to account are com prehensive?
Is there any exam ple where it has been done badly or it 
did not satisfy the provincial governm ent or respective 
departm ents?
Could these processes on how to attain these 
specific departm ental perform ances agreed with 
various stakeholders be changed by the 
departm ent at any tim e?
Is there any exam ple where it has been done badly or 
it did not satisfy the provincial governm ent or 
respective departm ents?
Do you know ifthese fram eworks are com m only
im plem ented to the entire provincial governm ent or 
every departm ent has their own?
  Are there any particular m ethods /m echanism s those 
have been used for these consultations and were better 
than others?
In whatcircum stance do theseprocesses onhow
to attain these specific departm ental
perform ances can be changed? Please provide an
exam ple?
Have these m echanism  changed in any way 
overtim e and what has led to the reform ?
How frequent should this process of holding the 
departm ent to account on its perform ance take 
place? And why?
How does provincial governm ent m ake sure that the 
results of the consultations m akes contributions to the 
governm ent policies?
Does the result of consultation between the 
departm ent and various stakeholders also give 
details on how attainm ent of departm ental 
perform ance could be determ ined?
How has the im plem entation of these m easures 
affected the provincial governm ent perform ance in 
term s of achieving objectives?
Has im plem entation of these fram eworks by the 
provincial legislature affected the actual 
departm ental perform ance in any way?
How these consultations’ outcom es are built into the 
governm ent policies and objectives?
Can you give an exam ple of where the
im plem entation of these fram eworks effected
changes to the departm ent’s perform ance?
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Pilot topic guide Updated topic guide Pilot topic guide Updated topic guide
Giving an account Giving an account Redress Redress
 Is provincial governm ent (departm ents) expected to 
give explanations for its action or non- actions to the 
public or any other stakeholders?
Is the departm entexpected to give an accountfor
its perform ance? And why do you say that?
W hat are the processes in place in the provincial 
governm ent to ensure correctives m easures are 
taken in cases where expected services were not 
provided satisfactory?
Are there processes in place to help the 
departm ent to identify poor perform ance in the 
departm ental perform ance?
W hy does (does not) provincial governm ent have to 
provide such explanations to the public and other 
governm ent service users?
Does the departm ent give an account for its
perform ance to various stakeholders?
How provincialgovernm ent does m ake aware by
the com m unity and services users in case the
latters are not satisfied by the services being
provided?
W hat are these processes in place to help
departm ent identify poor perform ance in the
departm ent? Describe them  please?
Does this process enhance transparency or bring burden 
to the provincial governm ent (departm ents)?
In what form  does the departm ent give an account 
for its perform ance to the provincial legislature?
W ho has access to im plem enting these m easures
of ensuring im provem ent of accountability is
achieved?
Does the provincial legislature have access to 
im plem enting these departm ental processes to 
identify poor perform ance?
Do you think there are proper m echanism s in place (i.e.?  
In the provincial governm ent) to allow the sm ooth 
process of given such an account?
W hat specific contents are to be included when the 
departm ent is giving an account for its 
perform ance to the provincial legislature?
How do these m easures used to im prove 
governm ent services to the com m unity and other 
governm ent services users?
Should corrective steps be taken in cases where
departm entperform ance is deem ed to be poorby
the above m entioned process?
Could you please describe these m echanism s used by 
the provincial governm ent to give an account where 
necessary?
Are these specific contents of giving an account 
com prehensive?
How often has correctives steps (redress) been 
given? To the satisfaction of those affected?
Is corrective steps been taken currently in your 
departm ent in case perform ance is deem ed poor?
W hose responsibility is it to ensure that there are proper 
accountability fram eworks (for reporting to the public 
and other stakeholders) in place for our province and 
respective departm ents, and why?
How often does the departm ent give an account 
for its perform ance to various stakeholders?
Does the provincial governm ent m easure the effect 
of the redressing on the services?
W hatspecific corrective steps should be taken in
case was the perform ance ofthe departm ent is
regarded to be poor?
How often does the provincial governm ent provide such 
explanations to the com m unity and other stakeholders?
Do these specific m echanism s allow the 
departm ent to fully give an account on its 
perform ance to the various as well? W hy do you 
say that?
How sim ilar are these m easures to those been 
im plem ented by the national departm ents and other 
provinces?
Are there fram eworks in placeto allow correctives
stepsto betaken where departm entalperform ance
is poor? Foran exam ple,notawarding incentives
where prom ised.
How does provincial governm ent m ake sure that the 
results of the consultations m akes contributions to the 
governm ent policies?
Does the national departm ent expect the 
provincial departm ent to give an account for its 
perform ance?
Is there a balance between accountability and being 
able to provide desired level of services to the 
com m unity and other stakeholders?
W hat effect do these corrective steps have in 
subsequent perform ance of the departm ent?
Does national governm ent or national treasury expect 
any sim ilar explanations from  the provincial 
governm ent?
If so, how is the account on departm ent 
perform ance given to the national departm ent?
Do you think governm ent departm ents are lim ited in 
providing services due to the expectation of them  
having to provide explanation for any actions they 
take?
W hat is the role of the provincial legislature in 
im plem entation of the corrective steps in cases 
where departm ental perform ance is not 
satisfactory?
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF PARTICIPANTING INSTITUTIONS 
 
APPENDIX B: Institutions participating in Thesis
No. North West Province No. Gauteng Province No. National level
1 Office of the Auditor General 13 Office of the Auditor General 25
Department of performance monitoring and 
evaluation
2 Public Service Commission 14 Public Service Commission 26
Department of public service and 
administration
3 Treasury office 15 Treasury office
4 Education department 16 Education department 
5 Social development  department 17
Health and social development  
department
6 Sports, arts and culture department 18 Sports, arts and culture department
7 Office of the Premier 19 Community safety department
8 Human settlement and community safety 20 Infrustracture development
9 Local government and traditional affairs 21 Roads and Transport department
10 Provincial legislature 22 Local government department
11 Economic development 23 Provincial legislature
12 Office of the Public protector 24 Economic development department
Institutions Participating in the research
295 
 
APPENDIX C: LETTERS OF RESEARCH INVITATIONS
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
  
 
 
 
 PARTICIPATION IN AN ACADEMIC RESEARCH (INTERVIEW) 
I am currently a full time registered doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham 
(School of Government and Society) in the United Kingdom. I qualified as an accountant in 2007 
and decided to further my studies abroad and got an opportunity to do so.  
My research interests are focuses on exploring government performance accountability and 
services delivery. I am interested in exploring the extent to which provincial performance 
accountability is being achieved over the years. This entails identifying the process of 
determining the respective provincial government departments’ strategic goals. I’m also 
interested in exploring the various departmental measures in place for reporting on such goals. 
I intend looking at different departments’ approaches and later consolidate such to form a 
provincial analysis. Two provinces in the country would be compared to try and draw an 
analysis from national point of view.  
My research will oblige me to have inputs in the form of interviews with different departments 
accounting office. This would be in addition to the documented reports and other information 
available from the departments’ information systems. With all that been said I would like to 
request your time for a face to face interview. The purpose of the interview would to be for me 
to ask you some informal questions related to departments’ objectives and other related issues. 
The depth of some of the questions might not be relevant to you and would appreciate if you 
could refer me to relevant officials in your department. It is really difficult at the moment to 
know how long the interview would last, but it is to my interest not to take too much of your 
time. The intention is not to take more than an hour in an interview.  
The research process would be on-going during the duration of my degree which is expected to 
end in the year 2013.   
I would like to emphasise that my researching process does not intend in any way interfering 
with the departments’ and its official operational activities. The final research compilation can 
be provided to yourselves if a need arises before submission to my examiners. This would 
purely satisfy yourself that I did not misrepresent your inputs.  
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APPENDIX D: LIST OF POTENTIAL INTERVIEWEES FROM VARIOUS INSTIUTIONS 
APPENDIX D : Institutions participating in the Thesis
No.
1 Office of the Auditor General Senior Manager Office of the Auditor General Senior Manager
Department of performance 
monitoring and evaluation Head of M&E
2 Public Service Commission Director Public Service Commission Director 
Department of public service 
and administration Chief director of BP
3 Treasury office Head of Department M&E dir. Treasury office Head of Department M&E dir.
4 Education department Head of Department M&E dir. Education department Head of Department M&E dir.
5 Social development  department Head of Department M&E dir.
Health and social development  
department Head of Department M&E dir.
6
Sports, arts and culture 
department Head of Department M&E dir.
Sports, arts and culture 
department Head of Department M&E dir.
7 Office of the Premier Head of Department M&E dir. Community safety department Head of Department M&E dir.
8
Human settlement and community 
safety Head of Department M&E dir. Infrustracture development Head of Department M&E dir.
9
Local government and traditional 
affairs Head of Department M&E dir.
Roads and Transport 
department Head of Department M&E dir.
10 Provincial legislature Secretary of legislature Local government department Head of Department M&E dir.
11 Economic development Head of Department M&E dir. Provincial legislature Secretary of legislature
12 Office of the Public protector Head of Department M&E dir.
Economic development 
department Head of Department M&E dir.
13 Agriculture and environment Head of Department M&E dir. Agriculture and environment Head of Department M&E dir.
Office of the Premier Head of Department M&E dir.
Institutions Participating in the research
North West Province: Potential Interviewees Gauteng Province: Potential Interviewees National leve:Potential Interviewees
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APPENDIX E: DETAILED ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE ON ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
1. Government accountability pursued in the thesis 
Bovens(2007) describes an accountability measurement tool in which 
accountability is based on the type of relationship between the 
‘actor’ or ‘accountor’ (‘actor’ or ‘accountor’ are regarded as agents 
in this thesis) and ‘account holder’ (‘account holders’ are regarded 
as principals in this thesis) within a ‘forum’ where the account is 
given. In describing accountability Bovens(2007) developed a structure 
from which forms of accountability and their relationships between 
the agent and principals are identifiable. Figure E.1 shows the 
processes of different components that make up accountability 
relationships according to Bovens(2007). In Figure E.1, accountability 
relates to the kind of relationship established between the ‘actor’ 
(agent) labelled by ‘2’ in the diagram and ‘account holder’ 
(principals) in a forum is labelled by ‘1’ in the diagram.  
 
Figure E.1 further illustrates accountability relationships as 
labelled by ‘4’ and the form of account is expected, labelled by ‘3’in 
the diagram. Multiple accountability relationships of this kind build 
up to create a strong government structure of government 
accountability. Figure E.1 illustrates the accountability process and 
Table E.1 describes accountability relationships as they relate to 
the processes in Figure E.1. In Table E.1, there are four 
accountability categories in which account holders in forums, actors, 
conduct and obligations are described. The four categories are, ‘A’ 
forum, ‘B’ actor, ‘C’ conduct, and ‘D’ obligations as illustrated on 
Table E.1. The accountability relationships in the four categories of 
Table E.1 are given in no particular order. In order to determine the 
type of accountability relationship to be explored, Bovens(2007) asks 
four main questions. These questions are illustrated by the 
connections in the Table E.1.   
 
The questions are asked in the following order: 
1) Who is expecting account? (Nature of account holder in a forum)(I.e. 
Principal in the overall framework of this thesis) 
2) Who is expected to give an account? (Nature of actor)(I.e. Agent 
in the thesis context) 
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3) For what is account expected? (Nature of conduct) 
4) Why is an actor expected to give an account to a particular forum? 
(Type of relations between actor (agent) and forum (principal): nature 
of the obligation)  
 
Figure E. 1 Accountability process with role players (Actor and Forum) 
Actor (2) 
Expected to give account
(1)
Forum: 
Expecting 
accountability 
(3)
Informing about 
conduct: about 
what  
Debating Judging
Consequences
Informal
Formal
(4)
Type of relation 
between the actor 
and the forum
Sources: Adopted from Bovens (2007) 
The answers to these four questions are used to determine the type of 
accountability relationship to be explored between actor and account 
holder in a forum. Following a four factor approach to determining 
which type of accountability to study, is not always straightforward 
because some accountability types are related to each other. This 
process does not give an absolute direction to each type of 
accountability relationship. An accountability relationship can cross 
categories. If, for example, in category A shown on Table E.1 
‘administrative accountability’ is selected as the forum (of account 
holder) of accountability this could involve an actor or actors in 
category B such as public officials and this could apply to conduct 
in government performance (category C) and obligation required by law 
(category D). To trace a route through these intertwining’s 
researchers need to be clear about the particular aspect of 
accountability they are concerned to pursue.  
 
The details of the four categories and questions for determining the 
accountability relationship are shown in Table E.1. The potential 
answers to question one are found in category ‘A’, potential answers 
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to question two are in category ‘B’, potential answers to question 
three are in category ‘C’ and potential answers to question four are 
in category ‘D’. Table E.1 describes all the categories and potential 
answers based on Bovens’(2007) approach. For example, the categories: 
(A,) political accountability to citizens;  (B), public official and 
institutions giving an account (collective); (C) accountability for 
government performance; and (D), government institutions required by 
law to give account to citizens on their performance. Highlighting 
some accountability entries in the diagram is to reflect on 
accountability being pursued in the thesis. The details description 
of these accountability entries is given in following paragraphs. 
 
Table E. 1 Types of accountability categories and relationships   
Four 
Accountability 
Questions  
Q1: 
Who is 
expecting 
account?  
Q2:  
Who is expected 
to give an 
account?  
Q3: 
For what is 
account 
expected?  
Q4:  
Why is an actor 
expected to give 
an account to a 
particular forum? 
Category  A:  
Nature of the 
Forum Political  Legal  Administration  Professional  
 
Category  B:  
Nature of the 
Actor Corporate  Hierarchical  Collective  Individual  
 
Category C: Nature 
of the conduct Financial  Performance  Procedural    
 
Category D: Nature 
of the obligation Vertical  Diagonal  Horizontal    
Source: Adapted  from Bovens (2007) 
 
In relation to this four questions approach, Bovens (2007)  emphasises 
that it is equally important to identify the participants (accountor 
and account holder) in the type of accountability being studied. 
Identifying the participants depends on the context of the 
accountability relationship which is being explored. In Table E.1 
category ‘A’ forms the framework of each accountability study from 
which the other three categories ‘B’ ‘C’ and ‘D’ are analysed. If, 
for example, professional accountability is selected as the framework 
of a study, the actors could only be individuals in category ‘B’ 
because professional accountability involves individuals giving 
account to the professional body they belong to, but not corporate 
giving accountability. Another example is say in category A Political 
accountability is framework, in category B ‘Individual’ politicians 
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would be accountable to citizens on government performance (political 
manifestos) in category c.  
 
1.1. Accountability relationships explored in thesis 
Bovens makes use of ‘actor and account holder in a forum’ as account 
giver and recipient respectively, but for the purpose of this thesis 
‘actor’ relates to agents from which account is expected by various 
principals described as account holders in a forum in Bovens’ 
analysis. There are various classifications used within the thesis 
but they all fall within the principal and agent categories. Table 
E.2 gives the various roles which are classified as agent and principal 
in this thesis. To form a clear narrative for the thesis on government 
accountability, the framework for this thesis is based on performance 
accountability in category ‘A’ and this account holder in a forum sets 
a direction for the analysis performed in this study where various 
principals expect performance accountability from the agent (actor).  
 
Government accountability in this thesis relates mainly to political 
accountability in category ‘A’ as illustrated in Table E.1. As 
category ‘A’ represents various types to examine how more 
accountabilities could create two parallel studies as these types are 
significantly unrelated.  
 
Table E. 2 Various roles classified as belonging to principal or agent categories 
     
 Principal   Agents  
        
 ‘Account holder’   ‘Account holdee’  
 ‘Account receiver’   ‘Account giver’  
 ‘Service users’   ‘Service provider’  
 
‘Forum of account’  
‘Accountability receiver’   
‘Actor’ 
‘Accountor’ 
‘Accountability giver’  
 
Sources: Created by the author 
    
It would also require a wider analytical approach to explore various 
accountabilities from category ‘A’ since the accountabilities in 
category ‘A’ are indirectly related to each other. In other categories 
(i.e. B, C and D) the thesis looks at various accountabilities in 
every category in addition to political accountability from category 
‘A’. For example performance accountability from government 
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departments may be studied with financial accountability in category 
C; it would also appear illogical to look at diagonal accountability 
without exploring both the vertical and horizontal accountability. In 
category B, C, and D some accountabilities are interrelated making it 
implausible to explore the one without the others (for instance, 
performance and financial accountability are together since government 
performance is achieved through spending).  
 
Indeed, in the pilot study for my empirical research, the interviewees 
argued that many South African government institutions consider 
performance accountability as a by-product of financial 
accountability. They argued that exploring performance accountability 
in the provincial government would be difficult if financial 
accountability is completely ignored. The outcomes of the pilot study 
further influenced the consideration of performance accountability 
with financial accountability in category ‘C’ when necessary.  
 
1.2. Types of accountability for consideration 
The next section will provide a detailed analysis of the types of 
accountability relationships in all of the four categories. Firstly I 
will briefly cover the types of accountability that are not explored 
in this thesis. These are administrative, legal, professional and 
social accountability. I subsequently discuss political 
accountability, which is pursued by this thesis, albeit within the 
context of ‘performance accountability’. 
 
a. Administrative accountability 
In administrative accountability public institutions and officials 
are scrutinised for compliance with legislation and prescribed 
frameworks (Bovens, 2007). Government institutions are expected to 
give an account annually for their use of financial resources and   
indicate whether they comply with administrative processes (Chan and 
Rosenbloom, 2010). Independent institutions, like government audit 
offices (AG) and the public service commission (PSC), conduct checks 
on whether government institutions have complied with rules and 
regulations and investigate the legitimacy of use of public finances 
by government departments. These external institutions further examine 
whether internal controls are functioning appropriately, making their 
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findings available to all interested parties including legislative 
bodies, media, governing bodies and citizens.  
 
In administrative accountability the account holder (AG and PSC) 
receiving account on compliance can only confirm the circumstance as 
they exist in a government institution. Administrative accountability 
can be classified as accountability based on ‘progressive public 
administration’ by Hood (1995) while Hood defines progressive public 
administration as:  
 
“the style of public administration that emerged in the 
progressive era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Accountability depends on limiting corruption and 
the waste and incompetence that are held to go with it”  
 
b. Legal accountability 
In legal accountability, law makers through the courts impose 
sanctions on government institutions and officials for not 
implementing policies (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987). The courts of law 
are mechanisms whereby government institutions are required to act in 
compliance with the state laws (Bovens, 2007). In cases where 
government institutions are seen as having not implemented policy 
requirements a wronged party may approach the courts of law for 
redress. Legal accountability basically revolves around whether the 
judicial power is able to hold the executive authority to 
account(Romzek and Dubnick, 1987).  
 
c. Professional accountability  
Professional accountability relates to accountability environments 
where individual public managers are affiliated with professional 
bodies. The professional bodies specify codes of conduct for their 
members to abide by (Freidson, 2007). Professional members who are 
public managers are often expected to give an account of their 
individual conduct to their professional bodies. For example, public 
managers belonging to professional bodies like the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants are required to engage in 
continuous professional development programs. This accountability 
takes place directly between individual public managers and their 
professional bodies(Romzek and Dubnick, 1998). In cases where public 
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managers are implicated in contravening the code of conduct of their 
professional body, such members would be suspended or have their 
membership cancelled.  
 
The professional body acts as an authoritative body that creates the 
standards by which its members conduct themselves. For example, the 
South African Institute of Government Auditors is a professional body 
that prescribes how government auditors are to conduct themselves 
(SAIGA, 2013).  
 
d. Social accountability 
Social accountability involves public institutions, such as government 
departments and their officials, giving account of their conduct (or 
performance) to social interest groups, (i.e. churches, charities, 
civil society groups and other community pressure groups). In social 
accountability government departments voluntarily account to local 
groups where these groups consider government to have not fairly 
represented their interests. Bovens (2007) argues that social 
accountability does not always yield the expected results for social 
groups. Social groups and other corporate organisations do not expect 
poor governance to recur on the part of government and public managers, 
nor do they expect it to go unresolved due to a lack of accountability. 
However, due to nature of social accountability, interest groups are 
limited to demanding and enforcing coherent redress mechanisms.  
 
In addition to the lack of regulatory obligation for government to 
give account, most social groups have only limited ability to demand 
an account. A further weakness in social accountability is the lack 
of frameworks that allow accountable actors to be held to account.  
 
 
 
e. Political accountability 
Political accountability is also known as public accountability of 
politicians in government. In this form of accountability, citizens 
(acting as voters) democratically elect public representatives to lead 
government institutions(Romzek and Dubnick, 1987). These publicly 
elected political representatives assume responsibility for providing 
public services to citizens who award them political power. Citizens 
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expect in turn that politicians and their political organisations 
provide public services and give account on the agreed dimensions of 
performance at given intervals (Romzek and Dubnick, 1987). It is 
through a cycle (or process) of accountability between different 
actors that political account to citizens is understood and realised. 
The cycle encompasses provincial citizens voting for politicians as 
their public representatives to serve as members of parliament or the 
legislature.  
 
The members of parliament elect the President and government ministers 
as political heads of different government departments. Government 
departments then appoint administrators to perform the day-to-day 
functions of the government. A process of accountability occurs 
between different branches of government where the ultimate account 
on public services is given to citizens. In the process of public 
accountability, authority and responsibility are delegated to 
different actors in accordance with the specific accounts of 
government performance which are expected (Bovens, 2007). Through all 
these branches of government, account is expected to be obtained by 
different account holders including citizens, legislatures and others. 
It is worth emphasising that in public accountability key stakeholders 
in government accountability are local citizens in relation to local 
government, provincial citizens for provincial government and national 
citizens for national government.  
 
1.3. Government accountability explored in the thesis 
The main focus of this thesis is to explore the South African 
government performance accountability in the provincial governments. 
But in analysing performance accountability other forms of 
accountability like financial and political accountability are also 
analysed. In this thesis, accountability framework for performance 
accountability is political accountability as shown in category ‘A’ 
of Table E.1. The focus on public accountability is attributable to 
the significant role played by provincial governments in providing 
public service to its citizens. Public services form an integral part 
of provincial government performance throughout the term of political 
office. Collective accountability (category B in Table 2.1), which 
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includes government institutions, officials, and other state agencies, 
is implemented to enhance public accountability in society.  
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section that other forms of 
accountability forms are analysed, collective accountability is also 
in this thesis. In order to provide public services, the provincial 
government is allocated taxes that are collected from citizens. 
Citizens expect public accountability from the government and so 
naturally seek some indication of whether the funds allocated were 
indeed used for rendering public services. For many of the government 
institutions and officials taking part in this research it is almost 
impossible to separate financial accountability from performance 
accountability (in category C in Table E.1). In exploring public 
accountability the views expressed about financial accountability have 
been compared to performance accountability and are so highlighted.  
 
It is arguable that provincial citizens, the legislature, the national 
government, and accountability institutions expecting government 
accountability are in some way able to influence government 
institutions for accountability purposes. For example if government 
and its political heads do not account effectively to citizens, 
citizens may decide not to vote for them in the ensuing elections. 
Similarly if the provincial government fails to account in a 
satisfactory way to the provincial legislature then this could lead 
to reductions, of budgets in subsequent spending years. These two 
examples of where the account receiver (holder) has power to demand 
account from provincial government relates to all three accountability 
relationships in category D of Table E.1: vertical, horizontal and 
diagonal. It is not easy to separate different types of accountability 
in all instances, for example, at times in this thesis administrative 
and public accountability are explored together.  
 
Exploring them together is due to public managers having to give 
account to bodies such as auditing institutions. Members of the 
parliament then rely on the work performed by auditing institutions 
to determine whether political accountability is attained. It is clear 
from describing the types of accountability that, in all forms, there 
exists an account receiver (holder) and a giver (actor). As a result 
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it is necessary to consider the relationship between the principal 
and agent that is created by the delegation of authority and 
responsibility. For an understanding of accountability some 
researchers make use of the well-known principal-agent model (Mayston, 
2003). In this model the resource owners are seen as the principals 
while employees act as the agent appointed to serve the interest of 
the principal (Mayston, 2003).  
 
The principal has goals and objectives that are delegated, while the 
employee (agent) is expected to achieve them. The principal-agent 
model is discussed in detail later in this chapter in section 2.5 
principal-agent model and accountability. During the process of data 
collection for the thesis, research participants (including those 
playing the roles of both principals and agents) contribute to the 
research on accountability as practitioners. Interviewees give their 
understanding and experience on what is government accountability. 
 
 
